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CONGRESS AND FOREIGN AID: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING, 1961-1975

By

Gale Harrison

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CHAPTER I

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN AID

In 1961 President John F. Kennedy sent a foreign aid message to Congress calling for a new approach to this major aspect of American foreign policy. The decade of the 1960's was to be the "Decade of Development" in which American foreign aid would be revamped administratively and philosophically. New purposes were envisioned, the Agency for International Development was created, and the legislative cornerstone for American aid policy for the next decade and beyond was laid by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The future of this proclaimed pillar of American foreign policy looked bright and hopeful.

Ten years later in October of 1971 the Senate of the United States killed the foreign aid bill which would have authorized continued foreign assistance expenditures. It was a decision that most Senators did not dream would actually materialize. The spirit was one of disillusionment not only with foreign aid in particular but also with American foreign policy decisions, especially those regarding

Indochina. As a temporary compromise the Congress passed a bill to continue funding only until February 22, 1972. During the first half of the 1970's many congressmen have continued to oppose passage of aid legislation and have reluctantly supported extensions of aid authorization. Often the Senate has refused to accept any but temporary resolutions to keep the program--especially the military segment--going.

This study attempts to illuminate the factors which caused this loss of congressional support. It examines changing attitudes towards foreign aid and the changing domestic and international political context within which aid decisions are made. While it concentrates on the period of the 1960's, it also includes analysis of the attitude of Congress toward foreign aid in the 1971-75 period.

The study focuses on both the foreign aid program as a major aspect of American foreign policy and the role of the legislature in U.S. foreign policy-making. The first theme emphasizes congressional perceptions of the substance of foreign aid, focusing on views held by the major congressional policy-making elites. As N.D. Palmer has said, "In spite of extensive studies there is still much uncertainty about the whole foreign aid experience including its essential

rationale, its objectives, etc."¹ In addition, the study analyzes the opinions of congressional leaders on the appropriate means of administering aid, the justifiable restrictions which should be applied to the administration of the aid program, and the criteria which should be applied in giving aid to foreign countries.

Between 1947, when the United States initiated a program of foreign assistance, and 1975 the U.S. officially spent approximately \$173 billion on economic and military aid to foreign nations. The original program was aimed primarily at Western Europe in order to rebuild the economies of those countries ravaged by World War II. In the immediate postwar period the United States also provided aid to the Mediterranean countries of Greece and Turkey in order to stem the spread of Communism in that area. These countries later became key links in the Western mutual defense chain of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the 1970's aid decisions are made in an entirely different political atmosphere and under different circumstances from those of the immediate post-World War II period.

¹N. D. Palmer, "Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: The New Statecraft Reassessed," Orbis, 13 (Fall, 1969): 781.

Therefore, one can assume that the necessity, justifications, and criteria for aid spending should be rethought if foreign aid is to be a realistic aspect of American foreign policy. In fact, such a reevaluation of the aid venture is underway.

In the mid-twentieth century the issue of congressional-executive relations has come under increased scrutiny. Since foreign aid policy is a significant aspect of overall American foreign policy, it is a good program to study in order to analyze the role Congress and its subsystems are perceived as playing in contemporary foreign policy-making. The study of Congress can be extremely important in illuminating one of the prominent current areas of investigation in the field of international relations: "the domestic sources of foreign policy."² Thus the second major theme deals with foreign policy-making procedures and analyzes the views of significant policy-makers, both congressmen and administrators, concerning the role that Congress has played in the foreign aid policy process.

²James N. Rosenau, ed., The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 392.

Congress' role in shaping aid policy is important because from 1947-69 the bulk of the program had to be approved annually by two congressional authorization committees (the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee) and later by both the Senate and House appropriations committees as well. The program not only had to meet the criteria set up by these four committees but also had to clear conference committees at both authorization and appropriations stages and survive several major floor votes. Since 1969, when Congress granted the program two-year authorization, part of the annual congressional routine has been eliminated. But there is still ample opportunity for congressmen to make their views on foreign aid clear to those who implement the program. While much initiation of basic policy has come from the executive branch, clearing the congressional hurdle has absorbed the energies of many administrators, and no funds can be disbursed abroad without the compliance of Congress. Successfully steering the aid legislation through the legislature has become increasing difficult since the mid-1960's.

The fate of aid legislation cannot be fully under-

stood without considering changes which have occurred within the international system and within the domestic political environment. America's involvement in Vietnam and the relationship of Congress and the Executive during the 1960's are important factors in explaining the loss of congressional support. Congress held the aid legislation hostage in an effort to force desired executive action in other areas.

Some Hypotheses

While the following basic hypotheses are explained more fully in later chapters, a brief outline of the major propositions is presented here. One set of hypotheses deals with assumptions and goals of the foreign aid program. First, while the rhetoric of the foreign aid debate has changed, the underlying assumptions of aid policy have remained basically the same. Second, while the ultimate goal--protecting U.S. security through the maintenance of an economically stable and peaceful world environment--has remained the same, the forces which policy-makers have perceived as threatening this security have changed over the past twenty years. Therefore, there have been changes in the strategies of foreign aid policy. Some congressional

groups have changed their perceptions of the primary purpose of assistance. Containing Communism has become less important than economic and political development with political development taking precedence over economic growth during the late 1960's. Since 1971 attempts to encourage economic and political stability have again become major priorities.

This study hypothesizes that the U.S. aid venture has been a confusing enterprise for several reasons. First, foreign aid rhetoric and action have not always been congruent. Second, different congressional groups often have disagreed on the legitimate goals of aid at any given time. Moreover, over time even the same congressional groups have emphasized varying goals. Therefore, it has been difficult to isolate exactly what the U.S. intends to accomplish through provision of foreign aid.

Furthermore, the author expects to find not only intra-congressional but also congressional-bureaucratic disagreements. Obviously, if all congressional subsystems do not agree on basic aspects of the program, the bureaucratic agencies set up to administer aid cannot hope to fully satisfy the demands of all relevant congressional

groups. Failure to operate in keeping with the expectations of some of these groups will likely lead to congressional opposition; on the other hand, the attempt to take into account conflicting views on aid provision will likely lead to a very confusing enterprise. It can be assumed that the administration will view aid primarily in a foreign policy context, while many in Congress will place more emphasis on the link between aid and U.S. economic interests.

If one looks at the congressional votes on foreign aid, legislative support for foreign aid obviously has diminished during the past fifteen years. This study hypothesizes three basic reasons for waning congressional enthusiasm: a worsening U.S. and international economic situation, increasing congressional skepticism as to the effect of the aid program on the international system, and increasing congressional mistrust of executive action, especially in the sphere of foreign affairs. Because of these factors, Congress has consistently lowered the level of funding for aid and has added increasingly restrictive provisions to aid legislation. The relationship of foreign assistance and domestic economic interests has been a

significant factor in determining the support of many congressmen. In addition, the use of aid legislation as a vehicle for release of congressmen's frustration over foreign policy and executive procedures has tended to enmesh aid in a web of controversy which has threatened the program's existence. Congressional groups discontented over various issues of policy and procedure have formed coalitions which have nearly caused the defeat of aid legislation several times in the 1970's.

Throughout the period 1961-75 Congress had made incremental changes in foreign aid policy in order to make it consistent with its own members' perceptions of foreign policy goals. In an attempt to fulfill a policy-modifying role, some congressmen have changed positions from general support of presidential proposals in the early 1960's to policy by legislative fiat in the 1970's. Congress' growing feelings of inefficacy in determining American foreign policy led to this shift in strategy. Unlike some other scholars, however, this author does not view this strategy as cause for alarm or as proof of the irresponsibility of Congress, but rather as exemplifying a healthy attitude of debate over policy and procedure.

In summary, this study analyzes changes in congressmen's perceptions of the foreign assistance program--its goals, methods, administration--during the 1961-75 period. It also explores the primary reasons for these changing perceptions. The study attempts to explain changes in congressional perception of the legislative role in the aid policy process during this period. Finally, the study hypothesizes that Congress has made significant impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign assistance policy by exerting pressure at specific points to induce incremental changes. These changes have affected not only aid administration but also basic aid philosophy. The influence of Congress has been largely beneficial to the legitimate conduct of foreign policy within a democratic society.

Methodology

Opinions of the foreign aid policy process have been gleaned from a variety of sources. A number of valuable scholarly studies of the U.S. assistance program are available. In addition there is a wealth of government material which provides extensive documentation of congressional perceptions of the program. Congressional committee hearings and reports are especially useful.

Congressional Quarterly provides discussion and analysis of congressional behavior. Executive branch documents such as speeches by administrators of the aid program provide insight into administrative perspectives.

Foreign aid is provided through various channels, and different congressional committees oversee the various aspects of the program. For example, the Public Law 480 program of farm surplus aid is handled by the House and Senate agriculture committees. Nevertheless, the foreign assistance bill, which includes the bulk of foreign economic and military aid, is handled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee (formerly titled the House Foreign Affairs Committee), the House Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Appropriations Committee. These committees have primary responsibility for evaluating the purposes and effectiveness of the overall program. Since Congress' work is extremely specialized with committee work constituting the foundation of legislative action, the views of these committee members are most relevant to understanding congressional reaction to the foreign aid package. Edward Duane has heartily recommended an "elite approach," because "the greater structure in the

conceptual content of these leaders' statements is more relevant for the discovery of foreign policy ideologies."³

The year 1961 provides a good beginning point for the analysis because of the announced major shift in the conception of aid policy. The program was to emphasize economic development, especially through the Alliance for Progress in Latin America. The creation of the Agency for International Development institutionalized this new vision of aid. The title provided a striking contrast to the defense connotation of the International Security Agency, which had been formerly charged with implementing Mutual Security Assistance. In 1971 President Richard Nixon proposed another major reshuffle of aid administration, but since the Congress did not completely implement the Nixon program, the 1961 aid legislation has remained the basis of American assistance.

The selection of certain facets of the aid program on which to focus calls for brief explication. First, it is difficult to distinguish precisely discussion of economic

³Edward Duane, "International Behavior: Congress and Inter-American Relations, 1961-1965," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1970), p. 393.

and military assistance when analyzing congressional reaction to the concept and practice of foreign aid. In debate, review, recommendations and reports, the congressional leadership has been concerned with both economic and military aspects of assistance. Since both types of assistance programs have comprised one omnibus bill throughout most of this period, it is preferable to look at congressional reaction to both aspects of the program.

Second, while trying to gauge perceptions of the overall aid effort, it does not seem feasible or desirable to study related programs such as the Export-Import Bank, Asian Development Bank, or Peace Corps. One can infer opinions concerning these aspects of foreign aid from congressmen's comments during the hearings on the foreign aid program in general.

Furthermore, this study focuses on the interaction between the legislative and executive branches of government. Therefore, emphasis has been placed on the testimony of executive department spokesmen during congressional committee hearings. The views of private citizens seem to be of less importance in the policy process and reflect a constituency-legislative linkage which is beyond the scope of this study.

Finally, while the study surveys the period 1961-75, some periods are given special emphasis. The large volume of published material concerning economic and military assistance (the hearings of the four committees alone run approximately 5,000 pages a year) makes difficult an in-depth study of the entire period. Therefore, four years have been singled out for particular scrutiny. They are approximately evenly spaced over the Decade of Development--1962, 1965, 1968, and 1971--and cover four separate sessions of Congress. Thus, the programs concerned are those for fiscal years 1963, 1966, 1969, and 1972. A focus on these years provides a wide range of differing circumstances and different congressional reactions that might affect policy-making.

The year 1962 represents one of the early years of the new economic aid program and provides a fairly accurate picture of long-range congressional concerns with the foreign aid venture. The year 1965 differs in various ways from 1962. President Lyndon Johnson had replaced the late President Kennedy, and there had been institutional shifts within Congress. By 1965 the House Appropriations Committee's role had begun changing, and the Senate was assuming a much

more critical stance toward aid legislation. Nevertheless, 1965 is a year in which Congress was most favorable to administration requests and a year in which one of the smallest cuts in foreign aid expenditures was made by congressional critics.

On the other hand, 1968 is a year in which large congressional cuts were made in foreign aid funding. It also marks a time of increasing congressional--especially Senate--criticism.

The last year readily lends itself for analysis because, while the administration of President Nixon took steps to revamp the aid program, the Senate took the unprecedented step of rejecting authorization for the program. Therefore, 1971 is a year of turmoil, with the Congress forcefully registering its discontent. A focus on these four years highlights the changes in the congressional conception of foreign assistance in recent years.

In an effort to provide a more precise analysis of the changes in congressional views over this period of time, the author undertook a quantitative content analysis of selected portions of the congressional hearings. Briefly, the content analysis was conducted as follows.

The base of information data used was the hearings of each of the four committees mentioned earlier (or subcommittees thereof) for each of the four years, 1962, 1965, 1968, and 1971. The questions asked of executive witnesses provided the source material for the content analysis. This seems appropriate since these questions are initiated by congressmen and should reflect their major concerns with the foreign aid program. As Bhanwari Maheshwari has stated, "congressmen use the hearings to give publicity to their views.

[Hearings] also provide opportunities to both the legislators and the administrators of the program to project their positions in an attempt to influence the outcome of the policy process.⁴

The unit of content analysis used was the "theme." As Bernard Berelson has defined it, ". . . a theme is an assertion about a subject-matter. . . ." ⁵ The unit emphasized a fact or opinion concerning foreign assistance. Generally, each question asked of a witness by a congressman,

⁴Bhanwari Maheshwari, "Foreign Aid and the Policy Process--A Study of the Struggle over Foreign Aid in Congress, 1961-65," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1966).

⁵Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), p. 138.

whether it was a sentence or a two-page paragraph, constituted one theme. Infrequently, one committeeman's question or statement would clearly consist of more than one idea, especially in the case of long statements. In these instances more than one theme was recorded. This type of analysis is more useful than using a single word or even a sentence. The latter is too cumbersome, and the former can be taken out of context too easily.

Most congressional questions about various aspects of the aid program were neutral in opinion. Where the committeemen gave a clearly stated opinion, the coder took this into account. Judgments were made on the basis of the actual meaning of words, and if there was any doubt as to the intent of the speaker, the statement was coded as neutral. Thus while frequency of a particular category indicates an interest in that aspect of the program, it should not automatically be construed to indicate a favorable attitude toward that aspect.

Where hearings were relatively short, the entire content was analyzed. The Senate Appropriations Committee hearings for 1968 are an example. Where hearings ran to several thousand pages (as do those before the Passman sub-

committee in the House), the portions dealing with the overall economic and military programs were analyzed quantitatively, while the portions dealing with each individual geographical area were perused but there was no count made of specific themes. The selected portions give an accurate idea of the interests of the committee, since further reading of the hearings showed similar concerns repeated. In several instances (for example, some of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings) where analyzing just the portion of the hearings dealing with the entire program did not seem adequate, additional material was added to heighten accuracy. Throughout, interrogation of high policy-making officials was emphasized.

Appendix A provides a more detailed discussion of coding rules for the content analysis, a list of the statement categories, and a list of sample statements. The major aspects of aid policy and procedure isolated through such analysis were categorized as follows:

1. Objectives--a statement or question directly concerning the purposes of the program
2. Means--a comment on the specific methods or categories through which aid is disbursed to foreign nations
3. Administration

- a. General administration--a comment on the institutional mechanisms, processes, and personnel for implementing the aid program
 - b. Administration of program--a statement dealing with specific operational concerns about how the program is actually implemented in the field and/or the criteria used to judge a recipient's eligibility
4. Technical--a statement dealing with very specific aspects of administration, indicating an interest in detail
 5. Scope--a comment on the general attitude toward foreign aid expenditures, level of funding, and the geographical distribution of aid programs
 6. U.S. Economy--a comment dealing with the relationship of foreign assistance to the U.S. economic situation
 7. Effect--a comment on the results of U.S. aid, dealing either with the program's success in achieving stated objectives or the actual results of the aid effort
 8. U.S. Foreign and International Policy
 - a. Foreign Policy--a statement which reflects a direct relationship between the U.S. and foreign countries or a concern with the U.S. role in international politics
 - b. International Policy--a statement which, while not directly reflecting U.S. foreign policy stands, deals with particular courses of action taken by various countries, which may have an effect on international politics or indirectly on U.S. foreign policy
 9. Congressional Role--a comment on the part Congress or a segment of Congress should or does play in foreign policy-making, including aid policy formation

Three coders in addition to the author coded a sample of these statements in order to establish the reliability

of the process. Inter-coder reliability ratings were 87%, 70%, and 68%, upholding the legitimate use of the data.⁶

Content analysis provides a more precise indication of areas of major congressional interest and allows comparison of different congressional subsystems' major concerns over a given time period. The study assumes that a large number of statements in a particular category indicates a certain orientation of the particular subsystem.

The use of content analysis has one built-in disadvantage: the possibility that one talkative congressman may so dominate questioning of witnesses as to skew the results of the analysis. One check against this skewing lies in the fact that other documents are used. When the results of content analysis do not seem logically to fit with the committee report or recommendations, this is noted and discussed. Also it is important to remember that when one congressman is in a position to dominate the hearing

⁶Appendix B presents the complete results of the content analysis. Tables indicate the number and percentage of statements within each category by committee for each of the four years highlighted. Tables separate statements made during hearings on economic assistance from those made during hearings on military aid.

process, he is probably also in a position to have significant influence on actual policy. If one member does dominate questioning but does not appear to have significant influence on final output, then it is important to question what role this person does play. For example, he may set forth a position which will later become a majority position or he may be allowed to speak only to add legitimacy to the democratic process.

To add richness to the research base, a semi-structured questionnaire was mailed to all members of the four relevant committees who were serving in Congress in 1972 or who had served on one of these committees within the previous decade. Likewise, information was solicited from committee staff members through the use of a mailed questionnaire distributed in late 1972. A similar questionnaire was sent to selected officials of the Agency for International Development (AID) and the State Department.

Unfortunately, response to the mailed questionnaires was disappointing. Responses from congressmen were so limited that this data was not used in forming conclusions. The published views of congressmen are easily available and probably give an accurate view of congressional opinion.

For example, one prominent senator, while not answering the questionnaire, sent a copy of his committee's current hearings and stated that they gave a valid statement of his views on the subject. Key committee staff members did provide useful information which was taken into account in forming conclusions.

While response to the administrators' questionnaires was less than hoped for (about one-third responded), the results do provide information on which to base cautious conclusions concerning administrative officials' views of Congress' role in the foreign aid policy process. However, one must view the answers not as a definitive indicator of an entire administrative agency's perceptions, but as examples of the way certain important policy-makers view the process.

Certain facts should be emphasized at this point. First, the focus of the study is congressmen's and administrators' perceptions of the role Congress plays. Congressional perceptions may be directly linked to actual behavior, but we cannot assume this automatically. Lewis Dexter has found this to be an important distinction in

his own research on congressional roles.⁷

On the other hand, the importance of the "stated" utterance should not be overlooked either. We need not assume too large a gap between what is said and what is actually occurring. As Duane points out, "This whole argument of real versus stated motives can be largely side-stepped when it is realized that it is the public utterances of legislators and not what their covert attitudes are that often have the largest impact on the making of foreign policy."⁸

In summary, the author has used content analysis of committee hearings to identify rhetoric; perusal of committee reports, hearings, and congressional proceedings to determine congressional attitudes and actions; and the views of relevant policy-makers to provide additional insight into the process of aid decision-making. Combined with scholarly analyses of the issues involved, this evidence provides the basis for conclusions drawn.

⁷Lewis Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (np: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 175-76.

⁸Duane, "International Behavior," p. 68.

CHAPTER II

THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE

In order to analyze the role of Congress in the foreign aid policy process, one must be aware of the legislative history of aid bills. This chapter briefly highlights congressional handling of foreign assistance legislation prior to 1961. It then presents the administration's foreign aid requests throughout the 1961-75 period and the manner in which such requests were handled by the four foreign aid committees and the Congress as a whole.

Table 1 puts recent congressional debate on the foreign aid program into historical perspective by presenting a history of congressional action on aid requests from 1947-1974. Several trends are apparent. First, after a decline in the level of administration requests during the mid-1950's as a result of the effectiveness of the European recovery effort and the end of the Korean War, the level of funding requested of Congress increased in the early 1960's as the Kennedy administration pushed a restructured assistance program. Congressional funding

TABLE 1
 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON FOREIGN AID, 1974-75

FY	Request (billions)	Appropriations	% Cut
1948-49	\$7.37	\$6.45	12.5
50	5.68	4.94	13
51	8.17	7.49	8.3
52	8.50	7.28	14.4
53	7.92	6.00	24.2
54	5.83	4.53	22.3
55	3.48	2.78	20.1
56*	3.27	2.70	17.2
57	4.86	3.77	22.5
58	3.39	2.77	18.3
59	3.95	3.30	16.5
60	4.43	3.23	27.2
61	4.28	3.72	13.1
62	4.78	3.91	18
63	4.96	3.93	20.8
64	4.53	3.00	33.7
65	3.52	3.25	7.6
66	3.46	3.22	7.0
67	3.39	2.94	13.3
68	3.25	2.30	29.4
69	2.92	1.76	39.9
70	2.71	1.81	33.1
71	2.20	1.94	11.8
72	3.09	2.23	27.7
73	3.13	2.23	28.6
74	2.50	1.92	23.4
75	4.19	2.60	39.6

* FY1948-49--1955 figures represent total foreign aid; FY 1956-75 figures represent Title I, which includes most economic and military assistance, but not Foreign Military Credit Sales, Export-Import Bank, Peace Corps, some international contributions, and various emergency and refugee programs.

Source: Congressional Quarterly, 33 (March 15, 1975): 565.

cuts during the early 1960's were similar in magnitude to those of the latter 1950's, indicating that Congress was willing to accept a slightly expanded level of funding during the early part of the Development Decade.

When Congress slashed a third of the proposed funds from the FY1964 bill, the Johnson administration noticeably shivered and cut its request for the following fiscal year by \$1 billion. Presidents continued to trim their aid requests each year thereafter until the FY1972 authorization bill was defeated by the Senate.

The intensity of congressional antagonism to the program had been indicated in FY1969 when congressional funding cuts were at an all-time peak amounting to 40% of the administration's request. In FY1975 the President's request was higher than those of the immediately preceding years, but a funding cut of 39.6% indicated that President Gerald Ford had not been successful in forging a congressional consensus in support of an expanded aid venture.

Table 2 presents total foreign aid as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) in the post-war period.

TABLE 2
FOREIGN AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP
FY 1951-1973

Fiscal Year	GNP (In Billions)	Total Foreign Aid (a)	% of GNP	Total Economic Aid (b)	% of GNP
1951	\$284.8	\$7.5	2.6%	\$2.3	.8%
1956	398.0	2.7	.7%	1.7	.4%
1961	503.7	4.4(c)	.9%	2.6	.5%
1966	684.9	7.1	1.0%	4.8	.7%
1969	864.2	6.8	.8%	3.5	.4%
1972	1,055.5	8.5	.8%	3.9	.4%
1973	1,155.2	8.4	.7%	4.1	.4%

(a) All economic and military aid provided through the foreign Assistance Act, PL 480, military credit sales, and Defense Department transfers of surplus equipment.

(b) All U.S. economic aid, including PL480 program, and contributions to multilateral programs.

(c) Approximate.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, in Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1974, p. 373. U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Oversees Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Annual; Operations Report, and unpublished data, in Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1974, p. 787. Adam Yermonlinsky, The Military Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 114, in David Olson and Philip Meyer, To Keep the Republic (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 524.

Interestingly, if one includes total foreign assistance expenditures through various channels, aid spending in absolute terms has actually risen over the last decade. While Congress has not been totally hostile to the concept of foreign aid, it has been critical of selected aspects and has used the aid legislation as a direct way of registering its criticisms.

If one considers all forms of aid, assistance spending as a percentage of GNP has decreased from the level of the Korean War period but has remained relatively steady in recent years. Total economic aid as a percentage of GNP has also dropped and has remained considerably below the 1% level that many experts on economic development view as a necessary commitment of an industrialized nation. On the other hand, the percentage has remained fairly stable during the late 1960's and early 1970's, even though these years were characterized by intense congressional criticism of the U.S. aid program. Congress appears not so much inclined to abandon the aid venture as to attempt to modify priorities and procedures.

Table 3 presents the annual administration requests and the final authorization and appropriations figures for

TABLE 3
HISTORY OF FOREIGN AID FUNDING, 1961-1975
(in billions)

Fiscal Year	<u>Authorization</u>				<u>Appropriations</u>			
	Request	House	Senate	Final	House	Senate	Final	% Cut
1962	4.8	4.4	4.1	4.3	3.8	4.2	3.9	18%
1963	4.8	4.6	4.7	4.6	3.6	4.4	3.9	18%
1964	4.5	3.5	3.7	3.6	2.8	3.3	3.0	34%
1965	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.3	8%
1966	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.2	7%
1967	3.4	4.1	2.9	3.5	3.0	2.9	2.9	13%
1968	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.2	2.7	2.3	29%
1969	3.0	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.9	1.8	40%
1970	2.7 ¹	2.2	1.9	2.0	1.6	2.2	1.9	30%
							2.6 ²	
1971				1.9	1.7	2.3	1.9	30%
							4.1	
1972	3.1	2.5	2.7		3.0	2.5	2.2	29%
	3.6 ³						3.2	26%
1973 ⁴	3.1				2.9	2.5	2.7	13%
	5.2				4.0	3.5	3.7	29%
1974	5.5	2.8	2.0	2.4	4.8	4.4	4.7 ⁵	15%
	7.0				5.8	5.6	5.8	17%
1975	3.3(m) ⁶	2.66	2.73	2.7				
	4.2(T.I)				2.7	2.5	2.6	38%
	5.9							

TABLE 3--Continued

Fiscal Year	<u>Authorization</u>				<u>Appropriations</u>			
	Request	House	Senate	Final	House	Senate	Final	%Cut
1976 (Ec.)	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	3.1 (T.I) ⁷	3.5		
(Mil.)	3.4	3.5	3.0	3.2				
(Total)	5.8				5.0	5.5	5.2	10%
1977 (Ec.) ⁸	1.5	1.5	1.1	1.5				

¹Appropriations request. Bill provided authorization for FY 1970 and 1971.

²First figure represents Title I of the foreign assistance legislation (most economic and military aid). Second figure represents total aid including related programs such as the Peace Corps. FY 1962-69 figures refer to Title I expenditures only.

³Includes Title I and Foreign Military Credit Sales. If related programs are included, the total request is 4.3. Final appropriation of 3.2 includes total aid funding.

⁴Continuing resolution.

⁵Includes Foreign Military Credit Sales.

⁶Economic aid had been authorized through FY1974 Act; military aid had not been. Second figure represents Title I which does not include Foreign Military Credit Sales. Third figure represents total aid request.

⁷Request was 3.7.

⁸FY1976 Act authorizes economic aid for two years. A final military authorization measure for FY1976-77 was not approved until late spring, 1976 and provides \$6.9 billion for the two-year period.

Source: Congressional Quarterly, Vols. 19-33, 1961-1975, passim.

the years 1961-75.¹ The remainder of this chapter dwells on these years. Controversies over aid policy in the 1960's clearly foreshadowed the congressional antagonism of the 1970's. In this context the 1971 Senate action is not surprising. Major issues accounting for this opposition become apparent upon review of the annual legislative debates.

1961-1965

In 1961, when President Kennedy presented his Foreign Aid Message to Congress, he vowed to bring all aspects of foreign aid into one package and organize it under one umbrella. Despite this promise, all that was actually brought under the roof of the new Agency for International Development was the former International Cooperation Agency and the Development Loan Fund. The administration of U.S. foreign assistance was to remain fragmented.

¹Since this chapter provides only a broad overview of the aid policy process, congressional reaction to specific parts of the program is somewhat blurred. For example, the controversy over the relative importance of economic and military aid is dealt with in Chapter III pp. 98-103. Appendix D provides a table which breaks aid requests and appropriations down into these subcategories.

But in requesting \$4.8 billion for the same purposes the old Mutual Security Act had sought to achieve, the President asked for a new look at the concept and structure of the entire foreign aid package. In essence, he desired

a clear separation between military and non-military portions, with the non-military portions being justified solely to help make a historic demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand in hand (rather than as being essential to combat Communism).²

Two major themes were evident from the President's message. One was an emphasis on economic and political development, illustrated by a significant increase in the amount of development loan funds requested. The new legislation stressed technical cooperation, private investment guarantees, and development grants for aiding the development of human potential.

A second major theme concerned executive branch discretion. Long-term borrowing authority was one of the most controversial aspects of this bill. Kennedy asked for five-year borrowing authority for development lending in order to facilitate long-term planning. In addition,

²Congressional Quarterly (Weekly Reports), 19 (June '2, 1961): 907.

he requested twice the amount previously set aside for the contingency fund, i.e., money for unanticipated political crises. The need for some such fund is obvious to most policy-makers, but the discretion to use such funds, resting in the Executive's hands, has become controversial. The nature and scope of a "political crisis" can differ depending on the viewpoint of the President and his administration, and some congressmen feared misuse of such funds.

Furthermore, in the military assistance portion of the International Peace and Security Act of 1961 the President sought permanent authorization, which would give him more authority to make decisions. Moreover, under the requested legislation the President would have the authority to transfer up to ten percent of funds from account to account. He would also have the authority "to spend 250 million dollars of total aid funds without regard to any provision of either the authorization measure or the subsequent appropriations act."³ It is easy to see that the door was opened wide for a debate over executive discretion. These two themes set the tone for congressional debate

³Ibid., p. 908.

throughout most of the 1960's.

During the first half of the 1960's certain congressional trends were evident. In general from 1961-63 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Senate Appropriations Committee were supportive of foreign aid and favorable to administration requests in this area. Generally, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was more supportive of presidential discretion than the House committee, while the House Foreign Affairs Committee consistently granted a higher level of funding than did its Senate counterpart. On the other hand, the House Appropriations Committee, led by its subcommittee on Foreign Operations, made the most significant cuts in funding foreign aid projects.⁴

In the final 1961 authorization report accepted by both houses, the long-term borrowing authority lost out. Annual appropriations were necessary, but previous loan

⁴Here only congressional committee reactions, as measured by committee recommendations, for example, are noted. In chapter VI a closer analysis of committee structure, organization, and norms provides a more meaningful framework for the understanding of committee attitudes and behavior. Conflicting opinions, committee minority positions, etc. are discussed at that time.

commitments could be made in the "national interest," if the four committees of Congress were notified prior to finalization. However, the conference report also stressed the strong obligation of Congress to follow the President's lead: "It is understood that the conferees regard the language in the bill as authorization for the Executive to make commitments which will be honored by the Congress unless there is evidence of obvious bad management or the other country has failed to meet its responsibilities."⁵

While not all of the cuts made by the House Appropriations Committee in 1961 were accepted by the full House, the funds actually appropriated were, nevertheless, more than one billion dollars less than had been requested by President Kennedy and almost \$600 million less than had been authorized by Congress.

In 1962 President Kennedy requested a cut of \$100 million from final 1961 military assistance appropriations and raised the economic aid request one billion dollars from the previous appropriation. However, while calling for political and social reform within the recipient countries, he also stressed the defense aspect of foreign

⁵Conference Report on authorization, in Congressional Quarterly, 19 (September 1, 1961): 1501.

assistance. On March 14, 1962, he said, ". . . the foreign aid program was just as important as the money spent on national defense and that, in fact, 'over half' of the foreign aid monies requested 'is directly tied to arms assistance which means that it represents an additional appropriation, in a sense, for the Pentagon.'"⁶

In 1963 the Senate took an unusual step and made deep cuts in the Foreign Relations Committee's proposed funding. These cuts were made over the opposition not only of the administration but also of Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the committee. In fact this year saw the strongest attack ever made by the Senate, which had historically been more generous than the House. Opposition also took the form of proposals for more specific congressional oversight. For example, Senator John Sherman Cooper proposed an amendment which would have given the authorizing committees the right to make a country-by-country review of the aid program.

In addition, the House Foreign Affairs Committee cut proposed funding over twice as much as it had before. While overall, the policy of the final committee measure

⁶Congressional Quarterly, 20 (March 16, 1962): 434.

stressed self-help and long-range economic development, more committee amendments of a political nature were being added. In House floor debate even more restrictive amendments were added. But in the conference committee many restrictions on executive discretion were dropped and, in the end, only two of the administration's requests were denied.⁷

While the House Appropriations Committee was most concerned with AID's growing independence from congressional oversight, the Senate Appropriations Committee, as in previous years, granted a greater amount of discretionary power to the President and to the aid agency. Nevertheless, President Johnson complained bitterly about growing legislative restrictions and threatened that if, for example, a new government came to power in Cuba, he would give it aid no matter whether the Congress liked it or not.

The 1963 congressional-executive confrontation ended with a monumental 34% cut in funding. Congressional dissatisfaction was shown graphically by the strategy of pulling the strings on the federal moneybags as tight as Scrooge himself could have done. Ironically, the same year

⁷Congressional Quarterly, 33.

a presidential commission, the Clay Commission, had produced a report calling for increased foreign aid funding.

The administration of President Johnson studied the lesson and rethought its strategy. In 1964, a chastened White House requested a much lower level of funding for foreign aid, labeled a "barebones" request. With this in mind, the Congress gave the bill the easiest sailing it had had in years.

In 1965 the scene of the foreign aid battle shifted. While the authorization bill caused little stir in the House, tension continued to grow in the Senate. While granting long-term authorization for FY1966-67, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called for termination of the foreign aid program as it then stood, with plans for a complete revamp ordered. The present program would end in mid-1967, with the President requested to bring forth new recommendations by the middle of 1966. It is significant that the emphasis was less on the President and his administration's thinking out a new foreign aid concept than on the Congress' role in shaping a new foreign aid outlook.

The appropriations process did not provide the same kind of political battle. The cuts in appropriations were the smallest in history. In the final Senate vote, Fulbright

voted present only, because foreign aid had not been given a new look or a new direction by Congress.⁸

The congressional deadlock in foreign aid was unprecedented. The authorization legislation had been tied up in conference for close to two months. The major stumbling blocks were the problem of long-term authorization and the issue of terminating the program.⁹ The calm of 1964 had been like the eye of the tropical storm.

Even though it seems that President Johnson had made a good faith attempt to meet congressional criticism, turbulence continued to grow in the Senate, which had by now become a more significant battleground than the House appropriations process. By the beginning of the second part of the "Decade of Development" it was clear that the administration would face a tough battle in obtaining congressional clearance for foreign aid.

1966-1971

In 1966, Congressional Quarterly noted radical changes to be made in both the administration and substance

⁸Congressional Quarterly, 23 (October 1, 1965): 1976-77.

⁹Ibid., p. 1632.

of the foreign aid program. Significantly, the impetus for change came from the Congress. While the aid changes might be sponsored by the administration, such changes would be made with one administration eye on Congress--and particularly on Senator Fulbright and his committee.

Because of the controversy in 1965, there was no single administration bill in 1966. This year, the House, as well as the Senate, called for a study of the basic structure of foreign aid. Twenty-five GOP members of the House brought forth a report urging that "the purposes of the aid program should be contained in a firm declaration by the Administration."¹⁰ They were reiterating Senator Fulbright's encouragement of a clearer delineation of foreign aid goals.

The Senate attack was the most vigorous since 1963. However, the final authorization bill backed away from radical changes. It funded most aid programs for one year, although the Alliance for Progress received three-year authorization. In the end there was once again just one omnibus aid bill, and Congress dropped the demand for a thorough and extensive review of the program.

¹⁰Congressional Quarterly, 14 (March 25, 1966): 654.

During the appropriations process the House made almost twice as big a cut in funding as in the previous year, and the Senate Appropriations Committee granted slightly less than the House-passed appropriations measure. On the whole, the requests looked low and the cuts looked high, and this seemed to be a bipartisan effort.

In 1967 three new issues surfaced during congressional debate. First was an adamant attack on the administration's lack of regard for congressional opinion on major policy; second was a basic discontent with "mismanagement" within AID; and last, but not least, was disgust with military aid and arms sales, which were felt by some congressmen to be escalating the arms race.¹¹

Both House and Senate made major cuts in funding from the recommendations handed them by their respective authorizing committees. Furthermore, both houses acted to restrict presidential authority in foreign policy. Fulbright seemed pleased with the policy stands, saying that the action of the conference "approaches more closely the action of the Senate than at any other time since I have handled the foreign aid bill." The administration was not

¹¹Congressional Quarterly, 25 (June 2, 1967): 938.

pleased. President Johnson reiterated that policy restrictions would "seriously inhibit" the aid program.¹²

Controversy over authorization was so intense that the House Appropriations Committee finally began debate on an appropriations measure in order to get the conferees moving on authorization. The money actually appropriated in 1967 was the lowest amount ever, far below the previous low of 1965.

The spokesmen for the administration admitted that the 1968 legislation was drafted with full awareness and concern for legislative opinion. The request for FY1969 was the lowest in history. So was the final appropriations figure. The Congress cut 40% from the President's request--the deepest funding cut in the program's history.

By this time a trend had become apparent: each year the President lowered his aid request and each year the Congress saw fit to provide even less. This year both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the full House cut funding significantly. The committee also added a statement of policy which would create a "new priority in the direction of U.S. economic assistance by focusing attention

¹²Ibid., p. 2379.

directly on the needs and aspirations of the people of the less developed countries."¹³

The tone of the Senate was reflected in the Foreign Relations Committee's report which asserted that what was at issue was not the specific details and whether or not they were right but whether there should be an aid program at all. Fulbright and Mike Mansfield, two key Senate leaders, wanted only temporary authorization.

This time a group on the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed a moratorium on foreign aid. The final conference bill on authorization called for a comprehensive review of the entire foreign aid program, a stand now backed by members in both chambers of Congress.

The 1969 aid legislation made one historic departure from previous measures by granting two-year loan authorization for the entire program. From the beginning of the decade, the executive branch had sought multi-year authorization. From 1961-65 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had supported this concept, which was consistent with its viewpoint that aid was a long-range endeavor. On the other hand, the House Foreign Affairs Committee had consistently

¹³Congressional Quarterly, 28 (November 28, 1969): 2374.

supported one-year authorization for two basic reasons. First, since at that time the committee viewed the program in more short-term political perspective, foreign policy considerations might warrant changes in aid policy. Second, since the aid program has been such an important part of the committee's work, the idea of removing the bill from committee jurisdiction met concerted opposition.

In 1965 the Johnson administration had considered the issue so explosive it had not even requested such authority. But in 1966 a shift had taken place, with the House committee granting long-term authorization in keeping with its shift toward emphasizing long-term developmental goals. The Senate, on the other hand, had not. As the Senate committee became more skeptical of the way the program was being handled, it viewed its own direct and continual oversight as absolutely necessary. Thus, through the 1965-68 period, there had been little congressional support for long-term authorization.

While Congress supported such authorization in 1969, its reasoning was different from that originally put forward in support of the concept. No longer was it to allow the Executive more discretion in long-term planning

as much as to facilitate more intensive congressional study of the entire program. The members of the authorization committees felt that if they were freed from the burden of annual aid bills, they would have more time to devote to thoroughly analyzing the purposes, methods, and administration of foreign aid. Therefore, action this year was based on Congress' desire to have a greater part in policy-making.

But if the authorization process in 1969 reflected disillusionment, it was nothing compared to the appropriations process. The aid controversy had become so intense that only a supplemental appropriations bill at FY1969 levels received approval. Finally in late January, 1970, the conferees on appropriations worked out a compromise for FY1970, which had begun seven months earlier. The House floor vote showed aid surviving by a narrow margin of 200-195.

In 1970 the Peterson Committee Report was submitted to President Nixon. This was the work of a private commission whose creation was inspired by the 1968 foreign aid legislation which had called for a thorough study of the program. The study group was composed of members of

the private sector and chaired by Rudolph A. Peterson, who was former president of the Bank of America. The primary recommendations of the Peterson Task Force were separation of military and economic aid, multi-year authorization, a greater shift to relying primarily on multilateral lending institutions, and the stimulation of private investment. The report also urged greater guidance by the State Department over military assistance programs. It should be noted that these recommendations were not strikingly different from those emphasized by President Kennedy almost ten years earlier. The mood of the Task Force Report exemplified an optimism not reinforced in Congress though, for while the Commission called for greater spending for foreign aid, the Congress seemed to be increasingly skeptical and oriented toward domestic issues.

In April of 1971, Nixon announced a new concept in foreign aid. It was the first major revision that had occurred since the creation of the Agency for International Development in 1961. First, economic development assistance and security assistance would be separated. Each would be separately organized through the International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act and the International

Security Assistance Act. Two new corporations would be set up to replace AID in handling economic aid--the U.S. International Development Corporation and the U.S. International Development Institute. These would supplement the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Inter-American Social Development Institute, set up in 1970. While the Department of Defense would handle the major implementation of the military assistance program, the overall decisions would be coordinated under a new official for Security Assistance to be housed in the State Department. Thus, ultimate authority would lie in the foreign policy-making apparatus. The private sector would be emphasized to an unprecedented degree.

The emphasis, according to Nixon, would be on long-term economic development and on the work of international agencies, not on short-term political considerations. The purposes for which the aid program would be conducted were (1) to "strengthen the defense capability and economies of our friends and allies"; (2) to ". . . assist the lower income countries in their efforts to achieve economic and social development"; and (3) for humanitarian reasons.¹⁴

¹⁴Congressional Quarterly, 29 (April 30, 1971): 998.

For FY1972 the House approved over a billion dollars more than that granted for the same kind of programs in FY1971. However, it made no decision on overall reorganization, granting only an extension of existing two-year authorization for the old program. The Foreign Affairs Committee had recommended this, since it did not feel that Congress had been given sufficient time to consider and fully debate a new approach to the whole program. Morgan seemed unusually critical of the President's delay in sending his recommendations to Congress. Congress had called for a review to be ready by March, 1970, and yet the President had not made his proposals known until April, 1971.

While the House had authorized more than the President had asked, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee dealt only with economic assistance (in this area granting more than the House had authorized). It intended to grant separate authorization for military aid later. The final bill was reported out 11-5. The five who voted against were an impressive political group--Fulbright, committee chairman, Mansfield, Senate Majority Leader, Frank Church, long-time friend of foreign aid, Stuart Symington, and William Spong.

After committee approval, the aid bill died on the floor of the Senate chamber on October 29 by a vote of 27-41. The vote was unprecedented, and some senators had already left before the final tabulation of the votes, not realizing what had just taken place.

For many people the news in 1971 that the Senate had "killed" foreign aid came as a bombshell. It was unthinkable that a group of responsible American senators could just shelve a major portion of the President's foreign policy program, for President Nixon had made it clear that foreign aid was an integral part of his foreign policy strategy. It was to be the key to American disengagement from world conflict, the key to the Nixon Doctrine. The President's reaction was swift and highly critical. "President Nixon feels this vote by the Senate is a highly irresponsible action which undoes 25 years of constructive bipartisan foreign policy and produces unacceptable risks to the national security. . . ."15

Obviously, the seeds of discord had been growing over the decade, and actually the end result should not have come as such a shock. In general terms the problems

¹⁵Ibid., p. 2259.

of 1971 were clear. First, the Senate was dissatisfied with basics, not peripheral issues. The question was no longer whether or not money was being spent economically, but what were the basic implications of our entire foreign aid system. At issue were the primary objectives of the aid program, the means through which aid was being dispensed abroad and the types of programs being funded. Senators did not believe that as aid was being administered it would accomplish desirable objectives. Furthermore, they were questioning what they perceived as the priority granted to military over economic aid, bilateral over multilateral aid, and large capital outlays over technical assistance. In addition, the proper level of foreign aid was tied to debate over the appropriate level of American commitments abroad. Aid debate could not be divorced from debate over Vietnam. Exactly what America was attempting to do through its foreign policy and the relationship of the aid program to these objectives were issues of central importance.

Also the restoration of what the Senate considered a proper relationship between the two political branches of government was at the heart of the matter. Running throughout the congressional debate was the theme of undue

presidential influence, power, and discretion.

In the early 1960's congressional groups of entirely different political persuasions had formed a coalition supporting aid legislation. By 1971 the political factors necessary to sustain that coalition had deteriorated.

The Senate defeated the foreign aid legislation in 1971 because of a merging of groups who opposed the aid program, often for entirely different reasons. What emerged was temporary aid funding (until February 22, 1972), with congressmen giving the sign that in the future they would take a firmer, more aggressive hand in reshaping American aid policy. The funding approved finally, and with much labor pain, was \$3,213,604,000, approximately one-half of the \$6-7 billion approved annually by Congress during the first years of the aid venture in the late 1940's and early 1950's.

Beyond the Decade of Development

The congressional history of foreign aid legislation in the 1970's has been fraught with conflict and indecision; in fact, since 1971, the program has survived on a hand-to-mouth basis. In 1972 Fulbright withdrew even the minimum support he had displayed in previous years, and second

ranking Democrat John Sparkman directed the floor fight for foreign aid. In the end the Senate rejected the military aid bill, accepting only a continuing resolution to keep the program going.

In 1973 the House Foreign Affairs Committee, consistently one of the most supportive congressional forces for aid, joined the Senate in calling for a major restructuring of the entire program. The major emphasis would be on the "mutuality" or reciprocal benefit to be gained by both the U.S. as donor and the recipient nations, and the name of the FY1974 Act was changed to the Mutual Development and Cooperation Act to reflect this emphasis. The House voted by a narrow margin of 188-183 to authorize economic aid for FY1974 and '75, but approved military assistance only for FY1974. The Senate passed the foreign aid bill by 54-42, but the legislation provided for the lowest level of economic aid ever voted by the upper chamber.

In contrast, the appropriations process produced the largest sum of money appropriated for foreign aid since the Korean War (1953--six billion dollars), with the House's accepting its appropriations committee's recommendation of \$5.8 billion. The significant difference between the funds authorized and those appropriated is explained by the fact

that the latter figure reflects \$2.2 billion specifically earmarked for Israel, an appropriation overwhelmingly supported by the House of Representatives. Actually, President Nixon had asked for almost seven billion dollars, and he received approximately a one billion dollar budget cut within the House appropriations process.

The FY1975 aid bill met intense congressional opposition. At the end of the 93rd Congress in 1974, a supplemental appropriations measure became the center of turmoil over military aid to Turkey. Fearful that the actual foreign aid legislation might become hopelessly bogged down, as it did, the senators added significant restrictions to the otherwise noncontroversial funding bill. The key clause provided for a 30% cut in foreign aid funds for November, 1974, and a 10% reduction in aid each month thereafter. The result would have been radical reductions in the aid program, but the conference with the House did not sustain such drastic measures. The compromise was clearly a win for the administration.

Interestingly, the political forces in this debate shifted positions somewhat from those of previous years. During the fray the Senate became the force supporting greater presidential discretion. On the other hand, the

most intransigent congressional force was the House of Representatives, led by liberal members of the House International Relations Committee. Their demand for a fixed termination date for Turkish aid if substantial progress toward a political solution were not reached appeared unopen to compromise. Congress finally did accept a compromise which delayed for a short time the automatic termination date but left the main substance of the House version intact.¹⁶

The FY1975 foreign aid bill itself was not funded until nine months after the beginning of the fiscal year on July 1, 1974. Congress cut 39.6% from Title I of the presidential request, the second largest appropriations cut in the history of the program.

During this period there has been no major revamping of the program due to delaying tactics within both the Congress and the executive branch. Some critics have accused President Ford of delaying because of fear of the Congress' mood concerning foreign affairs. On the other

¹⁶In May, 1975 the Senate partially lifted the ban, but it did so by a vote of 41-40. Nonetheless, the embargo remained since the House did not take similar action. Later the House did remove the restriction.

hand, many congressmen have refused any long-term commitment to the program because of their dissatisfaction with basic aspects of it. In 1974, in one of his last stands as a senator, Fulbright sought to kill the entire foreign aid effort. This unsuccessful move was a desperate attempt to force the Congress to take decisive action on basic issues such as provision of aid to oppressive political systems and continued reliance on bilateral mechanisms for dispensing assistance.

Before its eventual passage, the FY1975 aid legislation had been recommitted to the Foreign Relations Committee. It had become such a "hodge-podge," as Senator John Pastore termed it, that congressional opposition threatened to completely obliterate the program. Pastore's motion for recommitment, which passed by two votes, reflected an attempt to salvage the aid venture from the political quagmire. But there was little indication that aid had found a base of fairly permanent political support within the Congress.

Several conclusions are evident from this legislative history. First, a program which commanded congressional support in the early 1960's was barely

surviving a decade later. Second, administration attempts to appease Congress by submission of reduced budget requests have proved unsuccessful in curbing legislative opposition. Third, aid debate has been a part of a much broader policy debate involving a reevaluation of American international responsibility. Fourth, relevant congressional subsystems have shifted both policy positions and attitudes toward the Executive's role in foreign policy-making. For example, during the early 1970's the Senate became a greater obstacle to passage of foreign aid legislation than the House as a result of shifting perceptions and attitudes. The following chapters attempt to explain these developments by analyzing in depth changing congressional perceptions of specific aspects of aid policy and of proper congressional-executive relations.

CHAPTER III

THE RATIONALE FOR U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The basic rationale for U.S. foreign aid has remained essentially the same since the beginning of the program in 1947. This rationale appears to be as follows: the security of the United States will be most adequately protected by the encouragement of a peaceful international milieu composed of economically viable and independent nations. Fostering such an international atmosphere has been the major objective of United States foreign assistance. The basic policy assumption remained that "economic stability and the maintenance of peace are interconnected,"¹ and this assumption still provides the foundation for much policy planning in 1976.

While there was much fanfare surrounding President Kennedy's Foreign Aid Message of 1961, in actuality the theme he enunciated did not differ significantly from the justification for the Truman Point Four Proposal. In 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson spoke in favor of the aid

¹David Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 45-46.

proposal because economic development was a means of ensuring national security.

And as a security measure, it is an essential arm of our foreign policy. For our military and economic security is vitally dependent on the economic security of other peoples.²

In 1961 Kennedy set forth the goal of "an enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant nations," and stated that "our new aid policy aims at strengthening the political and economic independence of developing countries."³

In an address on March 17, 1975, President Ford phrased the same general theme in these words: "This freedom, security and prosperity of the United States are best sustained in a community of free, secure and prospering nations."⁴

Yet defining the day-to-day operational objectives of the program has created a much more thorny problem. How does one nation attempt to ensure a world "community

²Dean Acheson, "Aid to Underdeveloped Areas as a Measure of National Security," Department of State Bulletin, 22, No. 562 (April 10, 1950): 552-55, in Baldwin, Foreign Aid, p. 64.

³Robert Packenham, "Foreign Aid and Political Development," Ph.D. dissertation (Yale University, 1966): pp. 158-59.

⁴Congressional Quarterly, 33 (March 22, 1975): 604.

of free, secure, and prospering nations?" The threats to such an international system have been perceived differently by different observers throughout the history of the aid program. Therefore, at a less ideal and more operational level exactly how aid will be used to best protect the national interest of the United States is a very controversial issue with different congressional groups encouraging different approaches. At this level the purposes of foreign aid and the criteria for becoming and remaining an aid recipient have changed significantly over the past fifteen years and even more radically over the entire history of the aid venture. Changes during the period since 1961 are most significant for the purposes of this study, however.

The Background

It is impossible to speak of congressional perceptions of the foreign assistance program without first reviewing briefly how the aid effort has developed historically. American foreign assistance began in 1947 with provision of aid to Turkey and Greece for the specific purpose of preventing a Communist takeover of the governments of these nations. United States aid was set up on a

pragmatic basis to deal with such threats to U.S. national security. The European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, began in 1948, and also had a specific purpose: the economic reconstruction of industrialized European society in the postwar period.

It was not long before United States aid programs had been expanded to include Asian nations. David Baldwin notes that by the time of the Korean conflict the foreign aid program had taken on a clear national security orientation.

As the foreign assistance program blossomed throughout the 1950's, the major emphasis was in keeping with the era of Cold War competition. American foreign policy was based, in general, on the American fear of a Communist threat to American national security. Throughout most of the decade the foreign assistance program was used as a military and political weapon: a military weapon to stop Communist aggression and a short-term political weapon to keep Communist governments from gaining power and to induce nations to stay out of the Communist sphere of influence.

By the latter 1950's the beginning of a shift in the conception--or at least the strategy--of foreign

assistance was becoming evident. In his 1961 Foreign Aid Message to Congress, Kennedy stressed the economic development of the underdeveloped world; "Communism" per se was not mentioned. Actually, he saw aid as both promoting a higher standard of living within the underdeveloped countries and combatting Communism, and he deliberately blurred the distinction in order to win congressional acceptance of the program.⁵ Nevertheless, his emphasis suggested that the prior Cold War conception of aid as a sword to be used against the scourge of Communism would be, if not eliminated, at least significantly played down and eventually played out.

Much debate has occurred over exactly how much the objectives of American foreign aid were really changed by this new dialogue of the 1960's. While Andrew Westwood speaks of Kennedy's shift in rhetoric, he does not think that a shift in behavior followed. Robert Packenham, on the other hand, asserts that the focus of Kennedy's 1961 aid message should not be underestimated. The doctrines he espoused did not come about automatically, and according to Packenham, the introduction of phrases advocating economic

⁵Herbert Feis, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 65.

and political development into the rhetoric of foreign aid debate in the early 1960's signaled a major redirection of aid policy.⁶

The debate over the rationale for American foreign aid continues as it has since the 1940's. Several respected scholars have decried the lack of any political rationale for U.S. assistance. They argue that it is not clear that stimulating economic development is really in the long-term political interest of the United States. Hans Morgenthau argues that economic development criteria as a prerequisite for aid have often kept American aid experts from taking political advantage of the assistance program. This allows the Soviets to take over aid projects and gain political benefit.⁷

Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger agrees that the major purpose of aid should be support of

⁶Andrew Westward, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1966).
Pakenham, "Foreign Aid," p. 159.

⁷Hans J. Morgenthau, "Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American Political Science Review (June, 1962), cited in Edward Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 31-32.

the political objectives of U.S. foreign policy. Like Morgenthau, he does not believe that this has occurred in either the 1950's or 1960's. Rather he believes that the actual administration of aid under both Eisenhower and Kennedy was to provide aid according to whether or not nations could absorb it to increase economic productivity, without regard to the ultimate political consequences for the U.S.⁸ Some analysts then have questioned the basic value of the economic development emphasis.

Michael O'Leary has said, "There is a truly remarkable gap between the potential of foreign aid, the practice of foreign aid, and the rhetoric with which aid is discussed."⁹ More accurately stated, the practice of foreign aid has been consistent with the rhetoric of some political groups and inconsistent with that of others. This study attempts to more precisely determine distinctions in rhetoric and in behavior among different political actors.

⁸James R. Schlesinger, "Strategic Leverage from Aid and Trade," in National Security: Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead, eds. David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 691, 693.

⁹Michael Kent O'Leary, The Politics of American Foreign Aid (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), pp. 133-34.

The Decade of Development: Some Hypotheses

Most congressmen agree that more than one purpose is served by foreign assistance, but what these purposes are has created considerable controversy. Westwood has said, "The United States has tried to do many different things with aid in many underdeveloped countries, and the result has been an uncertain, confusing, and controversial enterprise."¹⁰

Although the ultimate rationale for aid has not changed, this study examines the hypothesis that Congress' perceptions of appropriate strategies for foreign aid provision have changed significantly during the 1961-75 period. By the late 1960's Congress appeared to have formed a consensus that aid was a long-term endeavor and not a short-term weapon. The debate on the priority to be given economic development versus fighting Communism as the major goal of the assistance effort was being superseded by congressional debate over the priority to be placed on political development, or the encouragement of self-governing political institutions with emphasis on bureaucratic competence and popular participation. In the early

¹⁰Westwood, Foreign Aid, p. 1.

1970's congressional debate focused on a reevaluation of the meaning of "national security," resulting in the call for a redirection of aid policy toward a nonmilitaristic concept. While members of both houses of Congress vigorously attacked the strategy of using military aid to influence international political relationships, proponents of economic assistance appeared to be increasingly consolidating a congressional consensus.

On the other hand, by the mid-1970's Congress as well as the executive branch reaffirmed the legitimate use of aid for short-term purposes. Actually, despite rhetoric to the contrary Congress has consistently supported the use of aid as a short-term political tool to further American interests. However, the interests pursued have changed significantly. In the early 1960's major interests were keeping foreign countries out of the Communist sphere of influence and protecting the business investments of U.S. citizens. In the 1970's major interests have been protection of the American people's welfare, viewed in non-military and sometimes non-economic terms, and encouraging peaceful settlement of disputes.

Changing perceptions of threats to the world order sought by the United States have largely accounted for

these shifts in strategy. There have been modifications in the strategy for pursuing long-term political goals when currently employed techniques have been perceived as ineffective in achieving desired goals.

The study attempts to show that part of the confusion engendered by the foreign aid venture has been due to the fact that congressional rhetoric and action have sometimes been inconsistent. Furthermore, perceptions of the primary goals of aid have differed among congressional groups, leaving the executive branch considerable discretion in policy and implementation.

A content analysis of portions of the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee makes clear that congressmen have indeed viewed the program as designed to further a wide variety of goals. For example, during hearings by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1968 no less than seventeen different reasons were given for the American economic aid program. The major task is to bring some order from such anarchy and find if there have been key goals which Congress has sought to emphasize and a coherent rationale for granting assistance.

For analytical purposes possible aid objectives have been delineated below. Some are straightforward and in most cases the exact words were used by the speaker. In other categories various phrases could signify a particular objective. The types of phrases which indicate a certain objective are provided in the following listing.

Categories of Aid Objectives

1. Economic development--includes statements concerning economic growth, sustaining viable independent nations and economies, and self-sustaining status when economic self-reliance is obviously indicated.
2. Political development--includes statements concerning fostering democratic processes, building self-governing institutions, fostering social and community development, and fostering local political participation.
3. Fight Communism--includes statements concerning building political support for governments in order to stop Communism, "Free World" defense, balancing Soviet arms in an area, freeing people from subjugation, giving aid to keep Communists from giving aid, keeping a pro-Western influence, buttressing a pro-Western ally.
4. Foreign Policy Political--includes statements concerning winning and keeping friends and allies, quid pro quo political arrangements, short-term political crisis aid, U.S. foreign policy objectives, short-term political objectives, and keeping political influence with recipient.
5. U.S. Interest/U.S. Security--includes U.S. military security, U.S. defense security, U.S. and allies' security, mutual security of U.S. and allies, U.S. and recipient's security.

6. Promote independence
7. Peace
8. Humanitarianism
9. U.S. economic benefit
10. Stability--includes economic and political stability
11. Recipient's military security
12. Internal security--includes statements concerning counter-insurgency

By analyzing the language in which congressmen discuss foreign aid, one can gain insight into the purposes for which officials perceive aid is, or should be, used.

The Decade of Development: The Early Years

During the early 1960's the major congressional debate over the objectives of foreign economic aid centered on the priority to be given economic development as opposed to fighting and containing Communism. For Kennedy the primary task of the "Development Decade" was to be the nurturing of self-governing and independent nations through the encouragement of economic development within recipient nations.

But it is certainly not at all clear that either congressional or administrative policy-making elites have

conceived of the major goal of United States aid as building viable economies. Foreign aid has been criticized when it has not achieved other goals such as anti-Communism, military alliances, liberal democracy, or pro-Americanism, along with "development."¹¹ Karl Von Vorys' content analysis of congressional speeches during the 1963-64 debates uncovered at least six different goals which the legislators perceived as being served by foreign aid. The goals most often mentioned were: (1) promoting the United States national security; (2) countering the Communist threat; (3) stimulating economic development; (4) developing friendship for the United States; (5) advancing the security and welfare of the Free World; and (6) implementing United States foreign policy.¹²

Studies have indicated that the economic development argument was received much more favorably by the Senate, and especially the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, than

¹¹O'Leary, The Politics of Aid, pp. 132-33.

¹²Karl Von Vorys, The Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid, Research Monograph Series #11 (University of Pennsylvania: Foreign Policy Research Institute, August, 1967), p. 304.

Edward Mason states that "the debates in Congress would indicate that mutual security is and should be the prime concern of our foreign assistance program." Mason, Foreign Aid, pp. 107 and 33.

by members of the House of Representatives. At least administrative policy-makers believed that the House was much more influenced by standard Cold War arguments. Content analysis indicates that there were differences in perception of economic aid goals among various congressional groups. During the committee hearings and the floor debate forces within both the House and the Senate paid lip service to the anti-Communism crusade, while forces within both chambers also encouraged pursuing the goal of economic development of underdeveloped nations. Table 4 provides a comparison of four congressional committees' perceptions of economic aid goals during the first part of the decade.

Throughout the Decade of Development a majority on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has consistently placed major emphasis on economic development, which seemed to be linked with the recipient's potential international viability. Committee members have perceived the economic aid program as designed to further long-range objectives, and committee actions have generally been in keeping with this viewpoint. For example, in 1962 the committee granted three-year authorization for the Alliance for Progress program. This would allow long-term planning for development

TABLE 4*

COMPARISON OF COMMITTEE PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES
1962

<u>Objective</u>	<u>Committee</u>			
	SFRC**	HFAC	HAC	SAC
Economic Development	33%(8)	27%(4)	12%(2)	37.5%(3)
Political Development	22%(5)		6%(1)	
Fight Communism		13%(2)	12%(2)	50%(4)
Foreign Policy Political	22%(5)	20%(3)	24%(4)	12.5%(1)
U.S. Interest/Security	4%(1)	20%(3)	18%(3)	
Promote Independence				
Peace	4%(1)			
Humanitarianism				
U.S. Economic Benefit	13%(3)	12%(2)	12%(2)	12%(2)
Stability			6%(1)	
Total***	98%(23)	92%(14)	90%(15)	100%(8)

TABLE 4--Continued

*Tables in chapters three, four, and Appendix C represent findings from the content analysis of committee hearings. Details concerning the various categories are provided in Appendix A, and a master table compiling all findings appears in Appendix B.

** SFRC--Senate Foreign Relations Committee
HFAC--House Foreign Affairs Committee
HAC--House Appropriations Committee
SAC--Senate Appropriations Committee

*** In some cases figures do not total 100% and numbers in parentheses do not coincide with numbers given in the master table. Sometimes a congressman would speak of the objectives of foreign aid without specifying a particular objective. These statements are categorized as "objectives" but do not appear in the tables in this chapter. An objective mentioned only once in discussion in any committee has also been omitted as insignificant to the discussion. In other cases during hearings on economic assistance, an objective of military assistance would be mentioned, or vice-versa. Since these objectives do not directly apply to the aspect of the program under consideration, they are omitted from relevant tables. Rounding makes total percentages slightly above or below 100%.

projects and indicates that the committee did not expect aid to be used for short-run political purposes. The committee has stressed that the encouragement of political development should go along with the encouragement of economic development. Discussion of these two goals accounts for over one half of all objectives mentioned during committee hearings in 1962.

At issue was the political stance of a potential aid recipient. While there was some support for granting aid only to those states which had taken foreign policy stands in America's favor, the view of the majority on the committee was that aid should be granted on a broad basis with minimum regard for the present ideological bent of the recipient.

Moreover, the committee opposed providing aid in order to keep a nation from coming under Soviet influence. Chairman J. William Fulbright even suggested that the United States should be glad the Soviets were giving aid to developing countries if it furthered their economic growth.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee emphasized economic, social, and political progress with the under-

standing that promoting long-term development was the most effective weapon to combat Communism. This point of view was completely compatible with President Kennedy's view, which helps explain the committee's favorable reaction to the administration's aid proposals during this time.

Content analysis of House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings in 1962 reveals a greater degree of conflict concerning the goals of economic aid. Like its Senate counterpart, the committee granted a plurality of its attention to economic and social development. But if the categories of "fighting Communism" and "short term foreign policy goals" (e.g. winning or keeping friends) are collapsed, discussion of these goals was as frequent as discussion of economic development. The committee report illustrated the committee's point of view by placing most emphasis on the use of aid as a direct political weapon against the Soviet threat: "the foreign aid program provides a means to strengthen nations which join together to oppose Soviet aggression, to give assurance of friendship and support to newly independent nations and to accentuate the disadvantage of following Soviet leadership."¹³ Certain members indicated that the goal

¹³Congressional Quarterly, 20 (June 15, 1962): 1030.

of economic development could perhaps conflict with the goal of security from the Communist threat. House Foreign Affairs Committee members spoke of economic and social development; however, they did not grant the President the long-term authorization he sought.

The distinction between rhetoric and actual policy action is highlighted in this period of the foreign aid debate. Through their recommendations the authorization committees tended to support President Kennedy's developmental emphasis. The 1962 conference report stressed economic self-help criteria, long-range planning, and technical feasibility and played down the "political" aspect of foreign aid.

But despite the rhetoric both committees sponsored aid amendments whose purpose was to change the immediate political stands of recipients.¹⁴

The House Foreign Affairs Committee not only

¹⁴For example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by a very narrow margin of 9-7, limited aid to India to the amount committed the previous year. This action was taken in light of the committee's concern with India's political actions; Indian Defense Minister Krishna Menon's attitude in the United Nations, India's invasion of Goa, and India's refusal to negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan were all factors in the committee's decision.

supported restrictions against Communist nations but, beginning in 1963, placed restrictions on selected countries outside of the Sino-Soviet orbit.¹⁵ Such actions indicated that in order to remain a recipient in good standing, a country would have to be willing to meet not only economic criteria but also certain political criteria, especially in its dealings with other nations within the international system.

The appropriations process in 1962 did not elicit nearly as much discussion of aid objectives, but committee spokesmen in the House and the Senate emphasized the threat of Communism. While the House Appropriations subcommittee on Foreign Operations has never paid very much attention to the objectives of foreign assistance, what discussion has occurred has primarily emphasized the potential of economic aid to influence the political behavior of recipient nations. In 1962 the committee was critical of the Kennedy administration for proposing increased aid both to "neutral nations" which criticized America and to six Latin American nations that did not agree with our Cuban

¹⁵For example, the committee cut aid to Indonesia because of aggressive actions toward Malaysia, an amendment to which the AID agency was very opposed.

policy. The prevalent view of the committee stressed the short-term political use of economic aid to fight Communism. Even though there was considerable concern within the Senate Appropriations Committee that aid was not being effective in combatting the Communist threat, committeemen's rhetoric indicates the belief that supporting the free world from Communism should be a major priority of American assistance.¹⁶

Nevertheless, throughout the period of the early 1960's, the committee worked to restore funds for development loans which the House committee had worked diligently to delete from the legislation. Therefore, through its actions the committee worked to further the developmental emphasis of the administration's bill, although the rhetoric within the appropriations process still clearly reflected the Cold War philosophy.

By the mid-1960's some perceptible changes were occurring in the rhetoric of the congressional foreign aid debate. Most notable was the increased attention

¹⁶In 1962 this goal accounts for fifty percent of the committee's goal statements. Three-fourths of the "fight Communism" statements were favorable to this goal.

being given to the goal of democratic political development, especially within the House Foreign Affairs Committee. While this goal had not been mentioned at all by House committee members during questioning in 1962, in 1965 it accounts for twenty percent of the statements regarding the purposes of economic assistance. (See Table 5) While the interest in a short-term Cold War strategy was still there, it was not as prevalent.¹⁷

¹⁷AID Director David Bell's 1964 call for a more vigorous effort on this front was actively encouraged the following year by Representative Donald Fraser. Although the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 called for the linking of economic growth and political democracy, Representative Fraser called political development, or the "fostering, stimulating and guidance of fundamental social structures and behaviors that make effective self-government possible, . . . the missing dimension in American policy toward the developing nations." About the same time a caucus of twenty-five Republican House members, led by Representative Bradford Morse, recommended greater stress be placed on bureaucratic efficiency and involvement of the ordinary citizen in the development process.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee gave active expression to its increasing concern with political development in the 1966 Foreign Assistance Act. It sponsored a new section to the Act, Title IX, which was later ratified by both House and Senate. Title IX dealt with the "utilization of democratic institutions in development" and read as follows:

In carrying out the programs authorized . . . emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the

TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF COMMITTEE PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES
1965

<u>Objective</u>	<u>Committee</u>			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
Economic Development	43%(6)	10%(3)	43%(3)	
Political Development		20%(6)		
Fight Communism	7%(1)	17%(5)		57%(4)
Foreign Policy Political		23%(7)	43%(3)	14%(1)
U.S. Interest/Security	14%(2)	20%(6)		14%(1)
Promote Independence	28%(4)	3%(1)		
Peace	7%(1)	3%(1)	14%(1)	
Humanitarianism				
U.S. Economic Benefit		3%(1)		14%(1)
Stability				
Total	99%(14)	99%(30)	100%(7)	99%(7)

During the mid-1960's the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sought to foster a more clearly defined approach to aid by introducing a plan which would place all foreign aid into four categories in light of the purpose to be served by each type: (1) humanitarian; (2) military; (3) political (short-term political considerations); and (4) development assistance. Most attention was given to the last category, under which aid would be granted to countries in which economic self-help and political development criteria were met. Both authorization committees sought to ensure that recipients were moving in the desired direction

encouragement of democratic private
and local governmental institutions.

Congress also instructed the Executive that in the future, when granting development loans and technical assistance, it should take into account "the degree to which the recipient country is making progress toward respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression and of the press, and recognition of the importance of individual freedom, initiative and private enterprise."

Congressional Record, July 13, 1966, pp. 14765-14767, quoted in Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 143.

Speech by the Hon. Don M. Fraser, U.S., Cong., reprinted in the Congressional Record, July 13, 1966, p. 14765, quoted in Nelson, Aid and Influence, p. 129.

Quoted in Nelson, Aid and Influence, p. 144.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, Sect. 102 (a) (1) and 103 (a) (1), amending Sect. 201 (b) and 211 of the Act, quoted in Nelson, Aid and Influence, p. 144.

politically while not requiring any firm commitment to a certain foreign policy stand.

The appropriations process still provided the main verbal opposition to foreign economic aid. Here the priority to be given economic development as opposed to short-term political considerations and fighting the Communist menace was more controversial.

In 1965 there was an interesting contradiction within the Senate Appropriations Committee. Although economic growth and stability received emphasis in the official committee report, in the hearings economic development or stability were never mentioned at all. Over 50% of the statements which dealt with objectives emphasized stopping Communism as the primary purpose of economic assistance.

In the House Appropriations subcommittee debate in 1965, members discussed the specific political goal of winning friends about equally with the economic goal of development. But the committee had stated in its majority report of 1964 that economic and political development were of great importance. Throughout the rhetoric of the congressional debate there was increasing consensus that the aid program was a long-term endeavor where fostering

economic growth and encouraging self-governing political institutions must be given priority over short-term political and military considerations. Nevertheless, economic aid continued to receive larger appropriations cuts than military aid. Rhetoric and action still showed inconsistencies. House action especially indicated that President Kennedy had been unsuccessful in mobilizing a congressional consensus on the value of economic development.¹⁸

The Decade of Development: The Later Years

By the latter 1960's the Congress increasingly turned its attention to the military aspects of the assistance program. But the debate over economic aid continued, especially in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which gave twice as much attention to the goals of economic aid in 1968 as in any other year of questioning. Committee members discussed an unusually large number of different reasons for aid-giving. Nonetheless, well over one-third of the statements concerning objectives dealt in some way with political development (See Table 6) and

¹⁸However, there was a significant shift from FY 1962 to FY1966 toward providing economic assistance. By FY 1966, sixty-eight percent of aid was economic.

of these almost forty percent registered approval of this as a legitimate goal of foreign aid.¹⁹

The great amount of time spent on objectives in 1968 indicates that many House committee members sought a reevaluation of the purposes of American foreign assistance. And in this instance rhetoric and action were consistent. The rationale now was not containing Communism but rather encouraging political and economic change within recipient nations.

In 1968 the Foreign Operations subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee likewise shifted to discussion of long-range economic goals. Yet rhetoric and action remained incongruent, with Congress approving only 56% of the economic aid request while approving 90% of the military aid request. Table 6 illustrates committee rhetoric.

By 1971 the rhetoric of the foreign aid debate had shifted radically from that of 1961. The Congress was now

¹⁹Several amendments to the aid legislation of 1969 stressed encouraging democratic institutions. For example, one authorized fifty million dollars for an Inter-American Social Development Institute, a semi-private corporation working through U.S. private organizations to help spur local Latin American efforts at community development.

TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF COMMITTEE PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES
1968

<u>Objective</u>	<u>Committee</u>			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
Economic Development	67%(6)	16%(9)	37.5%(9)	
Political Development	11%(1)	40%(23)	4%(1)	
Fight Communism	2%(1)	4%(1)		40%(2)
Foreign Policy Political	22%(2)	16%(9)	21%(5)	60%(3)
U.S. Interest/Security		7%(4)	12.5%(3)	
Promote Independence				
Peace		5%(3)	8%(2)	
Humanitarianism		5%(3)	4%(1)	
U.S. Economic Benefit		5%(3)		
Stability				
Total	100%(9)	96%(55)	91%(22)	100%(5)

locked in a debate over what actions would best further the "national interest," as illustrated by Table 7. In 1961 national security had been viewed by just about all major congressional and administrative policy-makers as protection from Communist advances throughout the world. Opinions differed only on the strategies to be used to stem the Communist tide. But in the international atmosphere of the 1970's congressional groups sought to reanalyze immediate and long-range threats to the national interest and to bring foreign aid policy into line with this revamped conception of international reality. Two groups especially, the Senate Appropriations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, became a more important part of the congressional debate over aid during this period.

During hearings in 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's verbal interest in the objectives of economic aid returned to the level of 1962, slightly higher than the level exhibited during the intervening period. Committee members felt that appropriate objectives were not being furthered by the means and administrative practices employed by the Executive. Senator Frank Church said, in a now famous Senate speech, that he would not "endorse

TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF COMMITTEE PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES
1971

<u>Objective</u>	<u>Committee</u>			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC*	SAC
Economic Development	33%(2)	5.5%(1)		16%(7)
Political Development		5.5%(1)		11%(5)
Fight Communism		5.5%(1)	20%(1)	7%(3)
Foreign Policy Political	17%(1)		60%(3)	11%(5)
U.S. Interest/Security	17%(1)	55.5%(1)		31%(14)
Promote Independence				
Peace	17%(1)			
Humanitarianism	17%(1)	5.5%(1)		4%(2)
U.S. Economic Benefit				2%(1)
Stability		16.5%(3)		11%(5)
Total	101%(6)	94%(17)	80%(4)	93%(42)

*There were actually nine objectives mentioned, but four dealt with the Marshall Plan. Since these are not relevant to the contemporary debate, they have been omitted entirely from the computation for this table.

with [his] vote a foreign aid program which has been twisted into a parody and a farce."²⁰ In this speech he noted forcefully that not the management but the underlying objectives of the program was the major issue.

Debate within the House Foreign Affairs Committee was even more vigorous. Committee rhetoric shifted back emphatically to a concern with United States security interests. This should be evaluated in light of the emphasis on which the Nixon administration focused in its presentation of the foreign aid program in 1971. Nixon set forth three basic goals of American assistance:

1. strengthen the defense capability and economies of our friends and allies
2. . . . assist the lower income countries in their efforts to achieve economic and social development
3. humanitarian concern

Although Under Secretary of State John Irwin emphasized the objective of economic and social development for international stability, the fact that Nixon's list put this objective second to fostering the defense capabilities of our allies was not lost on the Congress.²¹

²⁰Congressional Quarterly, 29 (November 6, 1971): 2265-66.

²¹Chairman Morgan, for example, reminded the

A similar kind of debate over "national security" occurred within the Senate Appropriations subcommittee which handled foreign aid in 1971.²² Under William Proxmire's leadership, the subcommittee took a much more intensive look at objectives. Proxmire urged that aid be used as a political lever to encourage more humanitarian treatment for people and as a means to stop the drug traffic into the United States and thus protect the real interest of Americans.

House that "our defense strategy depends on access to foreign bases and the cooperation of the armed forces of our allies." This attitude stressed short-term quid pro quo political arrangements and the military aspect of security. Furthermore, it emphasized that aid would be granted mainly to already committed "friends and allies."

Unlike Morgan, Congressman Fraser, representative of the liberal viewpoint on the committee, was not favorable to what he felt was implied by the Nixon administration's presentation. He called for a redefinition of "national interest" in order to get away from the military security emphasis. Significantly during House Foreign Affairs debate on military assistance one-half of the statements mentioning national security registered an unfavorable attitude toward this goal, indicating that the tendency to equate the concept of security with military security was now meeting opposition within both houses of Congress. Congressional Quarterly, 29(Aug. 21, 1971): 1809.

²²This year committee hearings were unusually lengthy. There were fifteen different economic aid goals discussed and the level of interest in the objectives of economic assistance (six percent) was higher than at any other time during the decade.

While the House Appropriations subcommittee did not engage in any vigorous debate, the emphasis of the discussion had changed from previous years. In 1962 the committee had seemed most intent on using aid to influence short-term foreign policy stands, such as a vote in the United Nations; in 1971 some committee members, at least, seemed to view the most appropriate use of aid as that of a lever to encourage long-range political change.

Thus, in 1971 members of three of the four foreign aid committees were actively supporting a major re-evaluation of the purposes of U.S. assistance. Since two of these were Senate committees, it is not difficult to understand why the Senate did not accept the foreign aid legislation of 1971.

The Effectiveness of Economic Aid

Generally speaking, Congress has exhibited a steady level of verbal concern with the effectiveness of economic aid throughout the Development Decade. However, perusal of committee documents and analysis of committeemen's statements indicate increasing criticism of effectiveness throughout this period. For example, during Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in 1962, only

slightly more than one out of six remarks (18%) had been critical; but by 1968, five out of six remarks (83%) were critical of effectiveness.

Questions about effectiveness of economic aid in meeting objectives caused no major stir within either House committee during the early 1960's. On the other hand, Senate Appropriations Committee debate during this time did elicit considerable criticism that aid was not fulfilling America's stated objectives.²³ Nevertheless, the committee supported the concept of foreign aid, and many senators indicated that a shift toward economic development of Third World countries might provide better long-term results than the previous short-term political use of aid to combat Communism.

The later years of the Development Decade produced a more skeptical attitude. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee spent most of its energy debating the situation in Vietnam in 1968, it was overwhelmingly critical even of the economic aid program. The committee exercised some influence over the fate of the economic

²³In 1962 eleven out of fourteen statements were critical.

assistance program, which provided it some political leverage for influencing the conduct of foreign policy in Vietnam.

In addition, there were fewer favorable comments emerging from the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings. Within this committee one major issue centered around whether aid might be leading to a middle-range goal but not to longer-range goals. For example, given the assumption that economic aid was leading to economic development, was it also leading to peace and stability? The lack of belief in the effectiveness of aid in achieving stated objectives was partially responsible for the authorization committees' slicing 36% from the administration request for economic aid. Ironically, these committees had given John Kennedy his greatest congressional support for economic assistance only six years earlier.

While the House Appropriations subcommittee has been consistently critical of economic aid effectiveness, in 1971 Chairman Proxmire led his Senate subcommittee into an investigation of possible reasons for the apparent lack of success of U.S. aid. One explanation was that the level of funding was simply not adequate to meet the stated

goals. On the other hand, it could be that America might be trying to accomplish feats which assistance could not accomplish. In that case pouring more dollars into the program would not increase effectiveness. Through its action the committee appeared to support the first explanation at least for the time being.

But generally many congressmen's attitudes seemed to reflect the latter explanation, and it was clear that this Senate position might represent only short-lived support. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's own assertion in 1971 boded ill for the program's future: "In terms of its stated objectives--the containment of Communism, the promotion of economic development, and the advancement of freedom--the program is on the whole a proven failure whose termination is warranted on these empirical grounds alone. . . ." ²⁴ Two years later the Senate, which had encouraged major shifts toward this brand of assistance throughout the 1960's, approved the lowest funding for foreign economic aid it had ever voted.

²⁴Congressional Quarterly, 19 (November 6, 1971): 2265-66.

Objectives of Military Assistance²⁵

In the early 1960's there was congressional consensus that the purpose of military assistance was maintaining security from Communism. This purpose had not changed throughout the previous fifteen year history of the aid venture.

In presenting his aid message in 1961 President Kennedy stressed internal security as a major objective of the military aid program. Thus he took the emphasis off defense against external aggression and emphasized instead the threat of internal subversion. This changed emphasis seemed compatible with Senate Foreign Relations Committee members' thinking, and in the early 1960's the committee upheld the use of military assistance. The ultimate goal was to protect the process of democratic political development, and many members viewed military aid as providing the political tranquility within which both political and economic growth could take place.

Even at this time some opposition to the internal security approach was voiced in the Senate. Senator

²⁵Tables illustrating committee debate on military aid goals for the four years studied appear in Appendix C.

Leverett Saltonstall, an influential member of the appropriations committee, expressed fear that the policy of helping governments defeat internal insurrections could interfere with internal changes which might be healthy and just. A decade later, this fear reached nightmarish proportions.

By 1965 the military assistance program had become more controversial in the upper chamber. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave the military portion of the aid proposal a real beating, restoring a cutback of funds in a close 10-8 vote after what Senator George Aiken called "pressure tactics" from the Johnson administration. Some members questioned the underlying objectives of military assistance, criticizing both the priority given to political stability instead of self-government and the use of military aid to influence the short-term political behavior of recipients.

In 1966 in Senate floor debate, senators were in almost total agreement that arms should be given to other nations only to protect what they considered to be the "Free World's" defense. Defense against Communism was still the primary goal, but the strategy to be used to

pursue this goal was definitely controversial.

By 1968 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had become so completely disillusioned with the entire military aid venture that it did not bother to debate it and instead turned its almost undivided attention to American foreign policy in Vietnam. On the other hand, the House Foreign Affairs Committee's concern with military aid goals rose to 13%, the highest level of any year, and in sharp contrast to the 2% concern shown by the Senate group.

While House committee members considered stopping Communist aggression and/or subversion a major goal, they were divided over whether this objective was important enough to make tolerable the risk of violent confrontations between aid recipients.²⁶

²⁶This year a number of euphemisms for countering Communism were used in the rhetoric of committee discussion. For example, members spoke of "freeing people from [attempted] subjugation" (30% were unfavorable to this goal, while only 10% were favorable). Some feared that if this were the rationale for foreign aid, there would be no limits to America's responsibility to intervene around the globe.

However, not all of the objectives mentioned were synonymous with combatting Communism. The committee also dealt with the role of military aid in promoting international peace and stability.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee's debate over military aid to the anti-Communist military dictatorship in Greece precipitated a reexamination of what the United States was really trying to accomplish through its aid program. One segment of the committee's membership, led by Representative Fraser, condemned outright the priority placed on the United States allied strategic interests. For him the political rights of the Greek people should take precedence over military strategic considerations. While some committee members believed that maintaining political influence through the military assistance program could be used to spur political change, Fraser urged a cut-off of aid to Greece unless constitutional government was restored there. But this dispute was over method; content analysis indicates that during discussion of military aid, 44% of statements referring to the political development objective were favorable.

On the other hand, the House Appropriations Committee continued to place major emphasis on the U.S. and her allies' security from Communism. While the goal of gaining friendship for the U.S. received notice, the major theme was that it was in the United States national

interest to promote military security for nations which had already made a foreign policy commitment to the United States.²⁷

The focus of the limited discussion of the goals' of military aid in 1971 was on the method by which to best protect "United States national security." The major issue was how to create a more solid linkage of aid to direct U.S. national interest. Military aid aimed at preventing an aggression which affected our interest was much more justifiable for some senators than was the objective of buying friends. Likewise, stopping the drug traffic from Turkey to the United States seemed to some to be more relevant to U.S. interest than stopping Turkey from "going Communist."²⁸ On the whole, by 1971 groups within both

²⁷The committee's viewpoint in 1968 was that economic and military aid was important to American national interest "in that it provided the means for 'selected allied and friendly nations' to strengthen themselves against the threat of external attack and helped alleviate conditions in the less developed countries which bred 'unrest and violence.'" Congressional Quarterly, 26 (September 27, 1968): 2538.

²⁸U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations of 1971, Hearings, before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, pp. 502 and 389.

houses of Congress agreed that if there was to be a military aid program, its basic purposes should be re-evaluated.

Economic versus Military Aid--The Great Debate

The most extensive congressional foreign aid during the Decade of Development concerns the relative priority to be given economic and military aid. During the 1950's, while major concern was military security from Communism, an emphasis on military aid was logical.²⁹ But in 1961, President Kennedy placed major emphasis on economic aid, and the following year he cut the request for military assistance by one hundred million dollars from 1961 appropriations and simultaneously raised the request for economic assistance one billion dollars from the amount previously appropriated. In keeping with the changed conception of aid, the category of "defense support" was renamed "supporting assistance," classified as economic aid, and justified as promoting economic and political stability.

²⁹In FY1952 79% of the foreign assistance program was in the form of military aid. By FY1961 the military aspect constituted only 41% of the aid effort. Appendix D provides statistical data on funding for economic and military aid during the Development Decade.

But it was immediately clear that not all members of the Congress agreed with the Kennedy plan, and significant congressional groups felt military assistance provided the best means to further U.S. interests. In general, throughout the decade of the 1960's and into the 1970's, the two Senate committees have preferred economic assistance as a means of providing aid. On the other hand, the House committees have consistently upheld military assistance.

During the fifteen years since the Kennedy program was first presented, the Senate has by stages been skeptical of military assistance in the early 1960's, increasingly disillusioned with it during the mid-1960's, and outright antagonistic in the late 1960's and early 1970's. During the early years of the Development Decade the Senate Foreign Relations Committee feared that reliance on militarily-oriented aid such as supporting assistance was antithetical to the objectives of economic and political development that its members wished to further.

Throughout the mid-1960's Senator Fulbright fought for a complete separation of military assistance from the economic aid package. His desire to split the two was

based on the premise that a more valid judgment could be reached on the merits of both types if only one were dealt with at a time. He must have felt that there was sufficient support within the Senate to pass the economic bill and defeat the military one. But Representative Morgan's fight to keep the two joined was based, he said, on his appraisal that in the House the best method of assuring any support for economic aid was to keep it firmly tied to the more popular military aid package. Throughout the decade Morgan's stand prevailed.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's U.S. foreign aid acquired a distinctly militaristic character despite the Senate's attempt significantly to reduce military assistance. Indochina was the primary focus of the aid effort, and by the late 1960's the military assistance program had become the focal point of congressional controversy. While President Kennedy had felt obliged to justify economic aid to the Congress by stressing its defense value, now Presidents were finding it increasingly difficult to sell military assistance to the Senate. Both Senate committees shifted funds from military to economic programs.

Disillusionment seemed to be setting in even in the House. In 1968 the House Foreign Affairs Committee cut

funding for military aid and supporting assistance, after the controversy within the committee over the proper objectives and effects of military assistance.

In 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee split the bill into two parts, approving the economic portion and intending to deal with the military segment later. But Senate defeat of the entire aid measure left only a continuing resolution in effect. In 1972 the Senate again defeated the military aid bill, and for much of the early 1970's the aid program has operated mainly on the basis of temporary resolutions, primarily because of the intense controversy over the military aspect. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has provided the initiative in attempting to curtail military aid, by 1971 the Senate Appropriations Committee had become another significant congressional force calling for increased economic aid and the termination of military assistance.

In FY1975 the Senate demanded complete elimination of the military aid program by September 30, 1977. Authorization conferees softened the impact of the proposal by deleting the specific termination date. Pressure on the Executive was maintained by requiring the President to

submit a "detailed plan for the eventual elimination of the program" within one year. Clearly there was now support forthcoming from both chambers of Congress for a significant change in the means of providing U.S. foreign aid and conducting U.S. foreign policy.

A major issue in the debate over military aid has been the increased use of credit sales of U.S. military equipment. In 1961 the United States had begun a military sales program to shift away from the grant approach. Congress had bestowed its blessings on the shift primarily because of the economic benefits to the United States. But by 1967 selling military weapons to underdeveloped countries had become a highly volatile issue.

Not only the Senate but the House Appropriations Committee sought to limit the arms traffic. In 1967 and 1968 the House committee sponsored restrictive amendments which would place a limit on Defense Department arms sales of "sophisticated weapons" to underdeveloped countries on the Communist periphery, except for eight specifically listed countries. The amendment also specified that if a country spent for such weapons, the United States would cut aid by that amount. The Senate Appropriations Committee worked for milder provisions, leaving the

President discretion in judging the effect of arms sales on the economic development of a country. So in conference these provisions were watered down, though notification of Congress was required. Nevertheless, because of the opposition of many congressmen, the 1968 appropriations bill absolutely prohibited the Export-Import Bank from financing arms sales to the developing nations.³⁰

By 1969 the controversy threatened the entire foreign aid program and was the main reason only a supplemental appropriations bill at FY1969 levels received approval. One provision of the final FY1970 legislation was complete elimination of the Foreign Military Credit Sales program, a stand supported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Of course, the program was resurrected in the next appropriations legislation, with the House and Senate committees working to place certain limits on arms credit sales while leaving the Executive a great deal of discretion in the final administration.³¹

³⁰In 1968 it became known that the Export-Import Bank, supposedly concerned with economic matters, had been used as a vehicle for arms sales.

³¹Content analysis statistics show the increase in the percentage of committee hearing discussion given to the arms sales approach during the decade. These

Foreign Aid in the 1970's

Since the 1971 aid battle, Congress has attempted to shift the use of aid toward encouragement of human rights. Although similar to the political development emphasis of the late 1960's, the recent attitude of many congressmen has placed greater emphasis than did earlier efforts on "humanitarian" considerations such as the treatment of political prisoners.

Humanitarianism has also increasingly become a major justification for economic aid as a result of severe food shortages in many countries. In 1968 President Johnson noted that 50% of economic aid funds would be used to increase agricultural productivity in the underdeveloped world. But within the next few years the situation became more critical. The issue in the early 1970's was simply a crisis one: preventing starvation.

Senate Appropriations Committee discussion in 1975 indicated the desire of many congressmen to shift the

figures are presented in Appendix D. Also included in this appendix is a discussion of other significant congressional debates over the means of assistance during the 1961-1975 period. The issues of multilateral/bilateral assistance, technical assistance, loans/grants, and private investment are explored.

primary purpose of economic aid to alleviating hunger in the short-term in contrast to the long-term "rural development" approach. In 1975 the committee criticized the fact that only 51% of bilateral aid went to truly poor countries and recommended that in FY1976 at least 60% go to these critically poverty-stricken nations.

While it forbade shifting Food for Peace funds to military purposes and programs, Congress allowed the Executive to switch military aid funds to economically-oriented programs. Moreover, authorization legislation for FY1975 clearly stated that Congress did not want food aid to be used for political purposes. It was earmarked for hungry nations, not those with a certain political orientation.

A second major trend since 1971 is the growing opposition to the military aid program on the part of congressional liberals within both houses. The opportunity for misuse of military aid funds had been apparent for some time, but the rekindling of the Cyprus crisis between Greece and Turkey in 1974 forced American policy-makers to make some hard decisions on the criteria for obtaining military aid. The controversy centered around the priority

to be given to the use of aid for military security purposes as opposed to the use of aid for diplomatic purposes such as supporting negotiations in a politically tense section of the globe or discouraging aggression. For two decades the Foreign Assistance Act had prohibited the use of American military aid and equipment for aggressive military actions, since aid recipients supposedly acquire arms only to defend their interests. Thus if the U.S. were to abide by its own regulations and if aid were to be used to further peace, a cut-off of aid to Turkey under the circumstances of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus would be completely justified. Both authorization committees initiated such action. But Secretary of State Henry Kissinger insisted that aid to Turkey not be suspended by congressional action. He argued that aid provided him with the political leverage to induce the Turks to come to reasonable terms concerning Cyprus. The congressional compromise provided that if a negotiated settlement were not reached by February 5, 1975, military aid would automatically cease. And cease it did in February, 1975.

The issues brought out by the debate over Turkish aid lie at the very heart of the conflict over aid objectives. While some congressmen such as Senator Mike

Mansfield opposed an aid cut-off partly on the grounds that it would undermine NATO defense security against Communism, this justification does not seem to have been of primary importance to members of either branch. While many congressmen differed with Ford and Kissinger on strategy, they were essentially in agreement on goals. The promotion of international peace and stability had become of greater value than security from Communism. While a shift toward this attitude had been going on since the mid-1960's, the vitality of the debate over Turkish aid and the intransigence of some congressional groups indicated a significant reappraisal of the uses of military aid.

In the early 1970's in some respects foreign aid legislation has deemphasized the long-term developmental strategy of the mid-1960's. With increasing world-wide economic shortages, Congress has called for economic assistance whose primary function is to stabilize the international economic system on a short-term basis. Moreover, congressmen have continued to encourage the use of aid for short-term political purposes such as the control of narcotics traffic into the United States.

In FY1975 and 1976 the Middle East has been a major focus of the foreign aid package. The use of aid to

encourage peace and political stability in that part of the world has been a primary objective of the Ford administration. Congress' acceptance of the major proposals for this area indicates support for this use of aid, although the congressional priority given to aid for Israel has affirmed its responsiveness to other considerations such as Israel's democratic orientation and the political influence of the domestic Jewish vote.

Along with changes in perceptions of primary threats to U.S. national security and the concomitant changes in the use of foreign aid to meet these threats have come changes in the means of aid provision. Some issues have been largely resolved. The question of providing economic aid through soft term loans rather than grants was answered in favor of such loans in the early 1960's. Likewise, the shift toward selling military equipment abroad rather than granting it has been accomplished. There has also been a trend toward increased reliance on international institutions.

With the knowledge that the methods of U.S. aid should be appropriate to contemporary international problems, in 1973 the House Foreign Affairs Committee initiated new proposals for a major restructuring of the

means of foreign economic assistance. The committee proposed that henceforth categories of economic assistance be broken down by problem areas, such as food and nutrition, population planning and health, and education and human resources.

Bilateral U.S. aid would concentrate on the transfer of technical expertise to the underdeveloped nations and the export of farm and industrial products, while multilateral institutions would be responsible for handling the bulk of large international transfers of capital and investment dealings. Political observers have noted that the Foreign Affairs Committee sought through this revamping not only to shift the basis of the foreign aid program but also to buttress the position of bilateral aid which was increasingly coming under fire in the Senate. This approach, which Congress accepted in 1973, allows congressmen to have greater impact on decisions dealing with program priorities within those countries receiving American aid.

Conclusions

The underlying assumptions of the American foreign aid program have remained basically the same. These can be briefly stated as follows: U.S. national interest can best

be protected through fostering economic development and/or stability abroad. This situation will be conducive to America's economic interest, and our political interests will be safeguarded primarily because economic stability is conducive to a peaceful international structure. U.S. political interests will be fostered by simultaneously encouraging a world of nations whose internal political structures and processes are compatible with the political philosophy of the United States.

The U.S. foreign aid program has also been based on the assumption that providing military assistance to allied or neutral nations will ultimately help secure the national interest of the United States by discouraging aggression. These beliefs have provided the philosophical and practical justification for aid spending throughout its history.

On the other hand, the strategies of assistance have changed significantly, and intervening middle-range goals have shifted with changing perceptions of the international and domestic political situation.

The Development Decade concept attempted to shift the emphasis of aid from that of a short-term political weapon to that of a long-term political investment. Military aid would be clearly supplemental to the economic aid

program.

In the late 1960's many congressmen felt that the intermediate objective of fostering democratic political processes was not being adequately achieved through the aid process, and congressional forces acted as catalysts to spur greater executive attention to the internal political affairs of U.S. aid recipients. The American experience in Vietnam increased congressional hostility to military aid, and the economic aid program became entangled in the controversy over policy toward Indochina and the effects of aid on the international system.

In the 1970's Congress has supported aid in the interest of short-term economic and political stability. The proposition that economic development and peace are somehow interrelated is still perceived by both the Ford administration and Congress as accurate, but the relationship is perceived differently from the basic assumption of the Development Decade. During the early 1960's the assumption was that a developing and fairly stable economic infrastructure would give indigenous social revolutionaries less cause to turn to radical political movements such as Communism for solutions to economic and political problems. In the mid-1970's both economic and military aid are

justified in more blatantly political terms; aid to Israel, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries is seen as an incentive for their acceptance of political and military compromises in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Aid is being used to encourage regional diplomatic settlement of political differences. It is also being used to ensure friendly access to nations controlling natural resources. Finally, policy-makers assume that the promotion of international political stability will in turn ultimately halt the spread of Russian political influence.

In the 1970's internal political relationships appear to be of less significance than a recipient's international behavior although the two are very related. During the Development Decade aid officials stressed the indirect method of building political support through aid provision, ostensibly aimed at encouraging economic and political development, but in the 1970's there is support for a more clear-cut two-track approach for American bilateral aid. While agricultural aid would be provided solely according to determinations of economic need, there would be increasing legitimacy for the use of other American aid as a direct tool for influencing the international behavior of other nation-states.

Actually, foreign aid is, has been, and will continue to be a distinctly political undertaking. While economic goals may be stressed, they are usually seen as leading to ultimate political goals. And non-political justifications for aid-giving often provide the means of attaining patently political results. For example, aid provided for humanitarian purposes carries the dividend of exemplifying the donor's moral recitude. Furthermore, it is impossible to completely separate short-term and long-term goals. Nevertheless, it is conflict over the latter which has engendered the major domestic controversy.

The congressional foreign aid debate in the 1960's and 1970's has centered around several themes. First, are intermediate goals consistent with long-range objectives? Many congressmen believe that accomplishment of middle-range goals such as economic growth has not automatically led to accomplishment of longer-range objectives such as international political stability. Second, is the United States successfully accomplishing the intermediate goals? Doubts concerning effectiveness have eroded support for the assistance effort. Third, are the means being used consistent with the goals being pursued? The use of bilateral politically motivated aid to accomplish economic

goals or the use of military aid to ensure peace has seemed inconsistent to many and has increased skepticism. Fourth, is actual implementation in keeping with broad policy concepts? The concern that aid has not actually been administered in line with congressionally approved policy has further weakened legislative support. The congressional aid debate has gone far beyond questioning administrative efficiency to questioning the basic structure and assumptions of aid policy-making.

However, congressional debate of foreign aid has created confusion for several reasons. First, congressional committees, at any given time during the Development Decade, often exhibited little agreement concerning the priorities to be given aid objectives. While it is possible that aid might be achieving several purposes simultaneously, still the rhetorical emphasis of committees has differed considerably.

Second, in some instances the perceptions of a given committee toward aid objectives changed significantly during the period 1961-1975. For example, the House Foreign Affairs Committee was stressing political development more than stopping Communism by 1966, and this was not merely a semantic difference.

Third, part of the confusion surrounding congressional debate has been due to the lack of consistency between words and actions. For example, congressional subsystems whose rhetoric emphasized long-term economic development were willing to pursue short-term political goals through the aid program.

Because of these factors it has been difficult to decipher the rationale of U.S. foreign assistance. Whatever the objectives, however, the Congress has played an important role in shaping the program.

CHAPTER IV

CONGRESS: PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ROLE IN THE FOREIGN AID POLICY PROCESS

In recent years more and more attention has been focused on the role Congress plays, or should play, in foreign policy-making. Congressmen, both in the Senate and the House, have called for an expanded, more meaningful role for the legislative branch in the conduct of American foreign affairs. The Senate decision to reject the foreign aid bill in 1971 reflected the growing congressional-executive antagonism over American foreign policy and the procedures being utilized in foreign policy decision-making.

During the 1960's, as the United States was seen to become increasingly bogged down in commitments overseas, especially in Indochina, the imbalance of power between Congress and the President became highlighted. Some critics were arguing that Congress had abdicated any responsibility for establishing policy in the foreign relations field and had become a submissive, compliant servant of presidential

policy. On the other hand, by 1974 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was increasingly complaining of the "over-assertiveness" of the Congress in the foreign affairs domain. He criticized the legislators for hampering the effective conduct of American foreign relations by restricting executive maneuverability in a field where delicate negotiations demand flexibility and the skillful use of executive discretion. While President Johnson complained of much the same problem--too many congressional restrictions--in the mid-1960's, it appears that Congress in the early 1970's has become less and less willing to tolerate a "one-man show."

The question of interest to us is: What roles have the four major foreign aid committees sought to play in the structuring of foreign aid policy? This chapter delineates what the committees themselves, through their members' questions and their actions, have perceived their roles to be. It also describes conflicts between committee members over appropriate role behavior. Finally, it analyzes congressmen's perceptions of the entire congressional process. Whereas the next chapter focuses on administrative perceptions of Congress' role, this chapter focuses

only on Congress' view of itself.

A Conceptual Framework

The literature on Congress' role in the American political system illuminates several possible ways in which the House and Senate and their respective committees may relate to the political forces within the system. For example, John Saloma constructed a four-fold model of legislative-executive relations as a framework for analysis. Briefly it consists of the following possible relationships: (1) Presidential-Responsible Party Model--the President predominates; (2) Presidential-Pluralist Model--President can be the strongest of the conflicting political interests; (3) Constitutional Balance Model--branches are coequal; and (4) Congressional Supremacy Model--Congress dominates.¹ George Goodwin, in his study of congressional committees, found the presidential-pluralist and constitutional balance models the most useful in practical contemporary politics.² In the area of foreign affairs presidential preeminence

¹John S. Saloma, III, Congress and the New Politics (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1969), ch. 2.

²George Goodwin, The Little Legislatures; Committees of Congress (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970).

makes the first model potentially useful also.

Randall Ripley constructed another set of models for congressional-presidential relationships. Two of his models are virtually the same as the presidential dominance and congressional dominance models of Saloma. A third model is joint program development, in which either Congress or Executive may originate program ideas or both may cooperate in the effort. Both are involved in the details of decision-making, and both exhibit a willingness to compromise. Ripley also adds a fourth possible legislative-executive relationship: stalemate. In this model either institution may produce initiatives, or both may embark on competing initiatives. Once again both branches are involved in the details of decisions, but this involvement leads to tension and conflict, not cooperation. The result is that no initiative is really carried through because of the parties' unwillingness to compromise.³ These latter two "models" are each consistent with Saloma's constitutional balance model, but in the first instance a workable program emerges from the efforts of the two branches and in the

³Randall Ripley, Congress: Process and Policy (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1975), ch. 1.

second no such program is produced.

Both of these sets of models focus primarily on institutional power positions. Alton Frye's models of congressional roles in the foreign policy area focus on the functions Congress performs for the political system no matter what the power position vis-a-vis the executive branch. He describes four possible roles. One is "initiator" of alternative policies. In addition, Congress can constrain and restrict the Executive ("constrainer"), can send messages to foreign political systems and maintain international contacts ("communicator"), and can provide the President with increased flexibility in the diplomatic realm ("liberator").⁴

What role, if any, Congress plays in initiating policy alternatives has been a persistent question. Nelson Polsby believes that during the initiation period of the policy process, Congress does perform an important function which has been largely ignored. He argues that Congress is an active participant in policy innovation at the early stages, providing the incentive for growth and development

⁴Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress (New York: McGraw Hill, 1975).

of a new policy. Congressional attention helps bring various aspects of the proposal into focus and aids in mobilizing a political following. Polsby views the Senate as especially valuable in performance of this function.⁵

In addition to the general role of the Congress, each congressional committee performs certain roles. Ralph Huitt devised a six-fold scheme, maintaining that committee members' behavior would fall into one of the following patterns: (1) "national party leader"; (2) "representative of special constituent interests in the state or district"; (3) "personal intercessor with an administrative witness for a constituent"; (4) an identificatory role, in which the committee identifies with a particular interest during the pluralist debate; (5) a judicial role, in which the committee attempts to study various policy alternatives and mold a course of action in keeping with its concept of the national interest; and (6) "detailed reviewer of administrative agencies."⁶ The first three deal with political and constituent functions which have little to do with formulation

⁵ Nelson W. Polsby, "Strengthening Congress in National Policymaking," in Congressional Behavior, ed. Nelson W. Polsby (New York: Random House, 1971).

⁶ See Ralph K. Huitt, "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study," American Political Science Review, 48 (June, 1954): 340-65.

of foreign policy alternatives. Therefore, they are not relevant to this study. The last three deserve further attention. Edwin Speir based a study of the two foreign aid authorization committees in the early 1960's on Huitt's model. At least in the area of foreign aid, Speir concluded that the committees performed a broad "judicial" role. The most predominant role appeared to be reviewing administrative policy in a good bit of detail,⁷ a finding which is congruent with Samuel Huntington's conclusion that Congress in the twentieth century has as its major function acting as a watchdog over administrative agencies.⁸

The present study analyzes congressional role behavior (1961-1975) according to a six-fold scheme, which draws on the work of other scholars. The six roles are:

1. Policy-initiation--an active and innovative role in formulating policy alternatives. Introduction of a new course of political action. This role is similar to the concept of a broad judicial role in which policy

⁷ Edwin Speir, Jr., "Congress and Foreign Economic Policy: The Role of Key Congressional Committees in the Formulation of Development Assistance Legislation During the 1960's," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Denver, 1966), synopsis in Dissertation Abstracts, 26: 6150-51.

⁸ Samuel Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in The Congress and America's Future ed. David B. Truman (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973): pp. 6-38. Second edition.

alternatives are formulated and crystallized in the national interest.

2. Policy-modification--a role in which Congress accepts policies initiated by the executive branch and concerns itself only with moderate changes in these policies to bring them more into line with the legislative will. This role is also close to the judicial role concept of Huitt. Both the policy-initiation and the policy-modification roles are related to Saloma's idea of a constitutional balance in which policy-making is shared by the two governmental branches. Likewise, both are components of Ripley's joint development model.
3. Catalyst--a force within the American political system to spur change which may be urged from a number of sources. The immediate cause or accelerator of change which has been initiated by a different source. This role can be, though it is not necessarily, similar to Polsby's idea of congressional involvement during gestation period of policy formation.
4. Detailed oversight of administration--congressional supervision of administration in specific detail. Characterized by extensive interrogation concerning technicalities of exactly how and where aid funds are spent. This role is equivalent to Huitt's sixth role.
5. General oversight of administration--congressional oversight of the broad dimensions of policy implementation. Setting broad guidelines for administration. Through specific criteria Congress attempts to bring implementation into line with its concept of policy.
6. Legitimation--a role of sanctioning or justifying the program as conceived and executed by the executive branch without seeking to modify it in any significant way.

Each of these categories refers to Congress' role vis-a-vis the Executive, not necessarily vis-a-vis any other political force. They are arranged in descending order of independent impact on policy-making and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

There is agreement that congressional committees seem to take on a distinctive life of their own, a life and function which is structured normatively and sanctioned by tradition and habit, but the nature of that function is perceived differently by different authors. William Morrow concluded that the House and Senate authorization committees view themselves as "legislative partners" with the executive branch, actively developing policy in conjunction with the administration. Since there is no real domestic constituency promoting foreign aid, these committees are free to attempt to shape the program in line with committee members' views concerning foreign policy.⁹

Morrow points out that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has acted as initiator in the foreign policy field, perhaps originally because of its constitutional birthright.

⁹William Morrow, Congressional Committees (New York: Scribner, 1969) p. 173.

. . . . the publicity which Congress receives on foreign policy matters is most often centered around the Senate Committee, and both committees together with their respective houses seem to acknowledge their differing roles.¹⁰

In contrast, Heyward Moore's study of the 1957-62 aid process led him to conclude that the two committees which authorize foreign aid merely added "legitimacy" to administration policy.¹¹ He also found that at that time the House Appropriations Committee acted as antagonist, while the Senate Appropriations Committee played protagonist for foreign aid.

Although acknowledging that the differentiation is somewhat artificial, Morrow defines the distinction between the functions exercised by the authorization committees and the appropriations committees in these terms:

Their concern [authorization committees] is for the more theoretical long-range implications of policy proposals, while the concern of the appropriations committees is more with an item-by-item examination of specific requests designed to accomplish a program already authorized.¹²

¹⁰Ibid., p. 72.

¹¹Heyward Moore, Jr., "Congressional Committees and the Formulation of Foreign Aid Policy," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1965), synopsis in Dissertation Abstracts, 26: 4057-58.

¹²Morrow, Congressional Committees, p. 170.

Scholars also have differed on the role they perceive Congress as a whole playing in the aid policy-making process. Mary Mangan, in a study of Congress during the 1950's, concluded, as did Brent Scrowcroft,¹³ that Congress is capable of being an assertive force within the policy process. Her conclusions tend to uphold the policy-modification role of Congress. She concluded that during the 1950's Congress not only had a definite impact on the substance of foreign aid but also revamped its image of its own function, learning how to be more influential in policy-making in the foreign policy field.¹⁴

In contrast, Moore viewed the primary role of Congress as "constrainer," controlling the administration of the program through the use of restrictive amendments, tightening the purse strings, and acting as watchdog over the program's implementation.¹⁵ Margaret Aghassi agreed

¹³Brent Scrowcroft, "Ideology and Foreign Aid: An Analysis of Congressional Reaction to the Foreign Aid Programs to Spain and Yugoslavia," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1967), synopsis in Dissertation Abstracts, 28, 2310-A.

¹⁴Sister Mary Mangan, "The Congressional Image of Aid to the Underdeveloped Countries (1949-1959) as Revealed in the Congressional Hearings and Debates," (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1965), synopsis in Dissertation Abstracts, 25, 4242-43.

¹⁵Moore, "Congressional Committees."

that Congress is not an innovative body and asserted that it has been important mainly in legitimating policy proposals.¹⁶

This study attempts to clarify the roles that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, the House Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Appropriations Committee have perceived themselves as playing during the period 1961-1975. It examines several hypotheses. Some deal with the delineation of functions performed by the various committees. One hypothesis is that the two appropriations committees have acted primarily as detailed overseers of administrative conduct, examining intensely the implementation of aid programs, while the two authorization committees have acted primarily in a policy-modifying capacity, concerned with broad policy trends. One method of testing this is to discover what aspects of the program have been emphasized during committee hearings. Content analysis provides some guides to committee interests. For example, extensive

¹⁶Marjorie C. Aghassi, "Little Legislatures: Four Congressional Committees and Foreign Aid Legislation, 1947-1964," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1967), synopsis in Dissertation Abstracts, 28, 1861.

questioning concerning objectives indicates a committee's interest in the basic policy of the program. The "effect" category also measures major policy concerns. Committee concern with U.S. foreign and international policy indicates congressmen's interest in the broader context of aid decisions. The study assumes that the authorization committees will show greater interest in this kind of questioning than the appropriations committees. Emphasis on "means" statements can also indicate concern with basic policy, but intensive questioning concerning the administration of particular categories of aid indicates a desire to act as congressional watchdog over implementation.

Emphasis on administration is indicative of an oversight function. The greater the number of technical statements, the more a role of detailed supervision of administration is indicated. Since the responsibility for providing funds for previously authorized programs falls on the two appropriations committees, the assumption is that the latter will concentrate more on technical detail and the implications of aid for the U.S. economy than will the authorization committees.

Emphasis on statements concerning congressional role reflects interest in the procedures for foreign policy

decision-making. The author hypothesizes that a greater degree of committee concentration on the role of Congress will correlate with opposition to particular policy output. Disagreement on policy leads Congress to seek to formulate policy more clearly and to oversee implementation in more detail.

The author proposes that throughout the period under study Congress has sought to develop jointly the program in concert with the executive branch. But as its members' perceptions of the impact of congressional opinion on final decisions became more pessimistic, Congress sought to assert its authority more forcefully.

In addition, this study argues that several of the committees dealing with foreign aid have changed their perceptions of their roles in the policy-making process. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has shifted its role perception slightly, but primarily it has shifted its strategy in an attempt to maximize its influence on policy. Throughout the time period under study, it has viewed its legitimate role as a combination of policy-initiation and policy-modification. The House Appropriations Committee has consistently conceived of its role as detailed supervisor of administration.

On the other hand, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee

have changed the roles that they perceive themselves as playing in policy formation. For both, the shift has been from a primarily legitimating influence within the political system to a policy-modifying and/or catalytic force for political change.

As a consequence of these changes, this study argues that the foreign aid policy process has changed from a presidential-pluralist and almost presidential-dominant system in the early 1960's much closer to a constitutional balance model in the early 1970's.

Congressional Role Behavior

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is an extremely prestigious Senate committee, which supposedly views itself as an advisory body to the President in the area of foreign affairs. Content analysis of committee hearings indicates that the committee has always given considerable attention, at least verbally, to the role of Congress in policy-making. (Table 8 provides a comparison of the verbal interest shown in the congressional role in policy-making by the four committees over the time period studied.)

TABLE 8

COMPARISON OF THE VERBAL INTEREST SHOWN TO THE
CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN POLICY-MAKING BY FOUR COMMITTEES
1961-71

	Economic Assistance			
	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>
SFRC*	8% (36)	5% (20)	9% (28)	8% (10)
HFAC	5.5% (18)	5% (47)	10% (49)	8% (23)
HAC	12 (117)	5% (33)	5% (49)	5% (30)
SAC	4% (17)	5% (9)	15% (31)	7% (53)
	Military Assistance			
	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>
SFRC	6% (8) less than	15% (25)	5% (4)	30% (31)
HFAC	1% (2)	3% (11)	2% (6)	5% (19)
HAC	2% (7)	6% (60)	12% (21)	3% (18)
SAC	5.5% (11)	10% (6)	31% (9)	16% (95)
	Total			
	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>
SFRC	8%	8%	8%	18%
HFAC	4%	4%	7%	6%
HAC	9%	6%	6%	4%
SAC	5%	6%	17%	10%

*SFRC--Senate Foreign Relations Committee
HFAC--House Foreign Affairs Committee
HAC--House Appropriations Committee
SAC--Senate Appropriations Committee

In dealing with foreign aid legislation the Foreign Relations Committee has focused on broad policy such as the objectives of the program and the means of implementing these objectives. Throughout the Development Decade the committee consistently perceived its role as providing the major policy guidelines for the foreign assistance program. Furthermore, the committee viewed aid in a much broader foreign policy context, using the aid bill to pursue its own version of American foreign policy.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has perceived one of its functions as broad oversight of administration to ensure implementation in keeping with congressional intent. Certain members of the committee, such as Wayne Morse, have favored the firm attachment of legislative strings. Significantly, the Senate in 1964 narrowly rejected his recommendation that Congress decide on specific projects, not just on general program loans. However, at the time Chairman Fulbright opposed Morse, arguing that AID should be given much discretionary power over administrative affairs. In criticizing the role Congress had played, he said,

It [Congress] can stop the power this year if it wants to, but as long as it agrees to have an AID

program, then it moves into the administration of it, by setting down precise requirements for loans and even going to the extent of forbidding you to negotiate or to have relations with specific countries. It seems to me you create an intolerable administrative problem for any program of this kind.¹⁷

In fact, he stated that an excessive number of restrictions on administration was one reason for his encouragement of a multilateral approach to aid administration.¹⁸

In some cases the committee viewed administrative oversight as an incentive to more efficient management of the program. But it also viewed specific restrictions on administration as directly affecting the content of United States foreign policy.¹⁹

¹⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 67.

¹⁸In 1964 a major controversy concerning AID's control over the quality of its administrative personnel had led some congressional groups to veto this discretion on the grounds of maintaining congressional control. For Fulbright this kind of behavior was completely untenable. He believed that if Congress was critical of administration, then it should allow agencies the room to make corrections. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁹For example, debate in 1962 focused on prohibiting any type of aid to countries where expropriation of American citizens' property without compensation had occurred. Senator Bourke Hickenlooper, who sponsored this particular proposal, noted, however, that policy guidelines should be in broad terms with the administration left free to write in the details.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee members have perceived their primary function as policy-initiation, or the development of policy in conjunction with the executive branch. In 1966 Congressional Quarterly observed that congressional initiative, and especially that of Fulbright and the Foreign Relations Committee, was responsible for much of the reevaluation given to foreign assistance.²⁰ Members of the committee tended to agree with this analysis. For example, the committee claimed credit for introduction of the population control program. Furthermore, the 1971 committee report pointed specifically to the fact that military assistance to Latin America had dropped from \$79 million in FY1966 to \$11 million in FY1971 as illustration of the success of congressional initiative.²¹ Clearly, the members perceived themselves as actively altering policy to fit their perceptions of the proper purposes of foreign assistance.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has perceived its proper function as analysis of the feasibility of

²⁰Congressional Quarterly,

²¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Report, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 8.

alternative courses of action and of the relative desirability of these policies in light of domestic and foreign policy considerations. Its 1965 committee report summarized this perception of its role:

It should be stressed in this connection that such views and suggestions usually are aimed at fundamental questions of policy, rather than at administration and short-term difficulties. . . . Only by questioning the basic premises behind the foreign aid program, as it has taken shape over the years, can there be a productive discussion of policy alternatives outside the misleading and barren context of being compelled to consider a single thesis and its antithesis.²²

While committee members have consistently sought to maximize their influence in foreign policy-making, pursuit of this influence has led the committee to develop different strategies at various times during recent years. In his study of congressional committee premises, Richard Fenno has delineated three strategies utilized by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The first dictated that "Committee members would presume in favor of executive branch requests, provided only that the Executive would maintain, in exchange a

²²U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Report, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 5.

close consultative relationship with the Committee."²³

In the late 1950's and early 1960's, Fulbright's statements sounded very similar to those of his counterpart in the House, Chairman Morgan. But while Fulbright saw the President as the policy initiator in foreign affairs, he envisioned a meaningful advisory role for his committee. He had inherited this posture from the committee tradition under Chairman Arthur Vandenberg. At that time President Harry Truman had frequently consulted the committee, primarily because as a Democratic President, he needed support of the Republican majority in the Senate. The close communication between the President and the committee enhanced the prestige of the Senate group. In circular fashion this prestige carried over to encourage continued presidential consultation. This traditional strategy was dominant through the mid-1960's and is exemplified by Fulbright's attitude concerning AID discretion in 1964.

During the mid-1960's a strategy of "policy-individualism" took precedence. This approach is characterized by each committee member's attempting to influence policy

²³Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), p. 163.

individually rather than in concert with other committee members. The latter 1960's saw the Senate Foreign Relations Committee exhibit a marked lack of ideological cohesion. One Democratic member characterized the group in 1966 as a committee in "disarray."

It cannot shape any consensus. And if the truth be known, the President and the Secretary of State probably like it that way. . . . So long as we are split we cannot be influential. . . . No one speaks for the Committee. . . .²⁴

Committee senators continued to be frustrated though during this second stage because they were aware that, facing a more unified administration individually, they were diluting their own potential for influence.

By the latter part of the decade committee concern with the role of Congress in foreign policy-making had become acute. During hearings in 1971 the disillusionment with the military assistance program led the committee to spend an unprecedented thirty percent of its time discussing the role that Congress should and did play in the policy-making process. The frustration and cynicism of the members could be seen in their decision to approve a Nixon administration request for relaxing the requirements

²⁴Ibid., p. 164.

for a President to grant military assistance. They stated in their report on the military assistance bill that they were granting this authority, not because the President should have it, but because he would exercise it anyway through presidential waiver. Essentially, this was an acknowledgement of the committee's feelings of inadequacy in policy-making.

At this time the committee was moving into a third era. The strategic premise now was "to make the committee the spearhead in strengthening the institutional independence of the Senate in foreign policy-making."²⁵ The new role is based on the constitutional prerogatives of the Senate and the institutional place of the committee within this body. The idea of leadership in restoring constitutional balance can be used to unify the committee. The earliest instance of this strategy was the Vietnam hearings of 1966, with progressive refinement since then.

In 1971 the Foreign Relations Committee emphasized two major points. First, it stated precisely that it was providing for only an interim program and that it would completely and independently reevaluate the foreign

²⁵Ibid.

assistance effort.

The second major point was that Congress was a coequal branch with the executive branch. Congress could not exercise this constitutional responsibility for ensuring that the executive branch kept the intent of Congress in mind without access to important information. In light of this assumption, the Senate set down specific procedures through which the Executive was to inform Congress of administrative action, including a requirement that the President inform Congress within thirty days after the Foreign Assistance Bill was passed exactly how much money would be granted to specific countries.²⁶ Committee action would prevent a President from rerouting large amounts of aid funds on his own and would require the Executive to provide Congress with relevant information while such determinations were being made.

Observers of the legislative scene in 1971-72 perceived a distinctly different view of decision-making on the part of the Foreign Relations Committee chairman.

²⁶The committee also added a prohibition against more than ten percent above this specified amount being siphoned off to another country without ten days prior notice to Congress, even if the president felt this was a situation involving the national security.

In reaction to increasing frustration with executive policy, the committee abandoned its earlier strategy of "advise and consent" and began to pursue a policy of writing policy into legislation. For example, after having suggested a reduction in aid administrative personnel, which had had little effect on the bureaucracy, the committee mandated such a reduction. As the 1971 committee report expressed it, "This amendment is aimed at bringing about the kind of corrective action which the committee had hoped the administration itself would initiate."²⁷ In 1972 the committee provided for a ten percent reduction of overseas personnel (mainly AID personnel) by the end of FY1973. Although this provision was not accepted by the full Senate, it was worded in even more specific language than that of the preceding year.

While never as high as in some of the other committees, concern with administration of economic assistance rose throughout the 1961-71 period. Increasing concern with Congress' responsibilities led to more intense questioning of administration and to a more restrictive

²⁷U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Report, 92 Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 9.

attitude toward executive branch discretion.²⁸ By 1974 in some areas such as reconstruction aid to Indochina the Senate was earmarking specific amounts of aid country-by-country and also specifying that there could be no transfer of funds from country to country.

In the early 1960's the committee was satisfied that it was exercising some influence on aid policy. Therefore, a role of broad oversight was sufficient. But as committee members perceived less efficacy in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the committee moved to more specific oversight of administration and to legislating rather than advising the changes it desired. However, by 1974 it appears there was some tendency to return to the first strategy. Emphasis was on behind-the-scenes negotiations and consultations between the leading Senate Foreign Relations Committee architect of the committee bill, Senator Hubert Humphrey, and the executive branch.²⁹

²⁸Concern with general administrative issues rose from 12% of content analysis statements in 1962 to 42% in 1971. Senate committee behavior indicated its desire to decrease the scope of administrative discretion.

²⁹Because of restrictions on aid to Turkey, the Senate, by a vote of 41-39 and with presidential backing, had recommitted the foreign aid bill to committee on October 2, 1974. While the major opponents of presidential

Many of the original Senate provisions survived. For example, while the committee dropped its provision banning aid to dictatorships, it kept its requirement for a three-year phase-out of military grant assistance.

In order to avoid the major public confrontations of recent years, and more importantly to avoid the specific legislative restrictions, the President probably will seek such compromises in the future. In order to secure more satisfactory floor support for its provisions, key committee members will also desire such consultations with the President. Therefore, there may soon be a return to the "meaningful consultation" role of earlier years.

For Senate Foreign Relations Committee members foreign aid policy could not be divorced from the general trend of American foreign policy which many committee members viewed as excessively interventionist. Committee attempts in the latter 1960's to cut foreign aid spending

discretion in this matter had taken their case to the floor, the committee leaders decided to work in concert with the President to get a bill through the Senate. A compromise bill was reported out for the second time by unanimous vote on November 27. Humphrey asked that senators not attempt to make major changes through floor amendments, because as he expressed it, "'we have received the assurance we have not had before that the administration will support us' in getting the committee's bill passed."

were directly linked to efforts to reevaluate America's responsibilities and reduce American commitments abroad to a level key committee members perceived as more realistic. To achieve this goal the Senate committee has sought a more active role in policy-making and has attempted to encourage the development of a system close to what Saloma has termed a constitutional balance model of decision-making.

House International Relations Committee

As illustrated by the relative emphases it places during its committee hearings, the House International Relations Committee has had a different pattern of interest from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The House committee has shown enormous attention to the administration of the program, especially the economic segment. Content analysis reveals the amount of questioning concerning administrative detail to be high in relation to other categories of interest and to the level of interest in implementation shown by the Senate authorization committee. There were many more questions of a technical

³⁰The House Foreign Affairs Committee's name was changed to the House International Relations Committee in 1974.

nature concerning both economic and military assistance than in the Senate hearings. Table 9 presents some comparative data on percentage of technical statements or questions initiated during committee hearings.

TABLE 9
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HEARINGS--PERCENTAGE OF
TECHNICAL STATEMENTS

	1965	1968
House Foreign Affairs Committee	33%	24%
House Appropriations Committee	29%	30%
Senate Foreign Relations Committee	7.5%	10%

Interest in the administration of military assistance has not been nearly so high as for economic assistance, however. The committee has generally given the military aspect of aid a favorable hearing, perhaps accounting for the relative lack of investigation into the implementation of this program.

For much of the period the committee clearly perceived its major role as detailed oversight of implementation. But such oversight was intended to mobilize support for the program as a whole and legitimize the

Executive's action, not to critically evaluate the program.

The committee has exhibited great concern with administrative mismanagement and inefficiency, illustrated by its addition to the 1968 aid legislation of a new section concerning management practices. Its aim was to upgrade internal administrative efficiency and to improve reports to Congress. The system required the President to establish procedures which would clearly define the goals of the program, clearly delineate alternative methods of achieving such goals, indicate by quantitative means how much progress toward goals had been made, and analyze the success of the programs in light of the goals they were set up to accomplish.³¹

Throughout the decade the committee emphasized administrative coordination and unification of the program. An administratively unified program would enhance and secure the position of the committee, whose duties have revolved almost exclusively around the aid legislation.

The House International Relations Committee's

³¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, Report, H. Rept. 1587, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, pp. 27-28.

concern with the specific administrative criteria for granting assistance has also had foreign policy implications. Chairman Morgan has stressed that the committee members are not adverse to adding very restrictive amendments to a bill in order to indicate the way aid should be allocated. Amendments in 1963 prohibiting aid to Indonesia exemplified this attitude; likewise, in the latter part of the 1960's the committee was responsible for prohibitions on aid to Greece and Pakistan.

There has been some committee disagreement over the degree of specificity of congressional oversight. Chairman Morgan believes that the committee can set guidelines but must leave the President room to maneuver in foreign policy, a position supported by a majority on the committee. In 1966, for example, the committee criticized the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for reducing the number of countries which could receive aid. It felt that the Senate committee was becoming too specific in its restrictions. The House committee, on the other hand, viewed itself as being more responsible in offering advice and suggestions without hampering presidential policy.

While upholding presidential flexibility, members have jealously asserted their right to make autonomous foreign policy decision. Consequently, they have denounced administrators who try to anticipate congressional behavior.³²

Where the role of Congress as budget cutter and foreign policy interests have been in conflict, most members of the committee have opted for foreign policy considerations to take precedence. This would be expected in light of the function of a policy authorizing committee.

However, some members have critically observed that where administrative efficiency and foreign policy considerations have been in conflict, the priority given to foreign policy has been detrimental to the aid effort. For example, Representative Fraser accused Congress of using the aid bill to register not only its opinions on matters directly related to assisting other countries but also its attitude on American foreign policy in general. For Fraser this tendency has led

³²For example, in 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said that he had asked for only one billion dollars for military assistance because that was all he thought he could get from the committee. In reply to that kind of thinking Representative Peter Frelinghusen indicated that he was "deeply offended" that such determinations had been made before the committee had had a chance to study the aid request in light of foreign policy needs.

to many of the administrative problems with which AID has had to contend.³³ Fraser recommended removing the bill from annual congressional scrutiny, arguing that through the kinds of general presentation made, Congress could not be effective in its oversight function anyway. In 1968, he encouraged the committee to move into more meaningful long-term studies of such issues as "the basic philosophy of development and the problems of external aid."³⁴ Representative Robert Taft further suggested that the committee be broken down into subcommittees in order to do a more extensive area-by-area study. Taft foresaw an expanded policy-making role for the committee through the use of such methods.

For the most part, the House International Relations Committee has seemed quite satisfied with its relationship with the executive branch. First, it has tended to uphold vast administrative discretion. Its views and those of the administration have coincided on this issue. Second, important committee members have believed that the committee was playing its own role of administrative oversight adequately. Chairman Morgan noted in 1968 that he was convinced

³³Ibid., p. 36.

³⁴Ibid., p. 493.

that Congress was taken into account in advance of commitments.³⁵ Roy Bullock, senior staff assistant to the committee, has stated that most committee members believe that the committee receives adequate information from the executive branch.³⁶

Although, on the whole, there has been little conflict between the House International Relations Committee and administration proposals for action, a minority on the committee consistently has questioned executive discretion. This group played devil's advocate throughout the decade, but by 1971, other members were also beginning to question executive discretion on a larger scale than had ever been true before.

While the House committee's members have modified the program by questioning and sometimes prohibiting aid to selected countries, they have not questioned the overall program's validity or basic structure. In 1971, for example, only one member, Representative Ronald Dellums, really critically questioned the basic purposes of military assistance. Only 3% of committee questions in 1971 were aimed at the goals of military aid. In the mid-1960's when the

³⁵Ibid., p. 812.

³⁶Congressional Quarterly, 28 (November 20, 1970): 2828.

Senate called for an overall review of the program, the Foreign Affairs Committee saw no need for such a basic revamp.

Most emphasis has been placed on ways to improve administration of the program. While leaving such issues as the relationship between the scope of aid and America's foreign policy posture to the Senate, the House committee has attempted to make the aid program more palatable through encouraging more efficient administration.

Analysis indicates that this posture began to change during the latter part of the 1960's and early 1970's, however. When the committee has focused on objectives such as in 1968, it has questioned in detail how administrative implementation would be used to pursue objectives which its members favored. Through its attempts to prohibit aid to certain countries, the committee has tried to modify the administration's course of action.

In 1973 the committee took action to modify the methods through which aid was granted to other countries. Led by Representative Clement Zablocki, it was responsible for formulating the Export Development Credit Fund concept, an action illustrative of a new initiative on the part of this

committee. As congressional support for foreign aid waned, the committee perceived that its own interest lay in shoring up as much favorable support as possible. Acting passively was no longer enough to steer foreign aid through Congress; thus in the 1970's the House International Relations Committee has become a more active, initiating force in the decision-making process.

House Appropriations Committee

The House Appropriations Committee has had a distinctive pattern of interest throughout the Development Decade. As illustrated by committeemen's questions during hearings on economic and military aid, the areas of aid objectives, administration, and effect have not generated the degree of interest shown by the authorizing committees. This lack of interest in broad policy questions would be expected in light of the committee's basic function of determining how money will be spent.

In general, the protection of the United States economy and the American taxpayers' money has been the committee's major priority. Content analysis of hearings reveals that interest in the U.S. economy category has been very high, 12-14%, throughout the decade, except in 1971.

The committee has consistently perceived its role as consisting of detailed supervision of the program in the interest of economic feasibility. The committee has questioned in depth concerning the technicalities of aid administration and financial considerations. However, the committee's concern with technical questions did drop constantly in both categories over the years, as illustrated by Table 10.

TABLE 10

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE--TECHNICAL STATEMENTS

	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>
Economic Aid	35%	29%	30%	18.5%
Military Aid	65%	57.5%	55%	38%

The members became more interested in substantive policy matters as the decade progressed.

In 1968 Representative Passman, chairman of the subcommittee on Foreign Operations which has primary responsibility for review of foreign aid requests, expressed his view of the committee's role like this: "I deal with dollars rather than foreign policy."³⁷ Cutting the monetary

³⁷U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,

requests has been the primary goal. Even in the area of military assistance to which the committee has always been favorable, Passman indicated that the group's purpose has been to "contain the foreign aid program."³⁸

Nonetheless, when Passman talks of a budget being "in excess of needs,"³⁹ he and his committee obviously have some "needs" in mind. Committee members have given the norm of economy preeminent weight, but they certainly have not been oblivious to foreign policy considerations. In fact, in contrast to expectations, the content analysis shows that there has been considerable interest in foreign and international policy issues. Comparison of House Appropriations Committee hearings on economic and military

Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1969, Hearings, before the subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 691.

³⁸U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, Hearings, before a subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 342.

³⁹Passman asserted in 1965, ". . . the only purpose of the Committee on Appropriations in conducting hearings is to ascertain whether or not the budget is in excess of needs, or just right. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1966, Hearings, before a subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 610.

aid over time shows that concern with such policy increased significantly throughout the Development Decade. While, on the whole, these issues were not as salient as they were during debate within the authorization committees, in 1971 there was a higher level of interest in foreign policy than there was within the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Table 11 provides a comparison of committee interest in this area for 1971.

TABLE 11
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY

	1971			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
Economic Aid	0%	15.5%	22%	10%
Military Aid	29%	18%	28%	15%

Military assistance requests, which have been considered legitimate, have never met the committee opposition faced by economic aid. Committee members have desired a chance to act on the substantive aspects of the program and to make a judgment based on what they consider to be the merits of the case.

By controlling funding levels for various aspects of the assistance programs, the House Appropriations Committee has made very significant decisions affecting not only the program's administration but also foreign policy trends. For example, even though the committee's opposition to a multilateral approach to aid has been justified as protecting the United States citizen's money, this policy stand has tended to keep aid tied directly to American short-term political considerations.

Committee members have perceived that some balance must be struck between economy and foreign policy considerations. The compromise has usually been to effect major funding cuts in economic aid to meet the norm of economy and to allow a little more fat in military aid budgets to meet the norm of protecting vital American foreign policy interests.

Like the House International Relations Committee, the appropriations committee has viewed attention to the feasibility of aid projects as ensuring not only administrative efficiency but also congressional control. Since the committee cannot specify for what particular projects money may be spent, its major leverage has been simply cutting back the amount which can be spent. But subcommittee

chairman Passman has long favored a line-item bill, allowing Congress to make more specific funding decisions, and other important committee members have likewise urged giving the committee more decision-making authority over specific programs.

The congressional-executive relationship has consistently been a controversial issue.⁴⁰ The basic antagonism between the administration which wants more money to fund programs and the appropriations committee whose primary desire is to cut funding has laid the groundwork for contention.

In 1965, Passman complained of lack of congressional initiative:

. . . the legislation is generally drafted downtown and sent to the Congress for consideration. Before we change even a comma or period we get permission. . . . We no longer write legislation here, we just pass it.⁴¹

His reaction to this role was one of defiance. In 1971 his

⁴⁰While concern with the congressional role did not manifest itself during debate over economic assistance except in 1962, debate over military assistance indicated significant interest in Congress' role in decision-making.

⁴¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1966, Hearings, before the subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 331.

declaration that he would not be a part of the "rubberstamping" process indicated that his perception of congressional ineffectiveness had not changed.

The same year Representative Donald Riegle put the congressional-executive struggle in the context of foreign policy-making. He asserted that the Vietnam War's history had made abundantly clear that Congress had not even been told of events, much less actually taken into consultation. His questioning of the Secretary of State concerned machinery for improving communication between the legislative and executive branches in the foreign policy area. Such questioning indicates a concern with policy and decision-making procedures which goes much beyond merely evaluating the level of funding necessary to support a particular aid project or program.

While the committee has adamantly defended its role as final decision-maker for specific government spending, it has, at the same time, viewed its function as that of examining the desirability of projects which have been initiated within the executive branch. It definitely has not perceived its role as that of initiator of specific projects. The original planning of projects has been viewed

as the function of AID. Members have agreed that requests initiated by a congressional committee without bureaucratic approval should be rejected.

The House Appropriations Committee has not hesitated to add policy restrictions to aid appropriations legislation. The committee's view has been that the restrictions it has sponsored have actively helped the efficiency of the program without hampering program goals. Members have also asserted that the committee serves a valuable function through adding legislative restrictions which the administration can use for foreign policy bargaining. But Passman's complaints regarding the presidential tendency to ignore congressional restrictions illustrate the committee's continuing concern with administrative discretion throughout the period under study.

Senate Appropriations Committee

The Senate Appropriations Committee is the last step in the congressional foreign aid process and has been called a court of appeals from the House Appropriations Committee. Institutional relationships such as those between the two houses of Congress, between congressional committees, and between the different branches of government have been more

significant in determining the committee's perception of its role than any specific views on the merits of foreign aid goals or implementation. Nor has there been much interest in protecting the American taxpayers' money, in contrast to the author's expectations.

Economy of expenditure has been one function of the committee though, at least in the eyes of some members. During the early 1960's the Senate Appropriations Committee spent a good portion of its time attempting to put the aid program on a business-like basis.⁴² But generally, interest in the category of the United States economy has not been nearly as high for the Senate committee as for its House counterpart.

Likewise, while committee members emphasized during the early 1960's that the group was as interested in the successful achievement of acceptable goals as it was in

⁴²For example, in 1962 Senator Karl Mundt indicated considerable dissatisfaction with the loan program which he considered too soft. He did not feel that the committee's advice on administration of loans had been followed. But he did feel that the committee had made a valid attempt, pointing out that the late Senator Styles Bridges, as well as Senator Allen Ellender, had worked tirelessly for such modifications.

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations of 1962, Hearings, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 787.

economy, verbal concern with the objectives of economic assistance during the hearing process has remained consistently lower than that of the authorization committees.

Most significant has been the role the Senate Appropriations Committee has perceived itself as playing in the legislative process. Until 1971, the committee acted primarily as spokesman for the administration's stand, lending it congressional sanction within the appropriations process. Senate members noted that the House committee slashed aid funds, anticipating that the Senate would restore a good portion of the aid budget.

Questioning took place not in the spirit of searching criticism as in the House Appropriations Committee but in the spirit of friendly interrogation, to gather information with which the committee could be armed in the conference battle with Passman. Chairman John Pastore expressed this function as follows:

. . . You know how I stand on foreign aid. I have to provoke your arguments in order to get the record. But we have to go to a conference with the House. What you are asking is a direct appeal to the House. It is a difficult job to go back and say, 'you are all wrong, just say "I confess" and put it all back.' We have this same problem each year.

You are asking for the full restoration of everything that was cut by the House.⁴³

In 1968 Pastore defined the committee's role as a mediator between House Appropriations Committee and AID.

The overall reaction to administrative discretion throughout the Development Decade was favorable. For example, in 1961 the committee upheld executive discretion concerning whether or not to withhold information from Congress. Members of the House appropriations body have criticized the Senate group for its leniency toward executive requests.

By 1971, the Senate Appropriations Committee was changing its stance considerably from its previous role of legitimation. For example, in the late 1960's and early 1970's committee debate over the role of Congress increased. With regard to discussion of military assistance in 1971, committee members' concern with the congressional role in policy-making was considerably higher than that of either House committee. Table 12 indicates this difference.

⁴³U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations of 1968, Hearings, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 210.

TABLE 12
MILITARY ASSISTANCE--ROLE OF CONGRESS

1971	
HAC	4.5%
HFAC	5%
SFRC	30%
SAC	16%

Subcommittee chairman Proxmire praised certain administrative agencies such as the Peace Corps and AID for their cooperation in attempting to make information available to Congress. But he stressed that the Defense Department, which handled military aid, did not make the committee's task any easier. He predicted that this communications problem between the two branches might be a significant cause of trouble for the substance of the foreign aid program. In particular, he stressed that the lack of voting support in the Senate might be the direct result of the administration's refusal to give military assistance projections to the Foreign Relations Committee. Proxmire joined Passman in advocating a line-item bill.

By 1971, the whole tone of the committee hearings had changed. There was no longer any talk of gathering facts in order to defend administration proposals. There was no talk of provoking argument in order to get justifications into the record. The hearings were extremely long,⁴⁴ and the questioning was more intense and thorough than in previous years. The questioners expected answers not to satisfy the House Appropriations Committee but to satisfy the Senate.

By the early 1970's the committee was showing more concern for broad policy trends. Content analysis indicates that during economic assistance hearings percentage of statements in the technical category dropped to thirteen percent in 1971 from fifty-four percent in 1968. During military assistance hearings the 1971 figure was ten percent--one-fifth of the interest in technical questions shown by this committee in 1962. The committee was beginning more actively to investigate the foreign aid program, and a desire to modify policy in keeping with members' views was becoming more apparent.

⁴⁴FY1973 hearings were almost 1200 pages long.

Conclusions

Several hypotheses concerning the role of Congress in policy formation have been examined. The hypothesis that there would be distinctive differences between the roles performed by the appropriations bodies and those of the authorization committees has not been upheld. There is a great deal of overlap of function and role behavior between the committees engaged in the two phases of the aid process. All committees have been interested in policy as well as in the technicalities of aid implementation, although degree of interest has certainly differed. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not questioned specific administrative practices in as great detail as the House Appropriations subcommittee, it has attempted to modify administrative practices when a committee majority has disagreed with the practice in use at that time. However, such interest has generally been directly related to its concern with broad foreign and domestic policy considerations. In contrast, the interest of the House Appropriations Committee members seems to have been more clearly the result of its desire to appear cost-conscious. On the other hand, the appropriations

committee, especially the House group, have not hesitated to add substantive policy requirements to funding legislation.

The general policy formation function of the Congress in relation to foreign aid has not changed dramatically during the time period studied. Throughout the period 1961-1975 Congress has taken policy set forth primarily by executive branch officials and modified it to make it consistent with congressmen's conceptions of foreign policy goals. This has been accomplished through incremental shifts in program emphasis, sometimes accompanied by considerable conflict among different congressional forces. While these shifts have come about slowly because of political controversy, the program has been significantly affected by congressional action.

The role of Congress has changed somewhat, however, as the roles and/or strategies of certain committees have shifted. In some cases committees have changed strategies in order to play more adequately a certain role. In its desire to be in a position to modify policy more effectively and to ensure the consistency of implementation and basic policy guidelines, Congress has demanded

increasing administrative accountability. This has meant a shift from its past role of broad oversight of administration to a role of more detailed supervision of administrative conduct. Evidence supports the hypothesis that concern with Congress' role would increase along with increased congressional opposition to policy output.

Generally, congressional committees and subcommittees specialized in the area of foreign aid have moved to an increasingly assertive position during this time. The one exception is the House Appropriations Committee, which has maintained a fairly consistent role performance. Figure 1 illustrates committee role behavior throughout this period.

The roles of the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee have changed significantly. In the 1970's the House committee has begun to deal with broader policy issues and to be more willing to initiate alternatives to buttress the concept of bilateral aid. The role of the committee as a catalytic agent for changes such as an increased political development emphasis for AID is significant in encouraging a shift in program emphasis.

	1962	1965	1968	1971	---
<u>Senate Foreign Re-</u> <u>lations Committee</u>					
policy-initiation	[//]	[//]	[//]	[//]	[//]
policy-modification					
catalyst					
specific oversight			[//]	[//]	[//]
broad oversight	[//]	[//]			
legitimation		[//]	[//]		
<u>Senate Appropri-</u> <u>ations Committee</u>					
policy-iniation					
policy-modification					
catalyst				[//]	[//]
specific oversight					[//]
broad oversight	[//]				
legitimation					

Figure 1. Comparison of Committee Role Behavior

Figure 1--Continued

	1962	1965	1968	1971	---
<u>House International Relations Committee</u>					
policy-initiation					
policy-modification				[//]	[//]
catalyst		[//]	[//]	[//]	
specific oversight	[//]		[//]		
broad oversight					
legitimation	[//]	[//]			
<u>House Appropriations Committee</u>					
policy-initiation					
policy-modification	[//]		[//]	[//]	
catalyst					
specific oversight	[//]	[//]	[//]	[//]	[//]
broad oversight					
legitimation		[//]			

During the mid-1960's the House Foreign Affairs Committee's role of blunting the thrust of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's initiatives was in part responsible for this shift in its own role performance. In compromise with the Senate committee House conferees agreed that if the Senate would retreat from its demand for an extensive study of foreign aid, then reciprocally the House would turn its attention more toward encouraging political development. The position of the Senate committee gave incentive to House members to play a more active role of policy modification.

The Senate continues its tradition of dealing with the broad foreign policy implications of aid policy. In the 1970's the Senate Appropriations Committee's role has enhanced the position of the Foreign Relations Committee. The Senate Appropriations Committee has been the negotiating ground for compromise, and it is likely that this role will continue to be a central one for committee members. But the committee has charted for itself a more independent catalytic role. The Executive can no longer take its support for granted.

The role of the committee has also become more significant during the aid controversies of the 1970's.

During the earlier period the compromises dealt mainly with level of funding; but in 1975 the committee attempted to negotiate compromises on policy issues such as arms aid to Turkey. Moreover, Senator Pastore, who has long been an influential appropriations committee figure, fought a successful battle to recommit the 1974 bill to the Foreign Relations Committee, a step he took in order to save the essence of the program from a 1971-type defeat.

Thus Congress moved toward an increasingly assertive posture during the Decade of Development, seeking to develop policy in conjunction with the Executive. But the confrontations of recent years indicate that the relationship may have devolved into political stalemate.

CHAPTER V

ADMINISTRATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF CONGRESS' ROLE

Congressional committees view the substance of the foreign aid program from varying perspectives and also view their own participation in the aid decision-making process in different ways. An analysis of the perceptions of the administrators who are engaged in program planning and implementation of aid legislation indicates that their perceptions of the program and of Congress' role in shaping the aid effort may be at variance with those of congressional policy-makers.

In order to study administrative perception, semi-structured questionnaires were mailed to thirty-one administrators within the Agency for International Development (AID) and to twenty-six administrators within the State Department. This survey was conducted in November, 1972. The same questionnaire was mailed to sixteen officials who had been employed by AID during the period 1968-71.¹

¹This sample was limited to those for whom addresses could be obtained. Responses to the questionnaires are presented in appendix E.

Analysis of responses must be preceded by a discussion of the limitations involved. First, not all of the questionnaires were returned; thus answers received may not be accurate as a general view of agency opinion. The rate of return was thirty-two percent for those employed by AID at the time of the survey, forty-four percent for those who had been previously employed, and twenty-seven percent for State Department officials.²

Fortunately, many who are or were in key positions to have the kind of knowledge requested (persons who had worked in the area of legislative presentation, for example) did reply. In addition to selected personal responses from AID officials, the agency provided an official answer to the first part of the questionnaire concerning the substance of the foreign aid program. Unfortunately, the agency refused to comment officially on the latter part of the questionnaire concerning the Congress' role, stating that it would be improper for it to do so. Nevertheless, the responses received provide a foundation for discussing some executive

²James Rosenau has stated that twenty percent is the expected return on mailed questionnaires; therefore, this response is viewed as a relatively good one. Rosenau, The Drama of Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), p. 183.

branch officials' views of the program and the decision-making process, even though some questions may have been answered with a view to public relations.

While an attempt to fit responses into the questionnaire categories has been made, this was not always possible. Some respondents indicated that they feared a mechanical statistical use of the data which could hide or overlook complexities. Many answered, not through the categories provided by the questionnaire, but through their own words, which has been extremely helpful. Therefore, this analysis will focus not only on quantitative responses but on a more flexible discussion of the subject including non-quantified comments.

It also should be noted that where more than one response to a question was marked, each response was included as a basis for analysis. This accounts for the fact that sometimes there are more responses than individual respondents.

The survey attempted to tap administrative perceptions concerning the objectives of United States foreign assistance, its actual accomplishments, and the consistency between purposes and effects. Also sought were perceptions concerning the methods of giving foreign aid and the administrative structure for implementation of the program. Further-

more, the study tried to ascertain how administrators view the role of the Congress in the foreign aid policy process.

The author hypothesizes that in many cases there will be disparities between the perceptions of AID officials and State Department officials. For example, AID personnel have been found to stress economic development as a goal of economic aid to a greater extent than State Department personnel, who view the program in manifestly political terms.³

One would also expect that there will be significant differences between perceptions of administrators and those of some congressional groups. These different perceptions of the program help to explain the confusion surrounding the aid effort and may help account for congressional opposition on the part of the groups not in agreement with administrators. One hypothesis is that the congressional subsystems in disagreement with administrative perceptions will be the ones which have been most antagonistic to the aid venture.

Furthermore, the author hypothesizes that administrators will perceive the proper role of congressional groups within the decision-making process differently from congressmen

³ Robert Packenham has stated that AID officials were more favorable to economic development goals than were State Department officials. Robert Packenham, "Foreign Aid."

themselves, most likely deemphasizing the more assertive roles for those groups which have been antagonistic to the program's administration and encouraging a more assertive role for those whose conception of the program is consistent with the administrators' point of view.

Administrative Perceptions of the Foreign Aid Program

The first question asked of administrators was three-fold: (1) What should be the major purpose of the economic assistance program? (2) What should be the second most important purpose for which economic assistance is given? (3) What is the goal actually being served by economic assistance as it has been administered? The second question dealt with the goals which should be and actually are pursued through the military assistance program.

Administrative officials showed considerable agreement on the most important purpose of U.S. economic assistance: encouraging economic development within a recipient country. There was more variety to responses concerning the second most important purpose of economic aid-giving. The official AID reply was that a combination of domestic economic well-being and national security of the United States compose the second most significant purpose of U.S. aid.

A plurality of officials perceived economic development as the goal actually effected through the aid process.⁴ Officially AID replied that a combination of "a peaceful world" and "an independent and self-supporting world of nations" was being actually fostered through the program. From written replies it seems that the rationale of many of the administrators is that if the United States fosters economic development of recipients as an intermediate goal, in the long-run the goals of a peaceful world and a world of self-supporting nations will be fostered simultaneously. This situation will provide the atmosphere in which the national security and domestic economic well-being of the United States will be protected. The rationale is very similar to that of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

While a majority of AID officials indicated that the primary emphasis of the aid program is pursuing long-term economic ends (both as an ideal and in actuality), the official

⁴ Responses within the category of former AID employees concerning the goal actually served were quite varied. Humanitarianism, economic development, security of the U.S. in terms other than the threat of Communism, and domestic economic well-being of the U.S. all received equal votes. There was less consensus on the primary goal(s) served by the program among those who had worked for the agency in earlier years than for those employed at the time of the survey. No doubt the former were less influenced to support an agency viewpoint.

AID reply was long-term political development. Although no official stated that short-term political goals should be pursued through aid, twenty percent of replies stated that in actuality they were.

State Department respondents gave slightly more emphasis to political development than to economic purposes, and among this group short-term political goals received only slightly less emphasis than the other two alternatives. State Department personnel tended to perceive the overall emphasis of the program more in terms of political development and short-term political factors than did AID personnel. Likewise, the Congress has apparently placed more marked emphasis on political development during this time than has the aid agency.

A majority of administrative officials perceived the major purpose of military assistance as the military security of the United States, while a peaceful world and an "independent and self-supporting world of nations" also received support as appropriate goals. Interestingly, the goal most frequently perceived as being actually served was political development of the recipient country, though the official AID

reply stated that a peaceful world was the goal actually served by military aid.⁵

Administrators were also queried as to the means through which aid should be granted. One major congressional controversy has been over the issue of multilateral versus bilateral aid, making administrative views on the subject relevant. Among AID and State Department officials, multilateral aid programs received slightly more support than bilateral programs, but both were emphasized as important. One AID official indicated that a mixture of both was preferable, with "a gradual phasing into an almost wholly multilateral system in about ten years." There appears to be congruence between the Congress' cautious attitude in favor of increased use of multilateral organizations and the preferences of aid administrators.

Administrators indicated a decisive preference for economic loans over grants, although AID officials gave more support to the grant approach than did State Department offi-

⁵United States military security and an independent and self-supporting world of nations also received frequent mention as goals which have been actually effected through the military assistance program. One AID official stated that the goal actually served was the bureaucratic interests of the U.S. military departments.

cials. One official stated that "historically, . . . United States grant aid has generally been more effective both politically and economically. . . ."

There was almost equal administrative support given to the loan and sales approaches to military assistance, but the official AID reply was that loans should be given major emphasis within the military aid program. The use of long-term credit sales has tended to blur the distinction between loans, sales, and grants.

Understandably, AID officials gave overwhelming support to economic assistance as the primary emphasis of the U.S. aid effort, with some support shown for technical aid specifically. State Department replies were similar. Officially the AID agency stated that economic assistance, supporting assistance, technical assistance, humanitarian assistance, and private investment should all be given emphasis. Generally there seems to have been little conflict in recent years between congressional and administrative perceptions of the means of foreign aid.

In addition to questions concerning objectives and means, the respondents were also questioned concerning the

quality of the administration of foreign assistance.⁶ Officially the AID agency reported that the program was implemented with very little waste and inefficiency in both the economic and military assistance spheres. Personal replies of AID officials, however, indicate that they would rate administrative efficiency somewhat lower, as "adequate" in both the economic and military areas. One respondent noted that administration of development assistance (development loans and technical assistance) has been improved substantially, while the administration of security assistance has suffered in comparison.

Former AID officials were less complimentary in their appraisal of the administration of economic assistance. A plurality of them agreed that some waste and inefficiency did occur, though not enough to condemn the program entirely.⁷

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- ⁶The questionnaire allowed a range of five responses:
- a. Very wasteful and inefficient
 - b. Some waste and inefficiency but not enough to condemn program
 - c. Adequate administration
 - d. Very little waste or inefficiency
 - e. Excellent administration

⁷A slight majority of State Department officials said there was "some waste and inefficiency" in the economic aid program but not enough to condemn it. However, in regard to military assistance there was almost total agreement that there was a fair amount of waste and inefficiency.

Responses in relation to military assistance ranged across the entire spectrum, possibly indicating less knowledge of military assistance administration.⁸

A majority of administrators' responses concerning the decision-making independence of the Agency for International Development indicated that final policy-making control should rest with the foreign policy apparatus of the State Department. This also was the official view of AID. In the area of military assistance the replies were virtually unanimous in favor of general oversight by the State Department and subordination of aid to the foreign policy goals of the United States. Only one respondent said administration of military aid should be handled primarily by the Pentagon.⁹ While congruent with views of officials on the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee,

⁸While one official viewed administration of both parts of the program as excellent, his remarks indicate that he perceived only the economic part of the program as valid. In regard to economic assistance he said, "Excellent administration in the context that development is a high risk enterprise and mistakes are inevitable." In regard to military assistance he said, "If you accept the goals and subgoals of the military assistance program, it is administered to death!"

⁹Expectedly, responses from the State Department were unanimous that the State Department should oversee both economic and military aid and provide coordination with American foreign policy goals.

these views conflict with those of Passman of the House Appropriations Committee and are not entirely in keeping with the major thrust of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has sought to have the political aspects of aid deemphasized.

The Role of Congress

Officially AID refused comment on the role of Congress in foreign aid policy-making, but individual replies from AID policy officials give insight into their perceptions of the part the Congress should and does play. The first question asked was: What should the basic role of Congress be in the formation of the foreign aid program?¹⁰ Answers were varied. Receiving the greatest number of votes was "modification of policy initiated by the executive

¹⁰Possible congressional roles listed on the questionnaire were:

1. policy-initiation
2. policy-modification
3. legitimation
4. catalyst
5. other

Possible roles for each committee were:

1. policy-initiation
2. policy-modification
3. broad administrative oversight
4. detailed administrative oversight
5. other

Please see chapter IV for role definitions.

branch," but "catalyst to spur executive branch action" and "initiation of policy stands" each received almost as much support. Clearly, administrative officials perceived the Congress as legitimately exercising a significant policy-making influence on the program. On the question of what role Congress actually was playing, a slight majority of respondents replied, "modification of executive branch policy." The next most frequently mentioned role was "legitimation of executive policy."¹¹

A subsequent question dealt with the basic role of each of the individual committees in influencing foreign aid legislation. Responses show that officials perceived the two appropriations committees as properly providing "broad over-

¹¹Former AID employees listed legitimation of policy as the role Congress played more frequently than did AID officials employed in November, 1972, perhaps indicating that administrators perceived the Congress as a more independent policy-influencing force in 1972 than in previous years. Such speculation is tentative due to the small n.

Some AID and State Department officials in 1972 perceived Congress as properly being a catalytic force. One respondent noted that in the early 1970's officials were perceiving a move for the Congress from a modification role to a catalytic role to spur executive branch action. A former official whose major responsibility was legislative presentation noted that while he had felt, at the time he worked in AID, that modification should be and actually was the role of Congress, in 1972 he felt that a catalytic role should be an actually was the most appropriate role for the legislative branch.

sight of administrative action." While there was a good bit of agreement that the Senate Appropriations Committee should primarily perform a broad oversight role, there was frequent mention of a detailed oversight role for the House committee.

Respondents perceived the role of policy-initiation as a proper one for the authorization committees but not for the appropriations committees. Modification of policy was perceived as an important function of both authorization committees, but interestingly, more administrators perceived this as an important role for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, while initiation was more frequently mentioned as an important role for the House International Relations Committee. It is possible that, based on perceptions of committee attitudes and past performance in regard to the aid venture, administrators believed the House body should be a more aggressively innovative force, while the Senate committee should be less so.¹²

Perceptions of the actual roles of the committees were quite similar to the roles that these officials thought the committees should play. For example, few respondents

¹² On the other hand, a majority of State Department officials perceived broad oversight of administration as the role both the authorization committees should perform.

perceived the two authorizing committees as performing a detailed oversight function, and no respondent perceived these committees as properly performing such a role. There was much consensus, though, that the House Appropriations Committee did in fact exercise this function. However, one official clarified that the cuts which this committee made were based on a concept of providing broad policy guidance, and a number of State Department officials saw the committee as modifying policy.

All committees were perceived as performing a general administrative oversight function. There was considerable agreement that the Senate Appropriations Committee exercised this function as its primary responsibility.

Both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were seen as playing an initiating role in policy-making, at least as a part of their function, although this role was less frequently mentioned as a role these committees actually did perform than as one they should perform.¹³ While respondents indicated that all

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Former personnel of AID perceived the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as being an initiating body more frequently than did AID personnel employed in 1972. It is possible that by late 1972 the committee was perceived as less significant in initiating major policy alternatives than it had been in previous years.

of the committees were engaged in modification of policy, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was perceived as most significant in this role, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee was seen as the second most significant policy-modifying force within the Congress.

Interestingly, two former AID officials asserted that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had played no useful function in the foreign aid policy process and had been a totally negative influence.

Administrators were also questioned on their perceptions of certain standards or norms which might act as guidelines for committee behavior. Concern with the economy was the norm associated most frequently with the appropriations committees. Officials also perceived "keeping control over the executive branch" as a norm which was considered by both appropriations committees. The major norm of the House Foreign Affairs Committee was perceived as "impact on overall American foreign policy." Administrators perceived the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as being guided simultaneously by concern with American foreign policy factors and with executive-legislative relations.

Two former AID employees perceived other norms for all of the committees. One said that the best explanation

for committee behavior lay in the motivations of individual congressmen. Another asserted that the primary norm of the committees was political attention to the voters back home in the state or district. A former assistant to Senator William Proxmire also noted the overriding concern for publicity for constituent consumption as a dominant guideline to behavior, including that in the area of foreign aid.

One AID official emphasized an already noted phenomenon: the overlap between the functions of the authorization and the appropriations committees. He stated that appropriations committees do, in fact, legislate. For example, the authorization committees have consistently put in a portion of money for multilateral institutions, and the appropriations process has consistently removed it. "So the Appropriation Committees set the policy actually followed, whatever change the Authorization Committees may initiate." On the other hand, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been quite active in cutting funding, supposedly an appropriations function.

However, there has been a difference perceived in the primary emphasis of the authorization and appropriations bodies. As one official expressed it, the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee have been more concerned with the "broad policy issues."

Generally, the roles the various committees should perform and the roles that they actually do perform are very often perceived as the same. There could be two explanations for this phenomenon. One is that administrative officials believe that the committees are performing the tasks that they should be performing. Second is that whatever role the committee is perceived as actually playing is granted legitimacy as a role the committee should perform. In other words, if the committee has the political power to act in a certain way, soon that way of acting will be considered legitimate.

The Impact of Congress

The third set of survey questions dealt with administrators' perceptions concerning the actual impact of Congress on the foreign aid policy process. While no administrator who replied viewed Congress' impact as negligible, opinion split on whether or not Congress has made significant impact on important policy issues. An equal number of administrators stated that "significant impact on basic policy has been made" as stated that "impact only on less important matters,

not on basic issues," has been the result of congressional attempts to influence the program.

Another question dealt with the impact of each of the four congressional committees separately. A majority of administrators perceived the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee as having significant impact on less important matters and not on basic policy issues. Approximately fifty percent felt the same way about the impact of the House Appropriations Committee. On the other hand, a majority of respondents perceived the impact of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a significant influence on basic policy, although one official qualified this to apply only to the latter part of the Development Decade.¹⁴

One set of questions dealt with Congress' impact on specific areas of the program: goals, means, and administration. A subsequent set of questions dealt with each committee's impact in each of these areas. These questions were designed to tap specific examples of congressional impact on the aid process.

¹⁴ Generally, officials at AID perceived slightly more significant impact for both House committees than did officials at State.

A clear majority of officials perceived the Congress as having an impact on both economic and military assistance goals. Several officials explained that through reducing funds and providing a steady flow of criticism, Congress has reduced the scope of programs, thereby narrowing and limiting program objectives.¹⁵ At least fifty percent of respondents perceived all of the committees except the Senate Appropriations Committee as having impact on economic aid goals. On the other hand, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was the only committee studied which was perceived as influential in affecting military aid goals.

Another set of questions dealt with the influence Congress and the particular committees have had on the means of foreign aid. A majority perceived Congress as having an impact on the means of economic aid. However, there was a fifty-fifty split in opinion concerning whether or not the Congress has had any impact on the means of military assistance. Specific examples of congressional influence on the means of economic aid were given in the areas of multi-

¹⁵ On the other hand, one former official of AID stated that the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had been responsible for the proliferation of objectives for the economic aid program.

lateralism, loans, technical assistance, and population control. One State Department official noted that the shift from grant military aid to credit and cash purchases has been largely accomplished due to the actions of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A majority of administrators perceived each of the committees as having some effect on the means of foreign assistance, although there was more credit given to the impact of the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee than to the other two groups.

Of most interest is the fact that in many cases administrative opinion concerning the impact of each of the four committees on the goals and means of foreign assistance was very divided. One official emphasized that congressional impact is reduced because of the differing opinions among various congressional committees. For example, congressional impact on the use of multilateralism as a method of providing assistance has been lessened because congressional pressures for and against this approach have largely cancelled each other out.

The last set of questions dealt with the impact of Congress on improving the administration of foreign aid.

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A slight majority of administrators felt that Congress has had an impact on improving the administration of the foreign aid program, but almost as many felt otherwise. There was disagreement on whether the congressional effort to encourage a higher level of performance had been a negative influence or a "real plus." One official said that Congress has:

forced improved budgetary procedures on foreign aid programs, and, through curtailment, has made the program more selective. But earmarking of funds, for example, has had an adverse effect on the efficiency of foreign aid administration.

Interestingly, while a clear majority of officials stated that Congress, as a whole, has aided administration, when questioned on the effect of each of the committees separately, a majority of respondents stated that each of the committees has not been of any assistance in improving administration. One State Department official did emphasize that in the past the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had been of most help since they had been the most critical. In the early 1970's the Senate Appropriations Committee had become more critical. The implication is that when committees have independently analyzed the program rather than just passing it through, their suggestions have generally improved the efficiency of administration.

When asked to rank which committee has had the most impact on the overall program and which has had the least impact, a majority perceived the House Appropriations Committee as exercising the most significant influence on the program.¹⁶ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was given the next rank, but with less than one-half the support given the appropriations body. Some officials believe that while Foreign Relations Committee debates and action may have delayed or otherwise affected the foreign aid bill and may have had major impact on foreign policy generally, they have not basically changed the foreign aid program itself. A clear majority perceived the Senate Appropriations Committee as having the least influence on the aid process. However, several AID officials asserted that the stance of this Senate committee had changed during the years 1970-72, so that a rating of least impact would no longer be accurate.

One respondent argued that in general terms foreign aid policy has been shaped more by the House than by the Senate. As he put it, the Senate has had the publicity of

¹⁶The influence of Representative Passman was praised by some former AID employees, who said that they had had increasing admiration for him especially since 1963. "I feel that he has been a constant beneficial influence on the program during those years," said one.

spectacularly rejecting aid legislation, "but if you look at the legislation actually enacted, including the amounts of aid, the decisive force as been with the House which has saved foreign aid time and again." One AID official who obviously does feel that the Congress has had constructive effect on the program summed up his reactions in this way:

Complaints by the Executive Branch about excessive Congressional restrictions are by and large ill-founded: these restrictions are mostly just sound business procedures or sound United States policies which have been enacted into law because the Executive Branch has somehow or other done something it should have had the common sense not to do.

Conclusions

Since the sample is so small, it is impossible to make any decisive generalizations. But since officials who replied to the questionnaire are or were in positions to have a great deal of knowledge of the foreign aid venture, their comments provide valuable insight into the aid process and provide the basis for some tentative conclusions.

Just as different congressmen have done, different administrators have perceived the aid program as fostering a variety of objectives. Concerning economic aid there was a difference though in the primary emphasis of AID and State Department respondents. AID administrators tended to view

the program in economic terms. while State Department personnel placed somewhat more emphasis on political goals. Different bureaucratic lenses can encourage different outlooks, which add to the complexity of program implementation.

There has also been variance between official AID statements and comments made by knowledgeable agency personnel. This indicates some confusion or disagreement concerning program goals. In some instances goals sought and those perceived as actually furthered were also different. While responses indicate that in general officials view the economic aid program as accomplishing what they feel it should accomplish, there is less administrative consensus concerning the goals of military assistance.

A lack of complete agreement or consistency in replies probably indicates a healthy bureaucratic situation. If replies had been in complete agreement, this would suggest that either they were being given by rote, and thus were not useful, or that a complicated program was being greatly oversimplified in actual operation. Foreign aid is a complex multi-purpose venture in which many legitimate goals are pursued simultaneously. The major inference from this survey is that the program deserves more careful analysis of the

relation of pursued objectives and those perceived as actually attained.

Generally, the objectives and means of the aid program were viewed in ways which were consistent with the views of major congressional actors. There was a good bit more congruence than was hypothesized.

There is some validity to the hypothesis that congressional subsystems which are in disagreement with administrative perceptions are also those most antagonistic to the program. But the most hostile congressional groups may be in virtually total agreement with administrators on proper objectives and in disagreement only concerning accomplishments. For example, AID personnel and Senate Foreign Relations Committee members have agreed on purposes. But while aid administrators saw the effort actually furthering economic development within recipient countries, the 1971 Senate committee report clearly stated that a majority on the committee did not perceive that the stated objectives were actually being attained through present implementation. In some cases those differing with aid officials on appropriate objectives (such as the House International Relations Committee, which preferred that aid be used to encourage

political development) have sought to modify the program toward more effective fulfillment of the group's desired objectives. But this attempt has not necessarily been manifested in antagonism toward the program in general. A significant distinguishing factor is the scope of foreign policy responsibility of the two congressional subsystems; since the House committee has had no other vehicle for influencing foreign policy besides the aid legislation, it has hesitated to take any action which would threaten the security of the program. This consideration again illustrates the importance of institutional factors.

Administrators perceived Congress and its committees as performing proper roles within the decision-making process. Moreover, perceptions from both Capitol Hill and the executive offices were quite similar concerning the role performance of particular congressional subsystems.

The hypothesis that administrators would deemphasize the more assertive roles for those congressional groups which have been antagonistic to the program's administration and encourage a more assertive role for those which have been less critical is partially valid. There was no evidence that administrators viewed detailed supervision of administration as a proper role for the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, although in the early 1970's this committee clearly moved toward that role. On the other hand, administrative perceptions of the House Appropriations Committee as properly a detailed supervisor of the program's implementation are interesting considering this committee's record of opposition to foreign aid. Possibly the moderated opposition of the House committee at the time of the study accounts for this attitude or perhaps, as indicated by some individuals, administrators have not perceived the appropriations group's criticisms as detrimental to the functioning of AID.

In general terms there was practically no consensus on what impact Congress has had on the objectives, means, and administration of foreign aid. AID and State Department respondents often did not agree on the influence of certain committees on specific aspects of the program. Generally, Congress was perceived as influencing the economic aid program to a greater extent than the military aid portion, but it should be remembered that other congressional committees may have had greater impact on military aid than those studied here and that officials surveyed were more directly involved with the economic phase of the effort. Yet even though they do not agree on the degree of congressional impact, administrators do perceive that Congress exerts some influence on

the policy as well as on the conduct of the assistance effort. The specific examples of legislative influence cited by officials are testimony to the fact that Congress is an active participant in shaping the foreign aid program.

CHAPTER VI

THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SETTING OF FOREIGN AID

Explanations for changes in the way Congress has handled foreign aid legislation in recent years lie in two areas: the domestic political system and the international system. Structural changes within Congress, changes in the relationship between President and Congress, and changing domestic economic and political considerations have partially determined the fate of the aid program.

Changes within the committee structure of the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee, coinciding with the movement of certain personalities into strategically significant institutional positions, have profoundly affected the behavior of these committees. Furthermore, personnel changes within committees have sometimes directly influenced the relationship of committee and chief executive. Congressional perceptions of presidential intent have influenced final aid

decisions, so that as legislative distrust of the conduct of foreign affairs grew in the early 1970's, so did legislative hostility to presidential discretion over foreign aid decisions.

Economic factors have also influenced the foreign aid policy process. Inflation, devaluation of the dollar, and balance of payments difficulties increased criticism of aid spending abroad. Some congressmen found it politically difficult to vote for foreign aid while funds for domestic programs were being cut or impounded.

Of major significance have been changing perceptions of international relationships and perceptions of the role foreign aid has played in shaping those relationships. The thawing of the Cold War atmosphere and the increasing political influence of states other than the United States and the U.S.S.R. have necessitated a reevaluation of aid rhetoric, policy, and administration. Increasing doubt concerning effectiveness of aid in achieving stated objectives has provided a logical reason for some congressional critics to demand a cut-back in funding. During the latter 1960's, concern over the consequences of military aid to countries in politically tense regions of the world heightened criticism of the program. But the impact of the Vietnam experience has

been overwhelming for several reasons. Executive decisions on Indochina policy led to congressional criticism not only of policy but of procedure for foreign policy decision-making. As a result, the aid program became a key vehicle for expressing congressmen's views on broader issues.

This chapter examines the impact of each of these factors on the congressional aid debate and analyzes how they affected the legislative reaction to aid proposals.

The Domestic Political System: Party and President

Support for foreign aid among all congressional partisan factions has clearly diminished during the 1961-75 period. In the early 1960's bipartisan support in the Senate and overwhelming Democratic support in the House of Representatives provided President Kennedy's foreign aid measures with comfortable margins of approval. In the Senate, significant changes in the voting pattern occurred in 1968 when defections by Democrats (with a Democrat in the White House) became quite noticeable. Loss of support of Northern Democrats¹ accounted for this shift.

¹Dissension within the majority party over Indochina policy coupled with increasing anxiety over economic factors explains this loss.

In 1971 two trends were evident. First, Republican support in the Senate had decreased. While Senate Republicans had generally supported the program under the previous Democratic administration, now, under a Republican administration, they split almost evenly on the foreign aid issue.

Second, loss of Democratic support was staggering. While there was some loss within the ranks of Southern Democrats (who have consistently opposed foreign aid), the most significant factor was the negative votes of Northern Democrats who voted 2-1 against the bill. In subsequent votes on bills which split the measure into economic and military components, increased Northern Democratic support (along with increased Republican support) gave clear-cut approval to the economic aid segment. The military assistance bill also won easy passage thanks to sizeable Republican and Southern Democratic support, but with considerably less consensus on the part of Northern Democrats.

The story in the House of Representatives has been different. Opposition has remained primarily within the ranks of Republicans and Southern Democrats, traditionally conservative forces. In the early 1970's Republican support increased, probably as a result of a Republican administration

in the White House. But this party loyalty did not last. Appropriations for FY 1975 passed by a very narrow margin with over sixty percent of the Republicans voting against. The House's stand on the Turkish aid cut-off was supported by all party groups even though it was directly contradictory to the President's position on the issue.

While congressional support for foreign aid has dwindled among all party factions, the inability of a Republican president to command party loyalty in the House of Representatives and the disenchantment of Northern Democrats in the Senate over the basic outline of foreign aid policy has put aid in a highly precarious position in the 1970's. It is interesting that the Johnson administration lost the largest proportion of congressional support from the ranks of liberal Democrats in the Senate. Likewise, Nixon lost support in the Senate from members of his own Republican Party. Clearly, party loyalty has not been enough to mobilize congressional support for the President's program when distinct policy differences and economic factors have been involved.

Congressional Structure

The brief political analysis presented above highlights the segments of Congress from which there had been a significant loss of support for foreign aid during this period. Explanations for this partisan loss remain to be explored. One set of factors lies in the internal make-up of Congress. The structure, composition and interrelationships of Congress and its various subsystems have played a part in the way foreign aid policy has fared over the past fifteen years.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Senator J. William Fulbright, who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee throughout the 1960's until his primary defeat in 1974, envisioned using his committee to maximize Congress' influence in the realm of foreign affairs, a vision shared by committee members. This perception of the committee's proper role has been encouraged by the institutional role of the Senate as defined by the Constitution. The prerogatives of the upper house in treaty ratification and confirmation of ambassadors provide the foundation for influence in policy-making. Generally, the Senate has provided the environment conducive to Senate Foreign Relations Committee influence, granting the body a high prestige

ranking in the Senate pecking order. On the other hand, the Senate has traditionally kept its committees "permeable" and "collectively unimportant,"² meaning that there has not been the additional support for a strong cohesive committee which would be necessary for the group to maximize its potential. The Senate has never granted its committees the autonomy of House committees. The system of overlapping committee membership also has diluted the independence of any particular Senate group.

While congressional-executive relations have been a matter of major concern to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, there have been problems of "balancing" power within Congress as well. Relations with the Senate Armed Services Committee have been strained. As early as 1963, Senator Humphrey's struggle to obtain more money for the Alliance for Progress was fought by members of the Armed Services Committee. But the war in Vietnam and the switch of some military assistance funds from the foreign aid program directly to the Defense Department budget in 1966 and 1967 caused severe squabbles over jurisdiction. Such quarrels were the result of basic disagreements over priorities. Senator Fulbright,

²Fenno, Congressmen in Committees, p. 155.

who had fought an increase in military assistance, said in 1971 that fellow committeeman Senator Stuart Symington had had no choice but to agree to sponsor an amendment raising the sum "because he recognized the fact of life that the influence of the Armed Services Committee is dominant in this body."³

In 1971 the committee sought the return of military aid programs in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand to Foreign Relations Committee jurisdiction. Finally, in compromise with Chairman John Stennis of the Armed Services Committee, only the Thai program was returned. Senator Stennis sought to dispel the idea that the disagreement was an institutional one between two committees, stressing that as soon as the hostilities in Southeast Asia ended, or even when a stable cease-fire agreement was negotiated, he would gladly return the aid programs to Foreign Relations jurisdiction. But clearly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's desire to have significant impact on aid programs directly related to the Indochina conflict was thwarted by institutional factors.

However, the major institutional parameter the committee must face is the preeminence of the executive branch

³Congressional Quarterly, 29 (November 6, 1971): 2263.

of government in the foreign policy field. The strategy of the Foreign Relations Committee has shifted in recent years largely because of frustration over what members often perceived as their ineffectual role in policy-making. Concern over the lack of information available to congressional committees from the executive branch resulted in the feeling that a role of meaningful consultation was largely a figment of the imagination. Disappointed that the committee as an institutional force was not playing a significant role in policy-formation, senators sought to have some effect through their own personal powers, an approach which led to the "policy-individualism" posture of the mid-1960's. However, in order to compete with the organizational structure of the executive branch, a cohesive, organized congressional body was necessary, one which could forge a policy stand and steer it through the floor debate successfully.

This executive predominance, combined with the internal structure of both foreign aid authorization committees, has not been conducive to an expert, initiating policy role for either of these policy-oriented bodies. Structurally, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee use subcommittees based primarily on geographic area, but both grant these subsystems "consulta-

tive" rather than major legislative functions. The subcommittees have not had specialized staff until very recently and therefore have been limited in their research function. There was a move within the Senate committee during the 89th Congress (1965-66) to develop specialized subcommittees with active staffs in an attempt to maximize the committee's role. But Senator Fulbright's personal philosophy and concept of the committee's proper function was at odds with this proposed revision. As he phrased his view in 1969,

I do not think the nature or character of the Committee on Foreign Relations or responsibility lends itself to a breaking down into [legislative] subcommittees. The Foreign Relations Committee is more of a committee to influence the attitudes and policies of the State Department than it is to legislate.⁴

Members have observed that Fulbright did not allow the subcommittees any really creative role and that the staff functioned to keep the subcommittees out of foreign policy decision-making.⁵ This attitude on the part of some members reflects their frustration.

The personal qualities and philosophy of Fulbright have determined much of the committee's operating style during

⁴Congressional Record, Daily Edition, Jan. 14, 1969, p. 5147, quoted in Fenno, Congressmen in Committees, pp. 188-89.

⁵Fenno, Congressmen in Committees, p. 189.

the period studied. Committee members and staff have referred to him as "the most brilliant" member and as "more savvy, more sophisticated, and more informed" than any other Foreign Relations chairman in recent history. But his style was individualistic.

As one member said, "Foreign Relations is the worst organized Committee of all." While acknowledging Fulbright's own competence, he criticized the chairman's lack of inclination toward organization. "He doesn't try to get a majority behind him. . . ." ⁶ And experience has reflected this. In 1966, for example, Fulbright's attempt to have military and economic aid completely split from each other did not command united committee support and failed.

Fulbright's personal bent has been partially responsible for what some observers see as a power shift in the early 1970's, with the House International Relations Committee becoming the more dominant foreign policy committee. Fulbright's style of leadership, which was a combination of maintaining a modicum of control but not decisive committee leadership, on the one hand, and not allowing other committee members to mobilize support through subcommittee activity,

⁶Ibid.

on the other hand, did not enhance committee influence.⁷

The concomitant decreasing interest on the part of committee members was in part a result of this factor and also a cause of the perceived power shift.

In the latter 1960's and early 1970's disunity seemed to be the byword of the committee. Differences in political viewpoints concerning American military involvement in Indochina and the role of Congress in determining such foreign policy matters were largely responsible for the increasing dissension. Important committee members, led by Fulbright, held views which were in conflict with the administration on Southeast Asian policy. Thus executive-legislative harmony disintegrated. As Francis Wilcox points out, by the end of 1968 when analysts decried poor congressional-executive relations, what they really meant was that the relationship between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the President had never been worse.⁸

In other words, it was more than just disillusionment with specific aid policy that sealed the fate of the foreign

⁷"Senate Panel's Voice is Softer," The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, April 28, 1974, p. 12-B.

⁸Francis O. Wilcox, Congress, the Executive, and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 21.

assistance bill in 1971. Rather it was the overall credibility gap and the mutual distrust between the two institutions--Congress and Executive--concerning both the substance of foreign policy and the process of decision-making.

However, while the Senate committee's frustration over a lack of information was an important factor in widening the credibility gap, Fulbright's attitude and behavior were not conducive to maximizing the group's information-gathering potential. Of course, it can be argued that the efforts of subcommittees in obtaining executive information may have been no more successful than those of the full committee.

Nonetheless, in 1971-72, Fulbright began to take a distinctly different approach to the decision-making process. The committee began writing into legislation what it had previously felt appropriate only to recommend. Many of these restrictions concerned Indochina policy and congressional-executive relations. The scope of the restrictions has entangled the aid legislation with the intense conflict over general foreign policy issues.

Committee members have not been able to win full Senate support for this type of restriction. The failure of many restrictions, such as end-the-war amendments, was largely

the result of committee defections on the Senate floor. On such key issues as a cut-back of administrative agency funds in order to pressure President Nixon into giving Congress more information, as many as eight of the sixteen committee members voted against the committee's recommendation on the floor. Thus while the committee could form a consensus so long as committee recommendations were very imprecisely worded, when they were worded in such a way as to indicate specific restrictions on the conduct of American foreign policy, a committee consensus could not be formed.

By this time, Fulbright had completely withdrawn his support from the foreign aid package, turning the committee leadership in this area over to Senator John Sparkman, second-ranking Democrat. Sparkman and Senator George Aiken, ranking minority member of the committee, sought to dispel rumors of intra-committee discord. Their explanation for the committee failures on the floor was that many of the amendments had been accepted by the committee without a great deal of deliberation in order to give the full Senate a chance to debate and vote on them. The credibility of this explanation is certainly questionable. More likely the minority on the committee realized that they had nothing to lose by voting

for a position they disagreed with in committee because the policy would be overturned on the floor anyway. This shift of responsibility for policy-making from the committee room to the chamber floor would indicate that the committee was so split as to be unable to forge politically feasible policy alternatives which could win acceptance in the general legislative process.

Senator Gale McGee asserted in 1972 that perhaps a modicum of harmony would soon be returning to the committee. "There's a mood that maybe the committee has overreached itself. The committee seems to be moderating its stance to a more refined and sophisticated attitude."⁹ To maintain its institutional prestige and have any significant effect on policy, the committee must take stands which will be perceived as responsible and which will be supported by a majority of the Senate members in floor votes.

House International Relations Committee

In contrast, it is the relative unity of the House International Relations Committee which has recently allowed it to maximize its influence. The committee has traditionally

⁹Congressional Quarterly, 30 (July 1, 1972): 1591.

acted to support presidential initiatives, and probably because of this, the administration has developed greater liaison and communications with this committee than with its counterpart in the Senate. Chairman Thomas Morgan supported presidential policy in Indochina until 1972, for example, while Senator Fulbright opposed such policy under Presidents Johnson and Nixon.

The two chairmen's views on the role of Congress have increasingly diverged during the latter years of the 1960's. Generally, in contrast to the Senate stand that it should have an "advise and consent" role in policy-making, Morgan has held that "the President is solely responsible for foreign policy."¹⁰ Thus the committee has been mainly a legitimizing influence in the congressional process. Considering the enormous advantage in information held by the executive branch and the House's lack of constitutional prerogatives in the area of foreign affairs, the committee has viewed the role of ally as the only option available if it is to have any effect at all on policy-making.

The House International Relations Committee has had to be constantly aware of its institutional role. In the

¹⁰ Congressional Quarterly, 28 (November 20, 1970): 2825.

1960's members feared what they perceived as the committee's decreasing jurisdiction. Part of the frustration was the result of the role played by the House Armed Services Committee. During the mid-1960's, a majority on the Foreign Affairs Committee fought separation of the foreign aid bill into military and economic assistance components. Their reasoning was that if the bill were split, the military portion would be sent to the Armed Services group. During the Vietnam conflict, jurisdiction over much military assistance was indeed shifted to the Armed Services Committee.

However, most concern has been with the power of the House Appropriations Committee. In 1971, Representative John Buchanan summed up a fear many Foreign Affairs Committee members shared:

. . . I am afraid that if we do rock along with too long a series of hearings now, and he [Passman] gets entirely ready to go on his appropriations bill, . . . we may find this committee being run over by that subcommittee; and I am not too sure that would be too good a thing, either for you [Administration] or for us.¹¹

Representative Walter Judd voiced the same apprehension over long-term authorization in 1962. He believed that the appropriations subcommittee did not spend as much time

¹¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Hearings, 92^d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 81.

on the issue of foreign aid and did not have the expertise of the authorization committee, a view affirmed by other committee members.¹² But political jurisdiction was the main issue. If the Foreign Affairs Committee granted long-term authorization, it would decrease even further its ability to influence policy.

The appropriations committee's propensity for cutting funds has directly affected the House International Relations Committee's handling of funding levels. The authorization committee has seen its role as providing a sufficient cushion of funding to allow the other committee to cut without doing damage to the heart of the program. Yet it must not inflate figures to the point where the other committee will irresponsibly cut in backlash fashion during the appropriations process.

Thus the predominant position of the appropriations body, which has generally been viewed as having a greater impact on the program, has had quite a bit of influence on the International Relations Committee's perception of its own role. Members have complained that the House leadership

¹²U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Hearings, 87th Cong., 2^d sess., 1962, pp. 25-26.

does not provide the international relations group with the support granted to some of the other House groups. Perhaps because it does not have the close interhouse ties of some of the other groups, its members have sought closer ties with the executive branch in order to influence policy.

In some ways the chairmen of both the Senate and House authorizing committees have operated in similar fashion. Both have sought to maintain control of the full committee and have been unsympathetic to the idea of splintering the group into legislative subcommittees. Even in the early 1970's the House committee marked up the foreign aid bill as a whole, and Morgan and the staff did most of the real work.

However, institutional reform in the House of Representatives during the period 1970-73 has caused significant changes in the behavior of the House International Relations Committee. While the committee has had consultative subcommittees since 1945, recently these subcommittees have become more active.

Incipient change was apparent in 1969, when Representative Clement Zablocki, second ranking Democrat on the committee, became chairman of the National Security Policy

and Scientific Development Subcommittee in January and convened his subcommittee without delay. This marked the second time since its creation in 1958 that the members had actually met. After the Cambodian incursion in May, 1970, Zablocki held hearings and his subcommittee recommended a resolution requiring the President to inform Congress in writing when he was committing U.S. armed forces without prior congressional approval. While a very mild pressure on the Executive, this action did indicate that the subcommittee structure might lead to more flexing of the House committee's muscle. In recent years this subcommittee has met on such diverse matters as the use of satellites and agricultural aid to underdeveloped nations.¹³ Since the House committee's members are reputed to be very hard-working and quite knowledgeable on issues, the subcommittees have the potential to become highly specialized units.

But until recently chairmanships have rested mostly in the hands of the traditionalists such as Zablocki, third-ranking Democrat Wayne Hays, and fourth-ranking L. H. Fountain. Thus, like their colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, many members have become frustrated. They have

¹³ Congressional Quarterly, 28 (November 28, 1970): 2826.

felt useless and under-employed; morale and the will to attempt change has been gradually worn away. Indicative of this debilitating lack of energy was the fact that the chairman was unable to muster a quorum for several mark-up sessions in June, 1972.

Furthermore, members have complained that the committee did not really investigate and get into detail nor orient its interrogation into really meaningful policy questions.¹⁴ But there are indications that this situation is changing.

Recent changes in committee chairman selection, culminating in the overthrow of some senior chairmen in 1975, have been a part of the larger reform movement underway since the 92nd Congress. The reform efforts of liberals in the Democratic caucus have tended to restrict committee chairmen's powers and place more responsibility in the hands of subcommittee chairmen. The reforms instituted by the Committee on Organization, Study, and Review (the Hansen Committee) have resulted in more far-reaching changes within the House International Relations Committee than within any other House Committee.

As a result of these measures three major subcommittee chairmanships changed hands. Ben Rosenthal took over

¹⁴Congressional Quarterly, 30 (July 1, 1972): 1589.

the European subcommittee from Leonard Farbstein, Lee Hamilton replaced Robert Nix, and John Culver took power from L. H. Fountain in the areas of Near East politics and foreign economic policy, respectively. Along with Donald Fraser, who also gained a subcommittee post, these three representatives have formed the core of liberals who have been attempting to modify foreign aid policy and the House's role in its formulation. It was largely this group which espoused the shift to a political development emphasis in the middle and latter 1960's, and they were successful in obtaining committee and House support for the modification. They have also become renowned for their intense probing questions of administrative witnesses. As subcommittee chairmen, they have taken the lead in activating a rather dormant chamber into a more forceful group of potential policy-makers. For example, the decision to terminate military aid to Greece is viewed largely as the handiwork of Representative Rosenthal.¹⁵

Reforms also encompassed allowing subcommittee chairmen to hire a professional staff member, and these liberals hired staff personnel whose views were in keeping

¹⁵Norman J. Ornstein, "Causes and Consequences of Congressional Change: Subcommittee Reforms in the House of Representatives, 1970-73," in Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform, ed. Norman J. Ornstein (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 103.

with their own, unlike those of the full committee staff. This has resulted in increased activity aimed at having significant effect on foreign policy trends.

House Appropriations Committee

The House Appropriations Committee has dominated the appropriations process throughout much of the period under study. This has been due primarily to the group's tendency to make major funding cuts in all aspects of the foreign aid program. Representative Otto Passman's subcommittee on Foreign Operations has been responsible for dealing with foreign aid requests throughout this period. Passman's basic philosophy has been to "contain" the foreign aid program; he has encouraged a retrenchment of activity and funding while supporting the basic concept of foreign assistance.

The most significant institutional change during the 1960's which had direct effect on foreign aid legislation was the death of Appropriations Chairman Clarence Cannon in 1964 and the ascendance of George Mahon to the chairmanship. Mahon's ascent to power significantly modified Passman's position.

The tradition of the House Appropriations Committee has been to allow enormous decision-making power to virtually

autonomous subcommittees. Furthermore, neither Cannon nor Mahon have been reputed to exercise strong central leadership over the entire committee. Since both have favored a budget-cutting strategy in order to maximize the committee's influence within the House, both have sought to ensure that subcommittee chairmen reflect this philosophy. Passman has done so, and under Cannon's leadership he was given the autonomy to ax the foreign aid program with vigor. For example, during the 1963 appropriations process the committee made a thirty-eight percent reduction in aid funds from the executive request. It managed to sustain a thirty-four percent reduction in the final appropriations bill.

However, Mahon was a friend of President Lyndon Johnson, a fellow Texan. Upon his ascent to power and upon urgent requests from Johnson, Mahon stacked the Passman subcommittee to assure more favorable treatment of Johnson's aid proposal. Passman's supporters were removed, and Mahon even exercised his formal right as an ex officio subcommittee member to sit in on hearings and use his voting privilege. The result was that Johnson was able to obtain a higher level of foreign aid funding in FY1965 than had been possible at any other time throughout the history of the program. Following suit the committee made an even smaller funding cut

in FY1966, only seven percent, in comparison with a twenty-two percent average cutting record for the years 1955-66. However, other factors, such as the expanded commitment to South Vietnam and increasing domestic economic troubles, intervened at this time to reverse the trend, and beginning in FY1967, the committee began again to be a source of major trouble for the aid program. With the election of President Richard Nixon in 1968 there were no longer the personal ties between committee chairman and President which had occasioned the favorable response of the committee during this brief interval.

Senate Appropriations Committee

The Senate Appropriations Committee lacks the constitutional prerogatives in the spending field granted to the House Appropriations Committee, since traditionally appropriations bills begin in the House. The Senate body is not in a structural position to initiate change and must work with the modifications already made by the House group. Also the Senate acts on the measure late in the process. Time pressure at the end of the legislative session tends to stifle extensive investigation. Thus the role the Senate committee

can feasibly play is somewhat determined by its place in the institutional process.

The totally distinct perspectives of the two House committees are not characteristic of the two Senate groups, primarily because membership overlaps among Senate Committees. Therefore, the policy differences between the two Senate bodies have often been less noticeable than those between the two House groups.

While the Senate Appropriations Committee acted mainly as a restorer of funds during the early part of the Development Decade, it did provide some independent study of the aid requests, including an in-depth study in 1963 when Senator Gale McGee held hearings on administrative issues within AID. But by 1965 under the leadership of Senator Pastore the committee acted only as an appellate body which did not probe into the thicket of foreign aid at all. At this time Senators Leverett Saltonstall (Rep.), Carl Hayden (Dem.), and Pastore (Dem.) formed a triumvirate of relatively influential senators who were very supportive of foreign aid.

While Hayden served as chairman of the full committee, he kept foreign aid out of any subcommittee's hands, fearing that the subcommittee might take on the "economy" complex

of the House subcommittee.¹⁶ But in 1969 after Hayden's retirement, Senator William Proxmire became chairman of the new subcommittee on Foreign Operations. Under Proxmire's leadership the subcommittee became an active, aggressive force in the aid debate. Hearings which had been short and shallow were now lengthy, intensive, and dealing with broad policy issues. One staff member asserted that the major incentive for such study was Proxmire's desire for publicity and personal prominence. But the result was to make the Senate appropriations process a more constructive part of the entire legislative debate.

Thus the fate of foreign aid legislation has been affected by the personal philosophies of key committee and subcommittee chairmen, the relationship of the committee vis-a-vis the Executive, and the internal structure of Congress.

Domestic Economic Factors

One significant reason for the eroding of congressional support for foreign aid has been the domestic economic situation and the increasing desire of congressmen to see more

¹⁶ Stephen Horn, Unused Power: The Work of the Senate Committee on Appropriations (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1970), p. 35.

spending shifted toward alleviation of domestic political and social problems. During the 1950's the U.S. was in a very favorable trade position, and the balance of payments situation was conducive to American generosity. But generosity was based primarily on economic self-interest. American foreign aid allowed many foreigners the opportunity to engage in trade with the U.S. Thus support for foreign aid was forthcoming.

However, during the period 1958-1962 this trend reversed itself, and the U.S. began to suffer from an unfavorable balance of payments. The cry arose for a cutback in foreign aid or at least more emphasis on tying aid to purchases of American products. But in fact, about three-fourths of aid had already been so tied. Undaunted, critics observed that tying the other one-fourth would about even out the balance of payments deficit.¹⁷

During the early 1960's, congressional groups held conflicting views concerning the part foreign aid played in the overall economic situation. Verbally, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has never shown much interest in how

¹⁷William G. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy, Its Global Range, 2^d ed. (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 203-04.

foreign aid affects the U.S. economy. During hearings in 1962 several conflicting points of view were presented. Some members felt that United States economic interests should be protected through strict legislation, while others criticized the aid program as primarily conducive to the benefit of U.S. corporations.

In action during the early 1960's, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the Senate as a whole, protected U.S. business interests. While the majority on the committee did not view as legitimate granting aid for the purpose of stimulating American business ventures, they did view helping the United States economy as a very pleasant side-effect of the aid program and one which should be encouraged as long as it did not interfere with pursuit of major objectives.

During this period the opinion of the majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee was that the foreign aid program did not adversely affect the balance of payments or the gold outflow problem, but that even if it did, the foreign policy goals of the program were more important and must be given top priority.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the committee also

¹⁸U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Report, H.Rept. 321 on HR 7750, 87th Cong., 2^d sess., 1962, p. 4.

generally acted to protect domestic economic interests. For example in 1961, the final authorization measure specifically prohibited loans to enterprises abroad which would offer direct competition to U.S. enterprises, allowing loans only when the recipient pledged to limit its exports to the U.S. to twenty percent of its production. Even this was a weaker provision than the House had originally urged. On the whole, the Foreign Affairs Committee viewed economic aid as helping the U.S. economy.

The House Appropriations Committee has spent much more hearing time discussing the effect of aid on the United States economy than any of the other committees. Unlike the authorization committees, it has perceived the foreign aid program as directly hurting the domestic economy and the American taxpayer.

In 1965, while AID Administrator David Bell argued that cutting aid would hurt U.S. exports, Passman declared that continuing aid would hurt the balance of payments situation. He felt that the United States was giving budget support to other countries when we had a deficit of our own to worry about. "It [the deficit] came into being at the

same time the foreign aid program came into being."¹⁹ He concluded that there was, therefore, a cause and effect relation. While some members such as Representative Clarence Long were more concerned about program goals, they represented a minority viewpoint. For the most part, the House Appropriations Committee viewed the United States economy as the most important consideration, except in the case of military aid, where the need to defend the country was predominant. This perception of the effect of foreign aid has been a major factor in the sizable funding cuts encouraged by the committee.

Interestingly, although the Senate Appropriations Committee is also an appropriations body whose major interest is supposedly financial, it has had the least verbal concern with the United States economy of any of the foreign aid committees. During the early 1960's it sought to place the program on a more businesslike basis in order to protect the American investment, but it showed little concern with the domestic economic effect of aid until 1971 when it began to more thoroughly analyze the broad dimensions of aid policy.

¹⁹ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1966, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 579.

During the early 1960's, the House Appropriations Committee provided the only significant obstacle to foreign aid funding on economic grounds. But during the latter 1960's and early 1970's, as the domestic economic situation went from bleak to bleaker, economic considerations became a more significant factor in consideration of foreign aid funding levels. FY1969 congressional cuts were the largest in the program's history (forty percent), despite the fact that the administration request was also the lowest in history. Inflation and the increasing budget deficit were major factors, though it is unlikely that alone they would have been sufficient to cause such major funding cutbacks. The fact that they were supplemented by disillusionment with the effect of foreign aid and with the role aid was playing in American foreign policy commitments helps explain Congress' lack of enthusiasm for aid.

By 1968 groups which in the early 1960's had supported the program were rethinking its merit. For example, in 1968 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended a one billion dollar cutback in aid. The reason it gave was over-expansion of the aid program, which it viewed as disadvantageous from the point of view of both foreign policy and domestic economic considerations.

Content analysis indicates that in 1965 and 1968 the House Foreign Affairs Committee's concern with the American economic situation heightened. In 1965 the members even suggested cutting back military assistance if it would aid the U.S. economy. In 1968 Representative Vernon Thomson decried the fact that while money was being squandered on luxuries in the AID programs, U.S. politicians were cutting domestic programs. Thomson, H. R. Gross and Edward Derwinski have composed a vocal conservative minority on the committee, which has consistently viewed foreign aid as too costly, but now this argument was being used by liberals and conservatives alike. In 1971 the tying of aid to United States purchases was a major issue during committee debate. While liberals like Culver attacked the practice on the same grounds as Senator Albert Gore had earlier, namely that benefits were reaped by big business not the average American, representatives such as Pierre duPont defended the approach. The latter noted that in FY1970 approximately ninety-eight percent of money granted through AID would be used within the domestic American market.²⁰

²⁰ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Hearings, 92^d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 102.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee took the initiative in attempting to mobilize support for the aid program in 1973 primarily by emphasizing the benefits to be gained by Americans through the aid process. The committee stressed that the United States would benefit from the program as much as foreign countries. Their key word was "mutuality." In keeping with this theme the act was renamed the "Mutual Development and Cooperation Act." A major pillar of the new legislation would be the Export Development Credit Fund (EDF). Through this fund, development loan repayments from aid recipients would be used as subsidies for interest rates charged on U.S. exports to the developing nations. The result would be easier terms for the developing country and a better competitive position for the American exporter in the world market. The EDF would create 80,000 new jobs, according to its supporters. The whole House rejected the fund, however, and the adamant and sustained opposition of Otto Passman was no doubt a major factor. Passman feared that the program could be much too costly and that the money would not be repaid to the U.S.

In the 1970's the economic factor has been uppermost in many congressmen's minds. In 1973 the foreign aid bill

passed by five votes in the House of Representatives. The extremely close vote was primarily the result of anxiety over inflation, devaluation of the dollar, budget deficits, and cutbacks in domestic spending, factors which were affecting Senate action as well.

The International System

A change in the rhetoric of the foreign aid debate during the 1960's occurred in large part because of shifting relationships within the international system. During the 1950's the Cold War ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union provided the basic framework for aid policy. The Cold War rhetoric helped mobilize public support for the program.

By 1955 the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were becoming competitors within the Communist sphere, but the Sino-Soviet split widened when the Russians openly supported India after China's war with her in 1962. The solid Communist pole had begun to disintegrate, and the world balance of power had begun to change. A system was emerging in which many countries of the Third World would refuse to support unequivocally either side in the Cold War.

The turning point in Soviet-American relations occurred during the Kennedy administration. The Berlin and Cuba crises highlighted the dangers of an international system in which the military might of the two superpowers met in stark confrontation. By 1963 both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were attempting to remove certain areas of policy from the context of Cold War politics. They began to seek areas in which accommodation was possible. The Test Ban Treaty of 1963, prohibiting atmospheric nuclear testing, was one product of this search. Geographical areas such as Antarctica were placed outside of the combat zone by mutual consent.²¹ Although it would still constitute a major threat to U.S. security, Communism could no longer be the only justification and the primary means of mobilizing support for aid.

This change in perception of international relationships helps explain the Kennedy administration's attempt to play down "anti-Communism" as an aid objective, and to play up the politically neutral term "economic development" and the euphemism for anti-totalitarianism, "political democracy." Still, in much of the congressional debate during the early 1960's, the rhetoric of the Cold War remained; it changed

²¹Charles O. Lerche, The Cold War and After (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 90.

more slowly than did the behavior of the two superpowers. But by 1965 the rhetoric of congressional debate was changing too.

By the end of the decade anti-Communism as a verbalized, specific and legitimate goal of foreign assistance was rarely discussed. This was in keeping with the Peking and Moscow trips of President Nixon in the early 1970's and the spirit of detente which they symbolized. Detente connotes a relaxation of tension between adversaries. The emphasis is on possible areas of cooperation within the context of continued competition between nations with different political outlooks and conflicting interests. The emergence of the People's Republic of China and Japan, among others, as influential international actors set the stage for a more flexible balance-of-power structure.

Clearly, changes in congressional debate reflected more than merely a shift in terminology. Officials were perceiving short-range threats to U.S. interest in significantly different terms from those of the 1950's, and the substance as well as the rhetoric of aid policy reflected these differences.

Contemporary Threats

Economic and Technological Threats

In the international system of the 1970's the United States must face the limits of its own power. The nuclear capacity of the major powers has expanded to the extent that the credibility of the threat deliberately to use nuclear weapons has been weakened. In a situation in which the use of such weapons is fraught with unacceptable dangers, adversaries seek other sources of political influence. In a sense the competition for military and nuclear superiority is being superseded by competition for economic advantage.

In the early 1960's the name of the game for Western or Eastern political systems was gaining influence within other nations' boundaries. In many ways the game today remains remarkably similar. The major world powers, no matter what their ideology, still seek to gain and maintain influence within other political spheres in order to protect what they perceive as their own national security. But the primary threats are increasingly those of an economic nature. Political security is perceived as directly related to the state of the international economic system; therefore, fostering a system conducive to healthy commerce is perceived as

a top priority. Ensuring access to raw materials, expanded markets for exports, and ultimately a better quality of life for one's citizens are important considerations for political leaders.

The belief that the contemporary international system is split less along East-West political lines than along North-South economic lines is widely held.²² The most serious global cleavage appears to be the split between the affluent nations and those in which a majority of the citizens survive at an extremely low standard of living. While the people of the developed countries account for only twenty-seven percent of world population, they possess eighty-three percent of gross world product.²³ The Third World community has become increasingly conscious of global economic inequality. This awareness has led to demands for a "new international economic order." Such demands were aired in a 1974 United Nations conference. They embrace far more than the revamping of economic mechanisms such as tariff legislation. The thrust

²²For example, see Robert Hunter, "The Changing Nature of U.S. Foreign Policy," The United States and the Developing World (Overseas Development Council, 1973), pp. 21-28.

²³Richard Sterling, Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 361.

is toward a fundamental restructuring of global political decision-making procedures allowing more active involvement by those who have felt colonized economically even after the attainment of political independence.

One significant development of the 1970's is the potential influence of Third World cartels based on possession of large quantities of raw materials. A major threat is the possibility of boycott of petroleum products from the oil-producing countries to the industrialized nations. The Arab oil embargo following the October, 1973 Middle East War epitomized the changing nature of international politics.

On the other hand, the economic interdependence of the international system means that economic boycott carries grave risks. The threat of an oil embargo provides incentive for the industrialized nations to speed exploration and development of alternative energy sources, for example, and might precipitate retaliation in other economic areas such as foreign investment opportunities within the Western countries. Furthermore, political disunity and the noncritical nature of other Third World products limits the credibility of such threats. Therefore, reasonable Third World leaders will probably prefer negotiation to confrontation.

Nevertheless, the international system in which Western industrialized nations, led by the United States, could largely determine policy is evolving into one in which policy will be determined through compromise among nations with more varied economic interests than the major protagonists of the past. Political influence gained through an understanding of and a respect for domestic priorities of Third World elites will likely do far more to ensure the appeal of American political values than military, economic, or political force. A top priority of most of these leaders is raising the standard of living among their own political constituencies.

Another significant phenomenon of the 1970's is the food crisis within the developing world. There has been significant progress in world agricultural productivity, but within the developing countries population increases have offset the benefits. For example, by 1960 the production of grain in Asia, Africa, and Latin America had increased forty-two percent over the average for the years 1934-1938.²⁴ But

²⁴Lester Brown, "Population Growth, Food Needs and Production Problems." in L. A. Richards et al., World Population and Food Supplies, 1980 (Madison, Wis.: American Society of Agronomy, 1964), p. 5, in Sterling, Macropolitics, p. 378.

when the factor of population is added to the equation, per capita grain production in the developing world had actually fallen three percent. The developed world has not faced such a rapid rate of population growth; and in the future the developing world will continue to face a much more significant increase in population than the developed countries.²⁵ Thus the gap between the standard of living of the industrialized nations and that of the underdeveloped nations appears to be widening.

By 1972 a drop in grain production, combined with changes in governmental policies, left the poor nations facing acute shortages of basic foodstuffs. This crisis brought food policy to the forefront of foreign policy debate. In the wake of the 1973 oil embargo some American officials urged that the United States use food as a political lever. But practical and ethical considerations intervened. Many of the target nations were able to obtain food from other sources. Moreover, fear of world reaction to withholding food from the starving diminished the likelihood of such a policy, as did officials' own disinclination based on moral grounds.

²⁵ Sterling, Macropolitics, p. 378.

The urgency of economic issues has changed the context of the foreign aid debate. It has highlighted the importance of economic assistance and of economic criteria for aid provision. It has also enhanced the position of those who have called for a clearer delineation of aid categories and goals. Furthermore, it has emphasized the importance of economic considerations in decision-making concerning the provision of military aid.

The Alliance of the U.S. with Repressive Regimes

As the emphasis on direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation was minimized in the 1960's, the threat of subversive tactics grew. Much of the Kennedy aid program was designed to deny the Communists any political ground within the internal political affairs of a country. For example, the administration hoped that a shift in the military aid program to an emphasis on maintaining internal security would stop the Communists from fomenting violent disruption within a nation.

At the time the Alliance for Progress was implemented in 1961, even though Communism was deemphasized verbally, U.S. officials made clear to Latin American recipients that a properly anti-Communist political orientation would be required along with a willingness to undertake economic

self-help measures. After 1963 Latin American popularly elected governments fell one after another through military coups. The U.S. emphasis seemed to justify, and in some cases even encourage, the military to take over governments in order to forestall social and political movements toward the left. The military often found it easy to defend its action as ultimately aiding the forces of political freedom. Unfortunately, protecting this freedom in the long-run too often meant stifling freedom in the short-run. As long as the Communist menace was perceived in terms of red devils trying to conquer the world, there was little doubt as to the real enemy. But if the overriding priority of fighting Communism were taken away, it was difficult to justify assistance to countries which were violating the basic principles American society professed to uphold.

Still, the ideological orientation of many policymakers remained strong enough to warrant continued aid to these regimes. But the goal of internal security increasingly began to worry some members of Congress as they became more and more aware that this could easily become synonymous with maintaining the political and economic status quo. Not only did this present a moral problem but a practical foreign

policy one as well. If the U.S. were linked too closely to very conservative, even reactionary, regimes, it would lose political influence among more progressive groups within the underdeveloped world. The ultimate consequence could well be increased Communist influence in these areas, the result that aid in most cases had been given to avoid.

In 1962, some Senate members deplored the fact that military aid was maintaining military dictatorships, but this attitude was not shared by the House membership. But by 1968 the House Foreign Affairs Committee was spending a large proportion of hearing time dealing with the effects of military assistance. Liberals on the committee who opposed aid to repressive regimes were joining the conservatives who opposed aid on economic grounds. The belief that aid actually was encouraging exactly the opposite of the desired objective of democratic self-government caused great frustration.

Congressional reaction to internal politics in Greece reflected this changing perception of threats to U.S. foreign policy interests. The Greek situation was somewhat more complex than that of many of the Latin American military dictatorships. While the latter were distinctly within the American sphere of influence and were thus of symbolic

diplomatic value, and while many were threatened to some extent by leftist political movements, the security value of these governments in any confrontation with the Communists was minimal. Conflicts within the area have been localized with little impact on big power politics. Greece, though, stands at a militarily strategic juncture in the Near East and therefore for geopolitical reasons is of security value in an area of the world where superpower interests have been more directly involved. Moreover, along with Turkey, it has secured the southern arc of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense alliance, the post World War II collective security network designed to prevent any military threat to Western European and United States interests. Thus its role in maintaining U.S. security has been perceived as significant.

In April, 1967, a right-wing military coup overthrew the constitutional government of King Constantine, justifying its action as protection against a Communist threat within the country. The military government attempted to eradicate all political dissent and became an international symbol of repression in a country whose pride in its heritage of democracy ran deep.

Segments of Congress had attempted since 1968 to stop military aid to Greece until constitutional reforms were undertaken and there was a movement toward self-governing institutions and free political expression. These forces were finally successful in 1971, when an aid cut-off provision carrying a presidential waiver in the interest of national security was accepted by both houses of Congress. By this action the House and Senate indicated that the military security value of aid in fighting Communism was less important than in the past and that encouraging constitutional self-government was becoming a higher priority. A Communist dictatorship was being perceived as no more basic a threat to the kind of world order the U.S. wished to promote than an anti-Communist dictatorship. By the 1970's Congress was indicating through its attempted limits on aid to dictatorships such as those in Chile and South Korea that it sought to modify the internal political structures of aid recipients in the direction of free political expression.

The Effect of Military Assistance--A Violent World

One stated objective of the economic and military aid ventures has been to promote international peace. The premises that those who are profiting economically will not

be violently inclined and that militarily secure nations will deter any aggressive world forces lie at the heart of policy-makers' reasoning. But actual international events during the 1960's cast doubt on the legitimacy of these theories. As international conflicts exploded in various parts of the world, policy-makers became more and more fearful that aid, especially of a military variety, might actually be encouraging international acts of aggression. As early as 1962, Senator Ellender of the Senate Appropriations Committee stressed that aid had been ineffective in achieving either stability or peace. But the matter was brought to a head in 1965 when India and Pakistan, both heavily armed with American military equipment, engaged in full-fledged conflict. During appropriations hearings for FY1966 congressmen observed that while the U.S. supposedly granted aid to both India and Pakistan to enable them to defend their interests against Communist aggression, the recipients were merely using this assistance to go to war with each other. Military arms embargoes were placed on the South Asian nations.

In 1967 Israel conducted a six-day war in the Middle East reaping large military benefits. It was clear that arms shipments to Israel had not exactly kept the peace.

In October, 1973, Egyptian forces moved across the Suez Canal and tensions in the Mideast once again exploded into war. Furthermore, the intermittent conflict between NATO allies Greece and Turkey over the island of Cyprus provided a prime example of conflict which was hardly discouraged by U.S. military aid shipments to both countries. In July, 1974, Turkish forces invaded the island of Cyprus, laying siege to the upper one-third of the island and leaving many Greek Cypriots homeless.

Such incidents illustrate a major danger within the arms aid program. While U.S. Foreign Assistance legislation carries prohibitions against the use of aid for aggressive purposes, an actual cutoff of aid under this provision must be carefully weighed within the overall framework of basic American foreign policy objectives.

Military aid to one country leads to military aid to other nations either to balance arms within a region or to gain political influence for one side in the continuing political conflict between East and West. The seemingly inevitable result is a spiraling arms race which in itself is conducive to an unstable international system. In recent years the added complication of military sales programs has

heightened the danger. Under the "sales" approach it is economically feasible to supply weapons on the international market, thus undercutting one argument against assistance-- that it is economically costly. The fear, often voiced by Passman, that aid of one type allows a recipient to use its resources to sabotage U.S. objectives could be applied here. Liberal congressmen now worried that economic aid would allow the recipient to turn its own resources to the purchasing of military equipment, either from the U.S., Western Europe, or the Soviet Union.

A congressional embargo on military aid to Turkey in late 1974 signalled a major reexamination of aid policy in light of the military crises of recent years. Maintaining access to military bases and the purchasing of political friendship in the East-West competition was becoming less persuasive in an international system where local conflicts could lead to Big Power confrontation.²⁶

²⁶Two other factors should be noted regarding the issue of Turkish aid. First, the Greek lobby within the U.S. was instrumental in pressuring Congress to ban Turkish aid. Thus domestic politics as well as international factors played a major part in the congressional decision. Second, one can assume that congressmen felt reasonably sure that access to strategic bases could be maintained despite temporary termination of aid.

The Impact of Vietnam

If one factor could be isolated as having most impact on congressional perceptions regarding the foreign aid legislation, it would be the war in Indochina. The fact that 500,000 American soldiers were fighting in Vietnam in 1968 led many congressmen to question what part economic and military assistance had played in leading the United States into such massive political and military commitments. By the late 1960's even some members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were asking government witnesses to explain why massive aid programs in other areas of the world could not, and would not, embroil the United States in other Vietnam-type situations. Some wanted more than explanations; they wanted assurances.

Therefore, one aspect of the impact of the Vietnam experience was that it inspired a reevaluation of America's legitimate responsibilities and commitments within an international system no longer characterized by a bipolar structure of power. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee led the search for such a redefinition of international responsibilities. A decade before the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973, Chairman Fulbright had written of furthering the national

interest more successfully through domestic programs of education and health than through far-flung international commitments.

By 1968 the committee placed its recommendation for a massive cutback of both economic and military aid partially in a foreign policy context. It argued that the scope of the aid program was not helping, and might even be hurting, the American image abroad.²⁷

But the Vietnamese War had another type of impact on foreign aid legislation, as congressional groups, most notably the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, used the foreign aid measure as a vehicle to vent members' frustration with American foreign policy decisions and the process through which they were reached. In 1971 the major debate on the Senate floor centered on the Foreign Relations Committee provisions concerning Indochina. The Cooper-Church amendment to force withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam was deleted by floor vote mainly because of the threat of a presidential veto. A year later the Mansfield amendment requiring (1) "the

²⁷ In 1968 the committee spent fourteen percent of its military assistance hearing time on the scope of the program, more than in any other year. This represents a larger percentage of questioning than was ever spent on the scope of the economic assistance program.

unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces from Vietnam by August 31, and (2) termination of all military action in Indochina upon agreement on a cease-fire between U.S. and Communist forces, release of American prisoners of war and accounting for Americans missing in action"²⁸ was also rejected by the full Senate after having been sponsored by the committee.

There were two major schools of thought in the Senate, the first advocating an aggressive congressional policy for ending American involvement in Southeast Asia and the other advocating that the exact nature of this extrication be left in the hands of the chief executive. Foreign policy debate and the issue of congressional-executive relations were inextricably linked, and the aid bill was entangled with both.

The widening of the Indochina conflict to Cambodia provided the impetus for the Foreign Relations Committee to attempt to restrict the President's hand in policy-making. The rechanneling of aid to Cambodia to support the war effort there heightened the committee's growing sensitivity to its lack of influence over specific country-by-country

²⁸ Congressional Quarterly, 30 (

aid figures. While a supplemental bill in 1970 provided all of the military assistance for Cambodia that President Nixon had requested, the committee complained that this was legalization after the fact. It claimed that \$7.9 million in military aid had already been given to Cambodia and that Congress had not been told of one \$3 million transaction until two and a half months after its conclusion.²⁹ The committee's action in 1971, which provided for informing Congress of specific monetary amounts by country and prohibited the wholesale transfer of funds from country to country, sought to prevent this type of situation from recurring.

The conflict in opinion over the proper role for Congress to play in foreign policy decision-making left open the possibility that the aid bill would be the victim of the struggle. The military commitment in Southeast Asia helped mobilize opposition to military assistance generally, and the fear of spiraling degrees of commitment left Congress increasingly skeptical of even much lowered requests for aid.

²⁹Congressional Quarterly, 29 (November 6, 1971): 2269.

Conclusions

The decline in congressional support for foreign aid and the increasingly tenuous position of the aid legislation have been the result of a combination of factors. Foreign policy issues, changing perceptions of the goals of foreign aid within a changing international political structure, and growing doubts about the effects of assistance on the international system have led many congressmen to criticize the aid venture. The growing belief that military aid was fostering a world in which U.S. interests were directly threatened has been a major cause of increased contention. These factors, combined with a worsening domestic economic situation, have induced many congressmen to call for decreased aid spending.

The Arab oil embargo illustrated the growing economic interdependence of nation-states. The potential instability of an international system in which there were drastic imbalances in the supply of valuable resources, whether food or oil or whatever, was forcing a reorientation of thought along economic, not political or ideological lines.

The Cold War context of the original aid program had provided a relatively clear-cut definition of the major

threat to U.S. national security: Communism. But by the mid-1960's the Cold War consensus, which had mobilized public and congressional support for aid with some degree of success, had disintegrated. Stripped of this compelling justification, aid became the prime target for those opposing various American foreign policy decisions.

The Nixon Doctrine itself helped mesh aid policy with overall American foreign policy. The doctrine was based on the idea of increased monetary and technical commitments to other nations at a time when congressional skepticism ran deep.

In the early 1960's opposition to foreign aid had come primarily from conservatives, especially Republicans and Southern Democrats, who saw the program as a gigantic give-away and as ineffective in fighting Communism. By the 1970's these opponents were being joined by liberals, especially Northern Democrats, who desired increased emphasis on domestic social activity. In light of economic conditions they desired a cutback in foreign programs proportional to cutbacks in domestic social programs. Liberals' opposition to the Indochina War and their aversion to the increasing emphasis on military aid and commitments put them in league

with their conservative colleagues in calling for reductions in aid. Both groups now viewed the U.S. as overcommitted internationally and coalesced to defeat aid proposals.

The situation has been complicated by the debate over congressional-executive responsibility. The split between liberal Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee and the Johnson and Nixon administrations over Indochina policy led the Senate to attempt to increase its role in foreign policy-making. By the early 1970's liberal members of the House, who had now gained more prominent positions within the internal congressional structure, were in disagreement with the White House on the way aid was being administered. They too were now willing to place more restrictions on executive discretion. The case of Vietnam highlighted the degree of independent executive action possible under the political arrangements of that time, and Congress reacted by attempting to set limits on that independence. The attitude of the Nixon administration, perceived by some congressmen as amounting to a virtual exclusion of Congress from the foreign policy sphere, pushed Congress to become even more adamant in its desire to have some impact. This congressional perception of the administration's attitude led to congressional

initiatives which affected foreign aid policy: one way to bargain for influence on decision-making was to threaten to cut back aid funds. The disaster of Watergate left the executive branch in a weak political position and provided the opportunity for a legislative resurgence of influence.

CHAPTER VII

CONGRESSIONAL IMPACT ON POLICY-MAKING

This chapter provides an analysis of Congress' impact on the aid program. It isolates substantive areas of the program in which Congress has been influential and deals with the contribution of Congress to the formulation of aid policy and to implementation of the program.

The study delineates the relative influence of congressional subsystems at particular times during the period and analyzes factors influencing changes in impact. It develops the hypothesis that the degree of influence on aid policy exercised by specific congressional subsystems is determined primarily by institutional and personnel factors within Congress itself and between Congress and the executive branch.

Factors which have influenced the roles congressional subsystems have played have likewise shaped the impact of Congress as a whole on the final aid legislation. This study concludes that disagreement between the perceptions of certain congressional groups and those

of the Executive regarding the basic objectives, means and effects of the program has been a major factor in loss of support for the foreign aid program. In addition, Congress' distrust of the procedures for formulating foreign policy has had immense impact on legislative reaction to the program. Differing opinions concerning broader foreign policy issues have been a primary cause of this distrust. Institutional factors also have been very significant in affecting the way Congress has handled foreign aid legislation. Finally, the study sets forth changes in congressional impact on foreign policy in general during the period 1961-1975 and summarizes factors influencing these changes.

The Impact of Congress on Foreign Aid Policy

Various analysts differ in their conclusions concerning congressional impact on the American foreign assistance program. One viewpoint is that Congress has had little impact at all on the functioning of the program. Some congressmen themselves assert that legislative provisions and prescriptions are frequently ignored by executive officials. They see even congressional intentions on funding ignored as the executive branch rechannels funds

from account to account and program to program.

Another group sees Congress' impact as beneficial to the effective conduct of the program. Administrative oversight, they say, has made the program more efficient in terms of distribution of resources, and policy debate has forced a more realistic appraisal of feasible goals and expectations.

A third group perceives Congress as having only a negative influence on the program. There are several variations of this criticism. Some view annual congressional scrutiny as requiring an unreasonable amount of time on the part of administrators who must justify the program in routine fashion year after year. This process denies both the witness and the Congress the time and energy to deal with meaningful long-range issues.

Second, critics view legislative restrictions, sometimes added to legislation for reasons having little to do with foreign aid per se, as needlessly hampering the efficient operation of aid administration. For example, the fate of funds for economic development loans may well hinge on whether congressmen have approved of a U.S. military action abroad, which is completely unrelated to the

merits of the disputed economic loans. Military aid funds for security purposes may be denied, not because they are unnecessary or illegitimate, but because the President has refused to release certain information to the Congress. Administrators argue that the task of pursuing long-range development projects under these circumstances is virtually impossible. Likewise, the task of pursuing long-term security considerations such as maintaining access to ports and bases abroad may be undermined. Scholars such as David Truman similarly have criticized Congress for its short-sighted and detrimental restrictions.¹

A third variation is exemplified by Henry Kissinger's criticism that Congress is now stepping into the "'day-to-day and week-to-week' conduct of foreign policy,"² overstepping both constitutional and practical bounds. Some argue that the Congress is too large and unorganized to forge a coherent foreign policy approach and that its piecemeal policy requirements and restrictions may make the

¹David Truman, ed., The Congress and America's Future (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 148-49.

²Congressional Quarterly, 33 (June 28, 1975): 1348.

pursuit of a well-coordinated foreign policy much more difficult, if not impossible.

This author concludes that Congress has had significant influence on foreign aid legislation and through such legislation, on American foreign policy. Furthermore, this influence has, for the most part, been constructive in regard to the conduct of foreign policy decision-making in a democracy.

The role Congress has performed has been primarily that of policy-modifier. If one defines policy-initiation as the introduction of distinctly new courses of political action, the contemporary Congress only infrequently engages in this type of activity. But Congress does seek, often successfully, to emphasize one proposed course of action over another, in some cases to clarify and sharpen proposals, and to mobilize public support for various alternatives set forth by the executive branch in an attempt to move the final policy output in a particular direction.

The terminology of Ripley (joint program development) and of Polsby (influence of Congress during a period of policy gestation) is more appealing to this author than the term "initiation." There are several problems with the

use of latter terminology. First, a role of "initiator" seems to carry the connotation of significant influence in policy-making; clearly distinguishing "initiative" from "influence" is a major analytical problem. For example, those who view the President as initiator of foreign policy, have often, at the same time, viewed him as dominant in this policy area, a fact that perhaps has led to some confusion of the terms. The fact that a subsystem originates an idea does not automatically ensure any independent impact on the final policy product. Quite possibly, actors who initiate major proposals may have less influence on policy than other participants, and those playing other roles such as policy-modifier may be much more directly involved in shaping policy output.

A second problem is deciding who initiates. For example, at what point does an observer decide that the original policy has been modified so much that in fact a new policy has been initiated? The name of the first individual who uttered the phrase describing a concept is probably of less importance than the process through which the concept is distilled, clarified, and shaped into a feasible policy alternative. In a sense those who take an

active part in this process can all be credited with participation in the "initiation" stage of policy-making. This give-and-take process is implied in both Ripley's concept of joint development as a model of congressional-executive decision-making and Polsby's concept of policy growth and development. It has characterized much of the relationship between Congress and Executive in the area of foreign aid during the Development Decade.

Congress has definitely been instrumental in decision-making in specific areas of aid policy. Certainly the Congress has made some impact on the goals of economic assistance. The Congress actively fostered the shift in the emphasis of the aid program to a long-term economic development approach in the late 1950's through congressional approval of the Development Loan Fund and the International Development Association.³ Throughout the early 1960's influential senators such as Hubert Humphrey of the Foreign Relations Committee urged increased attention to economic

³Whether or not Congress initiated either the DLF (Senators say it did; James Robinson says it did not) or the IDA (James Robinson says yes; David Baldwin says no), legislative support of both was crucial. Congress clearly was involved in policy modification and development during the early part of the policy debate. To imply that the shifting emphasis of aid legislation in 1961 was exclusively the work of the Executive would be inaccurate.

and political development abroad, actively supporting the point of view of the Kennedy administration. Research also indicates that it was congressional modification which shifted the means of economic assistance from grants or hard loans in the direction of soft loans in the late 1950's. The basic thrust of aid policy appears to have been jointly developed by Executive and Congress. The administration of aid has reflected this emphasis on economic criteria, as the criticisms of Morgenthau and Schlesinger attest.

In the late 1960's Congress was moderately successful in urging that both economic and military aid be used to promote political development within recipient nations. Clearly, President Nixon found military security considerations more compelling than encouragement of political development in the case of Greece in 1972. Despite stringent congressional restrictions, he pursued an aid strategy somewhat different from that sanctioned by a majority of both houses of Congress. Nevertheless, congressional action encouraged administrative moves generally in keeping with congressional intent. President Nixon did propose two new institutions, the U. S. International Development Corporation and the U. S. International Development Institute, to

institutionalize the development emphasis. AID presentations to Congress for FY1973 noted major redirection of assistance toward emphasis on quality of life in the least developed countries. This was certainly in line with the recommendations of Congress in previous years. In addition more specific congressional restrictions have mandated recipient compliance in particular cases in which many congressmen have perceived flagrant abuse of political liberties and human rights. For example, FY1975 legislation provisions concerning Chile specifically prohibited military aid which many congressmen felt directly threatened political development opportunities. The recommendations and exhortations of some Senate members during the early 1960's and of members of both the Senate and House in the mid-1960's did not prevent U.S. aid to dictatorial regimes, yet the role of Congress as catalyst has focused attention and forced rethinking of major aid strategy and criteria.

Congressional action has greatly influenced the means of economic assistance. The cautious move towards increased use of multilateral institutions has been a product of the interplay of conflicting political groups within the legislature. In general, the two Senate committees have been successful in gradually shifting the

program in the multilateral direction they desired, and the two House committees have been successful in keeping the movement incremental. Congress also can take much credit for the shift of U.S. economic aid away from large public projects to technical assistance.

The population control program is one aspect of aid methods often cited by both congressmen and administrators as an example of congressional initiative. Actually the idea to institute some minimum AID activity in the area of population control seems to have originated within the Kennedy administration. Nevertheless, the significance of the role of Congress should not be underestimated, for administrators largely ignored the implications for U.S. aid effectiveness until 1965.

A Fulbright amendment to 1963 foreign aid legislation gave congressional sanction to AID research into problems of population, legitimating an activity in which AID was already engaged in a limited way. But while AID did indicate some concern in the early 1960's, during Senate debate in 1965 Senator Joseph Clark urged increased executive attention. He noted that practically at the end of the floor debate, no one had even mentioned this type of program and urged movement to a more active role

for AID rather than the limited passive role it had played previously. The same year Senator Ernest Gruening, chairman of the Senate Government Operations subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, held hearings on population and aid, focusing attention on the subject.⁴ In this case Congress, especially the Senate, performed a catalytic role, encouraging the Executive to move more aggressively into an area about which it had exercised great caution. While initiative appears to have come from the Executive, in such a controversial area the executive branch was not willing to move vigorously without additional political support. Therefore, it sought to gauge congressional reaction and found this reaction to be favorable. The congressional influence can be seen by the fact that Congress earmarked funds for population control (in the late 1960's and 1970's) even when the administration had made no such request. Finally, in 1973 AID set up a new Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance. The role of Congress in this policy development is illustrative of its role in other areas of the aid program.

Congress has also had direct influence on the military assistance program. The objectives of this program

⁴Baldwin, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy, Ch. 8.

have been critically examined by some congressional groups, and through specific restrictions and funding cuts Congress had molded the military aid program. The Senate has provided a forum for a reevaluation of how military aid could best serve the true security interests of the United States.

Congress has clearly influenced the means of military assistance, primarily through virtually mandating a phaseout of grant assistance and encouraging a shift to credit and cash sales. The administration of military aid was also directly affected through the creation of the Director of Security Assistance within the Department of State, an administrative change in keeping with the Senate desire for clear foreign policy guidance over this type of aid.

In conclusion, in the area of foreign aid policy Congress has primarily played the roles of policy-modification and catalyst, encouraging certain courses of action. In this capacity it has worked along with the Executive in joint development of feasible policy alternatives.

The Impact of Congressional Committees

During the early 1960's the various roles performed by the foreign aid committees ultimately left the Executive

significant flexibility in policy formulation. Since three of the four perceived their roles as essentially broad oversight, they wrote guidelines in such a way as to leave considerable room for presidential maneuvering. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's desire for a collaborative role in influencing policy was satisfied in part because of similar committee and administration views on the basic substance of aid policy. Only the House Appropriations Committee sought to modify policy in a way not in keeping with executive wishes. During this period the House Appropriations Committee exercised most significant independent congressional impact on the aid program, primarily through budget cuts. Despite the support of both foreign affairs committees, final appropriations figures reflected Otto Passman's views on means and general scope of the program.

During the mid-1960's political neutralization of the House committee by President Johnson allowed the Senate to have more independent impact on determining final funding priorities. The major congressional hurdles lay in the authorization process, and mainly in the Senate, where the Foreign Relations Committee began to be more specific

on the Executive. Furthermore, the need to provide a cushion for appropriations cuts was less during this time, allowing the House authorization committee the luxury of a more assertive posture. Nevertheless, its general stance was to uphold the President. Although compromising with its Senate counterpart, the House committee's views on important issues such as long-term authorization continued to prevail.

By the latter 1960's the trend of congressional assertiveness was growing. The House Appropriations Committee returned to its policy of specific administrative oversight and policy modification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was moving in the direction of more specific oversight, and Fulbright was attempting to form the group into a Senate force for policy initiative.

At the same time the House Foreign Affairs Committee was moving in a similar direction, though not at the speed of the Senate body. The influence of energetic liberals on the committee put it in a position of catalyst. By the latter 1960's the Senate Appropriations Committee was the only one of the committees on which the President could rely for unquestioning support. But by 1971 this too had changed. This meant that the President faced his stiffest opposition in the upper chamber.

Yet while the Senate, especially the Foreign Relations Committee, got the publicity, Senate positions seemed to only indirectly affect final governmental action. The Congress funded aid in 1971, albeit only on a temporary basis and at a reduced rate. But few real modifications occurred and basic changes were postponed. While the President, reflecting Senate desires, proposed administrative changes for splitting economic and military assistance, Thomas Morgan balked at immediate acceptance of the new proposals, and the more clearcut delineation remained under discussion. Moreover, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's continuing effort throughout the Development Decade to shift a major part of development assistance to multilateral institutions appeared as of 1971 to have had little significant impact on the means of U.S. foreign assistance. Figures on total American development assistance to foreign nations indicate that the percentage of U.S. aid provided through such institutions actually dropped from 15% to 10% between 1967 and 1971.⁵ Furthermore, Senate liberals'

⁵Figures taken from The United States and the Developing World, p. 148. The original source was the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Agency for International Development, "U.S. Annual Review: Report to the Chairman of DAC," 1972, p. 15.

attempts to legislate an end to the Vietnamese War did not win widespread congressional acceptance until after the desired goal has been accomplished through executive channels.

The impact of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the late 1960's and early 1970's appears at first glance to have been greater than it was in fact. While initiating positions and taking definitive stands on policy, which gained it press publicity, its actual impact on final decisions has not been as impressive as that of other congressional subsystems.

In the early 1970's the Senate remained the major battlefield over issues relevant to the aid debate, with both Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees placing restrictions on executive discretion. Such restrictions were a major factor in forging support for aid among House liberals also.

But in 1974 President Ford faced intense opposition from the House International Relations Committee over the issue of Turkish aid. The disintegration of the "anti-Communism" consensus, prevalent within the House during the 1950's and 1960's paved the way for increased congressional

dispute over appropriate foreign policy objectives and approaches. Predictions were upheld that this House committee would be in an institutional position, to a greater degree than the Senate, to determine the actual implementation of the aid program in this area. The committee's views had most impact on the final policy product, despite the Senate's efforts to support the President. The force which had acted to grant democratic legitimacy to presidential proposals in the 1960's proved to be the major obstacle to the President's position in the 1970's. On the other hand, the Senate, which had been the thorn in the flesh of several administrations during the Development Decade, was now acting as a more conciliatory force within the congressional-executive confrontation.

Mid-1970's policy has been shaped somewhat more in line with the Senate's position than in the past. For example, FY1976 economic aid figures authorized by Congress were much closer to the lower figure approved by the Senate than to the higher one sponsored by the House.⁶ Moreover, 1975 figures indicate that there is congressional support for increased reliance on multilateral institutions. In

⁶Both were higher than President Ford's request.

FY1975 twenty percent of economic aid funds within the administration request were budgeted for various international programs, and the congressional appropriations process approved twenty-three percent, a significant increase from a few years before.

Nonetheless, the consistently hostile attitude of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee toward military aid did not seem to be having great effect on final foreign aid expenditures. FY1976 appropriations provided twice as much funding for military assistance as for economic aid.

With the Senate Appropriations Committee attempting to act as a catalyst for proposals originally encouraged by Foreign Relations Committee members, the position of the House International Relations Committee has left the President's program more vulnerable. Many of the committee's members, now including Chairman Morgan, are calling for closer study of broad policy matters. Representative Fraser has called for Congress to "play a valuable role by providing a forum for minority views on policy issues and by testing the underlying assumptions of major policies, primarily through committee hearings."⁷ This is indicative

⁷Congressional Quarterly, 33 (June 28, 1975): 1348.

of a role perception closer to the policy-initiation and modification role perception of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Determinants of Congressional Impact

Certain factors appear important in determining the impact of various committees on policy-making. Some involve the internal structure of Congress. A major determinant is the congressional committee's internal cohesion and its position within the full legislative chamber. The House Appropriations Committee's consistent impact on final funding levels has been partly due to its institutional place of authority within the House. The relatively less independent and autonomous position of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee within the Senate has not permitted it the same degree of integration as a decision-making subsystem, and the lower degree of consensus among the members concerning policy and role performance has put the committee in a less institutionally powerful position during the late 1960's and early 1970's. Internal political divisions have decreased the majority's ability to mobilize full Senate support for its proposals.

Of primary importance is the personal predisposition

of the chairman. A very dominant subcommittee chairman in the case of the appropriations committee permitted less freewheeling behavior than did the less dominating and less organization-oriented chairman of Foreign Relations. Internal changes within the House allowing greater subcommittee activity, which occurred simultaneously with personnel changes at the subcommittee level, coalesced to allow the House International Relations Committee more independent impact than had been previously possible.

It must be remembered that the distinction between visibility and influence is extremely important. The center of greatest antagonism to executive action may generate most publicity, but the subsystems which basically legitimized executive proposals during much of the Development Decade proved most influential in determining basic policy and administration. Time and time again the House Foreign Affairs Committee's position on issues was similar to the general shape of the legislation which was finally enacted. To the extent that the final policy output and the subsystem's policy position generally are similar, the role of legitimation carries a predisposition for success, even though little autonomous impact is made on the program by the subsystem. This tendency for success is partly the

result of automatic administration support, including the provision of prepackaged justifications. The resources, including money, time, and human energy, necessary to launch an effective challenge to executive proposals make success more difficult to attain.

Another factor is the support of other congressional groups. The policy stands of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not enjoy the organized support of other relevant congressional groups in 1971. However, when the two authorization committees have agreed on policy, even for different reasons, they have been better equipped to affect the executive branch. Ultimately, Senate Appropriations Committee backing for the Foreign Relations Committee's basic position lent support for restrictions at both authorization and appropriations stages, and House International Relations Committee restrictions buttressed the general thrust of the Senate committee's policy and procedural modifications.

Some factors involve the external political environment. When a committee does take a stand opposing a presidential program, it generally will be successful in directly influencing the program when its opposition is

based on a noncontroversial principle with which a majority in Congress can agree without political repercussion. The House Appropriation's Committee's opposition to aid has been based on the norm of efficient use of tax money, a principle with which congressmen find it politically feasible to ally. When opposition is based on controversial political issues on which there is no chamber consensus and which could possibly cause domestic political disadvantage, there is less chance of successful influence.

Determinants of Congressional Support for Foreign Aid

The determinants of congressional support for foreign aid legislation are varied. First, when congressional elites specialized in the area of foreign aid agree with the Executive on basic objectives and the basic thrust of foreign policy decisions, the Executive is able to mobilize congressional support for the program. In cases in which different congressional factions support varying objectives, the Executive's justification of aid as simultaneously accomplishing these various purposes may successfully mobilize support from congressmen of different political viewpoints. When congressional criticisms are of specific aid policies and objectives, the executive tactic of

cutting aid requests may be successful in alleviating criticism even if aid objectives are not changed.

Institutional trust, credibility and legitimacy play a decisive role in determining congressional support. When the Executive maintains overall credibility and employs decision-making procedures which Congress perceives as legitimate, legislative approval is forthcoming. Important here are congressional subsystems' perceptions of their own roles. When major congressional decision-makers perceive that they are actually playing the role they seek to play in decision-making, they generally support the product of that decision-making.

The specific role a subsystem seeks to play is partially determined by opinions on the substance of policy. Subsystems which agree with the Executive on basic aid objectives and means generally support executive discretion in actual implementation. For example, some subsystems' support for the military assistance program led them to relatively uncritical acceptance of its implementation, while those that criticized the basic objectives and effects of military aid more critically evaluated administrative procedures in that area. When congressional groups are

opposed to specific executive policies, they become more concerned with limiting executive discretion.

When Congress perceives itself as ineffective in determining policy output, it grants less support to that policy. When it perceives itself ineffective in a general policy area, it seeks to control in more detail the aspects of policy over which it has some control. Congress became more and more hostile to foreign aid as influential members' perceptions of their impact on foreign policy diminished. Since aid legislation required annual authorization and appropriations, it became the focal point for expression of congressional frustration over what it perceived as its inefficacy in the foreign policy decision-making process.

But the policy and procedural facets are interwoven. Observers have noted that the opposition of key Senate committee members to the substance of foreign policy decisions during the mid-1960's partially accounted for the Executive's lack of enthusiasm for involving these members in the process. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, whose support in the foreign policy sphere could be trusted, seemed to perceive less of a communications gap between committee and White House than was perceived by the Senate group. Since the House group perceived its role more as legitimator than

active consultant, it is possible its expectations of communication were quite different and therefore were met by the decision-making procedures of that time, while those of the Senate group were not. In any case the process seems circular. Differences over policy tend to lead to less consultation which leads to increased hostility to policy.

Certain executive strategies appear successful in alleviating political opposition within Congress. The Executive may be able to neutralize political opposition through utilizing to the fullest personal and political ties with key committee members. President Johnson's relationship with fellow Texas George Mahon of the House Appropriations Committee is a good example. Another moderately successful executive strategy is reducing aid requests. On the other hand, appointing presidential commissions whose reports are favorable to the general outline of the administration's proposals does not appear to be an effective tactic for mobilizing support. Neither the Clay Commission Report of 1963 nor the Peterson Report of 1970 convinced Congress to support higher levels of funding for foreign assistance.

When antagonisms grow, based on a complex of factors of broader scope than the particular legislation under discussion, technical modifications of the specific legislation probably will not be sufficient to mobilize legislative support. Aid remained the focus of congressional hostility in the 1970's even though the Executive consistently cut requests and attempted to respond to some specific congressional criticisms of the aid process. But by this time criticisms were of the major trends of U.S. foreign policy and the procedure for making decisions in the foreign policy sphere. Distrust of executive judgment and intent undercut the significance of minor modifications.

An Evaluation of Congressional Effect on Foreign Aid

Some questions must be raised concerning the actual effect of well-publicized congressional actions regarding foreign aid. For example, Congress has been successful in significantly reducing the military assistance grant program and in spurring plans for its total elimination. This will eliminate the President's ability to use such aid as a short-term political inducement or prop in a crisis situation. But if congressmen are concerned about the justification of military aid per se and the effects of massive flows of

U.S. arms to foreign nations, this particular action will make less difference than one might expect. The foreign military cash and credit sales programs have become a more significant aspect of arms transfers in recent years, and congressional discussion in the 1970's indicated that many congressmen perceived that they exercised little control over this program. In FY1974 the United States sold military equipment valued at \$8.2 billion to seventy countries. This figure was nine times the comparable figure for 1970.⁸ Furthermore, the largest amounts went to Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Greece, and West Germany, the first four of which are located in geographical regions of high political and military tension. Congressional restrictions such as the House Appropriations Committee's ceiling on arms sales to Latin America are of minimal significance in the overall context of international arms flows. At times Congress appears to make firm decisions on issues of debatable significance while taking little forceful action on much more critical and controversial issues.

Congressional disagreement on aid objectives and means also gives incentive for Congress to shift responsi-

⁸Total and individual country figures are taken from Congressional Quarterly, 33 (March 29, 1975): 656.

bility for key decision-making to the Executive through the mechanism of the presidential waiver. The insertion of a waiver of congressional restrictions when the President perceives that the national security is threatened has left a loophole for executive decision-making which may be inconsistent with congressional intent. President Nixon continued arms aid to Greece despite congressional objections, yet remained within the letter of the law.

Executive negotiations may also include promises of aid commitments which circumvent congressional restrictions. It is possible that while a congressional ban on aid shipments is in effect, arrangements can be made for future shipments. In this sense, there is some validity to the argument that Congress has been ineffectual on some issues concerning foreign aid, although for the most part it has taken a constructive part in shaping the foreign assistance program.

Several points deserve consideration at this time. First, it is not necessarily accurate to assume that because a specific policy did not win full legislative approval and was not written into law that it did not have impact on executive decision-making. One can realistically

argue that Senate initiatives on end-the-Vietnamese-War amendments acted as a catalytic force to spur executive action in that direction. If the policy is ultimately carried out through executive rather than legislative channels, the independent impact of legislative action is hard to determine, but there is no reason to believe that it had no effect.

Furthermore, it is fruitless to attempt to distinguish between impact made on foreign policy through the vehicle of the aid program and impact on the foreign assistance venture itself. A broad philosophical debate on foreign policy, such as a reevaluation of United States commitments abroad, cannot be separated from a discussion of specific appropriations for specific foreign nations. For example, executive foreign policy decisions concerning Indochina resulted in strict congressional country-by-country restrictions on reconstruction aid to that region.

In cases in which Congress fails to take decisive action, the reason is not necessarily that Congress is impotent to halt an executive policy of which it disapproves. More accurately, the policy is probably one on which Congress has not yet formed a consensus which would allow

it to take firm action. As a consensus is forged, Congress will become more aggressive in modifying the relevant policy. The arms sales issue provides a good example. The shift toward sales of arms abroad was actively encouraged by many in Congress. Congressional approval of funding for military credit sales has provided the basis for implementation of the policy despite the objections of some congressional groups. But as many congressmen reevaluate the benefits and disadvantages of arms sales, there has been increased support for congressional restrictions on executive discretion over arms transfers.

The issue of the presidential waiver should also be considered carefully. While the provision of a waiver may allow considerable presidential discretion in the short-run, it nevertheless does not exempt the President from going on public record as taking action of which many congressmen have, at the least, been very skeptical. The chief executive is forced to explain and justify his action to the attentive public in a manner which would otherwise be unnecessary.

Requirements that the executive branch give prior notification to Congress in many areas of administrative decision-making seek to ensure that any decisions not

approved by a majority of Congress will not be implemented. In many cases notification of Congress is required even if presidential action is taken based on national security justifications. FY1975 legislation mandates this for defense sales over \$25 million, for example.

While it can be argued that such legislative oversight might encourage administrators to seek alternative and perhaps dubious routes to accomplish the same ends, exposure of such furtive maneuvering is likely to lead, in the long-run, to an increase in the scope and intensity of congressional oversight and to an increasingly assertive policy-formulating and implementing role for Congress.

Nevertheless, considerable administrative flexibility in the actual implementation of foreign aid and will probably continue. Most congressmen accept the legitimacy of administrative flexibility in many areas, although this legitimacy has been diminished in recent years. On specific issues it is probable that different congressional groups will continue to disagree on the proper courses of action. Therefore, it is likely that the conference result will be to leave room for presidential waiver of legislative restrictions in the interest of national security.

While there will be cases in which a particular congressional group will have enough political clout to legislate its own stand, there will continue to be many areas open to compromise. The Congress is likely to grant the President increased discretion in certain areas in return for increased accountability in other, more significant, areas. For example, in the mid-1970's Congress removed arms sales ceilings to Latin America but demanded the right to reject use of special funds for the Middle East if the Executive fails to convince Congress that their use is necessary.

Unsatisfactory experience with setting policy by legislative fiat will probably work to moderate the stand of some legislative groups. For example, the legislative cut-off of aid to Turkey did not lead the antagonists to work any harder for a negotiated settlement and did lead to a diplomatic crisis when the Turkish government closed down American bases on Turkish soil. Legislators are highly to be more cautious in mandating foreign policy in the future; at the least, it is more desirable from the lawmakers' point of view to be able to blame the President or the Secretary of State for poor judgment if the policy is unsuccessful than to have to take the responsibility them-

selves for a well-publicized failure.

In general Congress' effect on foreign aid has been noticeable and in most instances beneficial to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Executive and scholarly criticisms that Congress has had a negative effect on the program through irresponsible restrictions on its execution do not seem well-founded. This evaluation is based on several assumptions. First, foreign aid policy should be consistent with major administrative and congressional policy-makers' conceptions of American national interest within the domestic and international context of the particular time period. As is clear from congressional reaction to aid legislation, if the program is to survive, it must be not only justified but also actually administered in keeping with congressionally approved foreign policy objectives. Clearly, a new consensus on aid will not be formed without a new consensus on U.S. foreign policy. Congressional action in the 1970's has been taken, not with the intention of terminating foreign aid, but in order to force a reevaluation of American foreign policy goals. Congressional dissension has focused the debate over the primary objectives of American foreign policy. Although there is often little immediate effect on aid program administration, still

important messages on overall priorities are communicated to foreign leaders through the process. Furthermore, steady cutbacks in aid funding in the late 1960's forced administrators of foreign aid to be more selective in commitments, thereby encouraging some evaluation of top priority goals. Although it can be argued that such reductions in the level of funding rendered the aid program ineffective in accomplishing its objectives, the pattern of congressional reaction indicates support for aid funding in areas where explanations and justifications are perceived as adequate.

Changing domestic and international circumstances since the late 1940's have lessened congressional support for the aid venture. However, recent congressional actions indicate support for both economic and military aspects, given varying circumstances and within certain restrictions. There appears to be a feeling within the Congress that aid is a legitimate tool (both directly through bilateral means and indirectly through international institutions) for protecting the national security. But this belief presupposes that the executive branch can convince influential congressmen that there is a discernible link between proposed uses of aid and legitimate national security interests. Congress' decision to deny aid for pro-Western forces in

Angola while approving large amounts of assistance for the Middle East indicates that Congress intends to be a significant participant in the process of defining legitimate U.S. interests.

Furthermore, support for foreign aid will be built only if officials can merge long-term planning and potential advantages with short-term politically feasible justifications and benefits. Though not always successful, many congressional attempts, such as initiation of the Export Development Credit Fund, have been aimed toward this goal.

The more controversial aspects of the program must be revamped to meet major congressional criticism. The strategy of attaching the more controversial segments of the program to less controversial parts has ceased to be effective in winning legislative approval. Disillusionment over what is perceived as the lack of congruence between the effects of foreign aid and appropriate foreign policy objectives has become too deeply ingrained in both houses of Congress. In 1971 Congress defeated the omnibus foreign aid bill primarily because diverse political factions voted against varying segments of the act. This phenomenon demonstrated the need for a more clearly defined program. In the mid-1970's congressional groups have sought to

revitalize the program through dealing with economic and military aid separately, clarifying the aims of various portions, and narrowing and focusing the means of aid-giving. In addition, Congress has proposed restrictions on arms sales, indicating its desire to deal forthrightly with the most controversial issue related to foreign assistance at this time.

The second assumption is that the implementation of the aid program should be consistent with approved policy positions. Fairly specific administrative decisions written into aid legislation by Congress have been aimed at encouraging this consistency in areas where influential congressmen have approved of the policy.

Third, foreign aid should be accomplishing what it is designed to achieve. The fact that congressional cut-backs in aid funding have often been based on congressmen's belief that aid was ineffective certainly does not provide proof of the Congress' irresponsibility.

Fourth, foreign aid should be administered efficiently, i.e. obtaining the highest degree of effectiveness at the lowest cost. While the denial of aid funds as incentive to force executive action in certain areas may hamper the immediate efficiency and effectiveness of some

aspects of the aid program, still the absence of such leverage might allow the Executive the opportunity to engage in equally inefficient and ineffective activity. The long-term risks inherent in the latter case are much greater not only for the administration of a program but also for the policy assumptions on which such administration is based.

Most importantly, foreign aid policy should be determined through procedures which are consistent with the constitutional democratic policy-making process, i.e., processes which ensure accountability to the electorate for the broad trends of foreign policy and which avoid a concentration of decision-making power unchecked by other parts of the political system.

There is a basic axiom that administrators must accept: like it or not, aid cannot be viewed outside of the domestic and international political context. Those who argue that Congress should not restrict or entangle the aid program with political amendments are simply ignoring the fact that since aid administration is going to be based on political considerations, Congress should have a direct hand in setting those political requirements. Although this procedure may lead to a less rationally planned and coordinated foreign policy, at the same time decisions may be

made in response to a greater variety of pertinent considerations. The Senate's insistence in the early 1970's that foreign aid decisions be made with more attention to overall priorities among domestic and international commitments possesses great merit.

It is true that in some cases domestic political groups exert pressure on congressmen to take political stands based on the wishes of a small group of constituents. Those stands may have little to do with general foreign policy interests abroad. The Greek lobby's effort on behalf of a cut-off of aid to Turkey is a case in point. However, a group politically influential enough to have an independent effect on legislative decision-making is likely to have political clout within the executive establishment as well. Thus while the lopsided congressional votes for aid to Israel have been partially the result of the political influence of the American Jewish community, similar pressures have been brought on the Executive itself. Removing Congress from the decision-making equation would not insulate aid policy from domestic political and economic pressure groups.

The crisis in foreign aid has dramatized the fact that institutional mechanisms for foreign policy-making

which are accepted and trusted by relevant congressional elites must be developed. More meaningful communication between the executive branch and the Congress on broad foreign policy issues would probably build support for the foreign aid program more rapidly than would tinkering with the specifics of the aid machinery. In the long-term the perceived legitimacy of the decision-making process is one of the most significant variables in determining congressional support for American foreign policy decisions.

Congressional Impact on Foreign Affairs

The Congress has been striving for a "constitutional balance" relationship between Executive and Congress in the area of foreign affairs throughout the period. The period 1961-65 exhibits a close approximation of a presidential dominance model of congressional-executive relations. Congressional-executive similarity in perceptions of threats to U.S. security and of appropriate general foreign policy trends combined with the party linkage of a Democratic majority in Congress and a Democratic incumbent in the White House produced a situation of presidential leadership and congressional acquiescence. Congressional handling of foreign aid legislation reflected this relatively harmonious situation.

Ronald C. Moe and Stephen C. Teel present the idea that the period 1955-65 was an aberration in American foreign policy-making, in that the usually active participation of Congress in this area declined for a period. According to this analysis the resurgence of congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs since 1966 should not be viewed as out of character but merely as a return to normal.⁹

The 1966-71 period was one of intensifying congressional-executive antagonism, as congressional actors sought to reestablish a clear constitutional balance model of foreign policy decision-making. Feeling ineffective in determining the general shape of U.S. foreign policy, Congress attempted to constrain the Executive. The foreign aid legislation became the weapon for Congress to brandish in order to increase its influence on major foreign policy decisions. The result was an uneasy equilibrium, with the Congress asserting what it considered its rightful place in the institutional power struggle and in some areas jointly molding and crystallizing policy in concert with the Executive.

⁹See Ronald C. Moe and Stephen C. Teel, "Congress as Policy-Maker: A Necessary Reappraisal," in Congress and the President, Moe, ed. (N.Y.: Goodyear, 1971).

While much of the 1971-1975 period has been characterized by executive dominance in foreign affairs, it has been a period of political stalemate in the foreign aid area. The individualistic style of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy has partially occasioned this situation of stalemate. In the 1970's, Congress has taken radical action in a seemingly desperate attempt to force the President's hand. In 1971 the Senate defeated foreign aid authorization, and since then continuing resolutions have acted as life-support equipment to keep a critically ill program alive. In 1973 the House came close to defeating aid, and in 1976 the President vetoed the military assistance bill sent him by the Congress. Neither branch has successfully revamped and revitalized the program; both have delayed action. On the other hand, this period of stalemate may be necessary in order to clarify further the real problem areas and to build the necessary political consensus for change. Certainly, the time has not been unproductive; on the contrary, it has been a time of intense congressional questioning and testing of alternative proposals.

Some analysts believe that Congress reached its peak of assertiveness in the foreign affairs area in 1973-74

with such initiatives as the War Powers Act, passed over President Nixon's veto. While there is some support for this viewpoint, there seems to have emerged a trend of independent congressional thinking. While it is very likely that there will be attempts by both Executive and Congress to forestall the blatant kinds of institutional confrontations of the mid-1970's, there is every indication that some congressional groups have carved out a niche for themselves which they will not readily relinquish. Recently, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted, 12-2, to demand information on any undisclosed understandings pertaining to the 1975 Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai. The threat of delay in congressional approval of American observers for the region until such information was provided indicates that the Congress is determined to have a more vital impact on the conduct of foreign policy. The executive decision to submit the issue of future Spanish-American relations to the Congress for study illustrates that the administration realized the need to mobilize congressional support in the diplomatic arena.

Summary and Conclusions

The United States foreign assistance program in the 1970's is based on an assumption very similar to the

basic policy assumption of the original post-World War II assistance effort: that fostering the economic development and military capability of U.S. aid recipients encourages international stability which ultimately helps protect the national interest of the United States from the threatening designs of powerful adversaries. However, the United States has shifted its aid strategies in order to meet what officials perceive as the most pressing needs at any given time, and Congress has helped determine appropriate strategies.

Admittedly, congressional influence is diluted because of the different political factions and institutional subsystems which the legislature encompasses. Moreover, policy and implementation are planned primarily by executive branch officials. Nevertheless, Congress has modified this policy to ensure that it conforms with the views of the congressmen most specialized and interested in this, and directly related, policy areas. The final output is a composite of the prime concerns of both congressional and administrative foreign-policy elites.

Clearly any developments which threaten what members of particular congressional subsystems perceive as their proper role within the decision-making structure inevitably

lead to congressional actions designed to shore up the threatened position. Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee have dealt forcefully with this problem in recent years. Congress has actively encouraged restructured procedures for foreign policy decision-making. Congressional mechanisms and ploys for obtaining more relevant information, including recent additions of committee staff members familiar with relevant administrative agencies, are extremely significant. Procedural and institutional changes within Congress signal a movement toward increased influence for Congress in the area of foreign affairs. For example, the shift toward use of the congressional veto of proposed executive action in the foreign affairs area indicates that Congress is more willing than it has been in the recent past to make final decisions on the merits of certain courses of action.

The recent reforms which resulted in new budget committees in both houses of Congress as well as a congressional budget office are likely to provide Congress with the machinery for defining budget priorities more effectively than ever before. Thus spending for foreign aid will be examined in relation to spending in other

policy fields, giving a clearer picture of the relative merit and impact of military sales and agricultural transfers, for example.

The assertion that Congress has gone too far in attempting to be a "co-administrator" of the aid program is justified. However, the issue is as much one of executive accountability in a democratic system as one of legislative over-assertiveness. The pendulum swing toward the latter direction has been necessary and, under the circumstances, probably unavoidable, if some balance is to be struck. The conflict over aid has demonstrated the necessity for more open communication on foreign policy issues of major importance. This development has been healthy to the extent that it contributes to governmental accountability within a democratic policy-making context.

APPENDIX A

CONTENT ANALYSIS CODING RULES

1. The unit of analysis is the "theme." A theme is a fact or idea. It may be presented in a sentence, a paragraph, or a series of paragraphs.
2. Generally, each question asked by a congressman of an administrative witness consisted of one theme. It was, therefore, coded under only one heading. This format was followed in almost all instances.
3. Very infrequently, a question consisted of clearly more than one theme. This was especially true in very long comments in which the speaker dealt with several aspects of the program. Two separate themes were then coded.
4. If there was a question which could possibly fall under more than one theme category, it was counted under one only.
5. Each question was counted separately when there was an intervening answer or comment by a witness. When the interruption was very short and did not break the congressman's thought, only one theme was coded.
6. Since hearings on economic aid and military aid have been held separately, questions during hearings on economic assistance were coded under Economic Assistance and questions during hearings on military assistance were coded under Military Assistance.
7. A series of questions dealing specifically with the military aid program during hearings on Economic Assistance or vice-versa were noted and did not affect tabulation of comments on Economic Assistance.

8. Most statements about various aspects of the aid program were neutral in terms of opinion. Where a clearly stated opinion was given, this was so coded. For example, the statement, "Buying political friends should never be the goal of economic aid," would be coded as "con" this particular objective. Judgments have been made on the basis of the actual meaning of words, and if there was any doubt as to the intent of the speaker, the statement was coded as neutral. P = comment is favorable to the idea (pro); C = comment is unfavorable to the idea (con).

Statement Categories:

- I. Objectives--A statement or question concerning the purposes of either the economic or military aid programs

While purposes may be implied through various discussion of the administration of aid to a particular country, a statement would be coded under "Objectives" only if the speaker indicated that his concern was with the goals of the program or what the United States was really trying to accomplish through foreign aid. For example, a congressman may make comments concerning Greece and aid to Greece, and one could infer certain ideas about program goals from this discussion. However, if the speaker never mentioned a specific goal of the program encompassing aid to Greece, such as political development, security of an ally, or maintenance of base rights abroad, the statement would not be coded under "Objectives." However, if he was speaking of what the United States is trying to accomplish, and did this in relation to a certain country, the statement would be coded under "Objectives."

There was no attempt made to determine whether a stated goal was a long-range, intermediate-range, or short-range goal, unless the speaker clarified this.

Infrequently, a statement would be phrased to indicate pursuit of one goal in order to further an ultimate purpose. For example, economic development in order to combat Communism. In these cases the statement

would be coded under the ultimate goal. Exception would be made if the speaker gave overwhelming emphasis to the intermediate goal indicating that this was really the goal in which he had most interest. In these cases it seems most useful to count this intermediate goal. Analysis attempts to deal with the overall logic of foreign aid, including the interplay between short-range and long-range objectives.

A. Categories of economic aid objectives

1. Economic development--includes statements concerning economic growth, sustaining viable independent nations and economies, and self-sustaining status when economic self-reliance is obviously indicated.
2. Political development--includes statements concerning fostering democratic processes, building self-governing institutions, fostering social and community development, and fostering local political participation.
3. Fight Communism--includes statements concerning building political support for governments in order to stop Communism, "Free World" defense, balancing Soviet arms in an area, freeing people from subjugation, giving aid to keep Communists from giving aid, keeping a pro-Western influence, buttressing a pro-Western ally.
4. Foreign policy political--includes statements concerning winning and keeping friends and allies, quid pro quo political arrangements, short-term political crisis aid, U.S. foreign policy objectives, short-term political objectives, and keeping political influence with recipient.
5. U.S. interest-U.S. security--includes U.S. military security, U.S. defense security, U.S. and allies' security, mutual security of U.S. and allies, U.S. and recipient's security.
6. Promote independence

- 7. Peace
- 8. Humanitarianism
- 9. U.S. economic benefit
- 10. Stability--includes economic and political stability

B. Ex.: "We are so fascinated with Communism that we are just going to keep out the Communists all over the world. I do not think this is a good reason." Fight Communism-1 (C)

C. Categories of military aid objectives

- 1. Economic development
- 2. Political development
- 3. Fight Communism
- 4. Foreign policy political
- 5. U.S. interest/U.S. security
- 6. Promote independence
- 7. Peace
- 8. U.S. economic benefit
- 9. Stability
- 10. Recipient's military security
- 11. Internal security--includes statements concerning counter insurgency

D. Ex.: "this [good of the domestic economy], I think, is the goal that we seek to attain in the final analysis in this foreign aid idea." U.S. economic benefit--1 (P)

II. Means--A comment on the specific methods or categories through which aid is given to foreign nations.

Since the two broad categories of Economic Aid and Military Aid provide the overall framework for analysis, a precise quantifiable indication of concern with each is not available. When either was specifically mentioned as a type of assistance, this was recorded under "Means--Economic Aid" or "Means--Military Aid." Ex.: "The military aid program should be completely phased out." Means--Military Aid-1 (C)

When one method of aid-giving was preferred over another, the statement was coded under the category where the emphasis of the speaker was placed. Ex.: A statement indicating a preference for development loans over grants would be coded--Loans-1 (P)

If two distinctly clear themes were presented, such as one paragraph dealing with the merits of development loans and a second paragraph dealing with the disadvantages of the grant approach, two themes were coded.

Loans-1 (P)

Grants-1 (C)

Sometimes technical, specific questions were asked of a witness as a follow-up to a major line of interrogation concerning the means of foreign aid. Since it was clear that these questions concerned more intensive discussion of "means," the coder classified them under this heading.

When the statement dealt with the scope of one particular method of granting aid and not with assistance in general, it was coded under that means of assistance. For example, a statement favorable to a cut-back in supporting assistance would be coded: Supporting Assistance-1 (P). A statement favorable to increasing technical assistance would be coded: Technical Assistance-1 (P).

Questions concerning the administration of certain methods of aid-giving, such as arms sales, were classified under the means category if they clearly referred to that particular method of giving aid. For example, the administration of the civic action program refers directly to that method of granting military assistance, and these statements were coded under "means."

The statement was coded under means even when discussed in regard to administration to a particular country when the emphasis of the comment was on the method of aid-giving. Ex.: Greece is able to support a loan program, so the U.S. doesn't need to give aid in the form of grants. Loans-1

On the other hand, if the question referred to the general administration of the aid program to a certain country it was classified under "administration of program." For example, "Do the Koreans get other military assistance besides this?" Administration of program-1 This statement does not indicate any interest in military assistance as a form of aid; it is therefore not a means statement.

A. Categories of economic aid means

1. Loans
2. Grants
3. Technical Assistance--aid in the areas of agriculture, education, etc., was used synonymously with technical aid so often that discussion of aid for these areas was coded here.
4. Supporting Assistance
5. Emergency humanitarian assistance
6. Private Investment--the level of capital and technical expertise shifted through the private sector has an effect on the level of aid funds granted through the public sector
7. Population or family planning--some funds have been specifically earmarked for certain types of activities, such as this. Statements concerning these particular activities were coded under means. Since FY1974 aid funds have been broken down into these substantive areas.
8. PL480--agricultural commodities

B. Ex.: "If I had to choose between an appropriation of money for increases in agriculture, in education, and in health or guns for extermination or temporary advancement of any army, I would choose the agriculture, the education, and the health programs. . . . It seems to me overall lasting progress is done by the long-term investment that your economic people have done." Technical Assistance-1 (P)

C. Categories of military aid means

1. Loans
2. Grants
3. Sales

4. Civic action
 5. Public safety program
 6. Military training
- D. Ex.: "Are they proposing doing away with the ceiling on arms sales?" Arms sales-1
- E. Multilateral vs. Bilateral Aid--statements dealing with the multi-national approach to aid-giving would be coded under "Multilateralism." Statements dealing with the U.S. granting aid directly to a recipient nation would be coded under "Bilateralism." Ex.: Aid given through multilateral institutions may go to Communist nations. Multilateralism-1
- F. Contingency Fund--Even though these statements reflect congressional views on presidential discretion, Congress appropriates aid funds for this special category as it has for Development Loans.
- G. Sharing of burden of aid-giving--statements concerning the shifting of the burden of supplying aid to needy nations (however these may be defined) were classified under "Means-Sharing of burden." While they reflect international policy and also have a bearing on the scope of U.S. foreign aid, such statements are concerned with funds which, if not forthcoming through international institutions or from other donors, might necessitate increased aid funds through means such as U.S. loans or U.S. sales. Thus, they are concerned with the method through which assistance is provided to recipient countries. Some commentators feel that such statements reflect a desire to cut back the U.S. bilateral aid program. Since the bilateral-multilateral controversy was classified under this heading, logically, these statements should be classified here also.

III. Administration

- A. General administration--A comment on the institutional mechanisms, processes, and personnel for implementing economic and military assistance.

1. Coordination among aid-giving agencies
2. Institutional coordination, e.g. between AID and State Department
3. Personnel
4. Widespread administrative issues, e.g. rampant corruption or inefficiency within administration
5. Locus of decision-making authority

Ex.: "What I would like to do, instead of fragmentizing it, is to let you [AID Director] handle it all." "This committee has repeatedly stated that the shortcomings in our program have been due frequently to the inadequacy of our administrative personnel."

- B. Administration of program--more specific day-to-day operational concerns about how the program is actually implemented in the field.

A statement dealing with the operation of a program within a recipient country was coded under this heading.

1. Criteria for granting aid
2. Particular way aid is administered to various countries
3. Specific requirements in aid implementation

Ex.: "You are satisfied that . . . the program as a whole is well-conscious of the problem in Thailand and we are taking care of all the considerations there?"

"Wasn't this plant designed to produce nitrogenous fertilizer, and isn't it the fact that there was already abundant evidence before this AID financing that Colombian farmers wouldn't use nitrogenous fertilizer?"

- IV. Technical--A statement dealing with very specific aspects of administration, indicating an interest in detail.

Statements of a financial nature such as those concerning availability of funds in the pipeline, funds

to be reobligated, exact nature of the use of funds.

Ex.: How many jets are going to be sold to this country?
"Why is there an increase of 14 new positions?"

V. Scope--A comment on the general attitude toward foreign aid expenditures, the level of funding, and the geographic distribution of aid programs.

A. General feeling toward entire foreign aid program, e.g. statements which indicate a pro-foreign aid orientation

B. Level of funding
Statements concerning funding levels even if they refer to certain areas of the world

C. Distribution of foreign assistance, e.g. the concentration or dispersion of programs in terms of geographical areas

Ex.: "Could you tell us the number of countries where aid has been terminated?"
"Is the amount being requested this year adequate?"

VI. U.S. Economy--A comment dealing with the relationship of foreign assistance to the U. S. economic situation.

A. Effect of aid on the U. S. economy

B. Tying of aid to domestic economic purchases

C. Concern for U. S. taxpayer

Ex.: ". . . in fiscal 1970, about 98% of the AID money was in fact used to purchase in the United States."

Statements which refer to furthering U. S. economic benefit as a specific goal of aid were coded under "Objectives."

VII. Effect of foreign aid--A comment on the success or failure of assistance programs, their success in

achieving stated purposes, or the actual results of the aid effort."

Most often a statement would refer generally to the effect of the aid program or its effect in a certain area of the world.

A comment which dealt with the effect of aid in achieving a pursued objective was coded as two themes, one reflecting the objective mentioned and one reflecting an opinion on the effectiveness of aid in achieving that objective.

Ex.: If we are trying to win friends, we would be more successful if we sent Sukarno some dancing girls.

Objective-Foreign Policy Political-1 (no comment is made on the desirability of this goal)
Effect of aid-1 (C) (aid as administered is not viewed as effective in achieving the pursued goal)

Actual effect of aid:

Ex.: "We have created more problems which demand more money. . ."

VIII. U. S. Foreign Policy and International Policy

A. Foreign Policy--A statement which reflects a direct relationship between the U. S. and foreign countries or a concern with the U. S. role in international politics.

Ex.: "A Washington Post editorial stated that 'Strategic and electoral considerations seem to have inclined Mr. Nixon to ease into the Israeli position that the best stance at the moment is to provide Israel with arms and aid and diplomatically to sit tight.' Is that our current policy?"

B. International Policy--A statement which, while not directly reflecting U. S. foreign policy stands,

deals with particular courses of action taken by various countries, which may have an effect on international politics or indirectly on U. S. foreign policy.

1. Relationship of two foreign nations to each other
2. Amount or administration of aid given by a foreign nation, such as France
3. Internal policy of a foreign nation, such as land reform programs

A statement that dealt with the policy actions of another country was coded "International Policy" despite its relationship with the U. S. aid program unless that relationship was specified by the speaker.

Ex.: "What about land reform efforts in Chile?" International Politics-1

"Has our aid program in Chile taken into account the land reform efforts being undertaken there?" Administration of program-1

Ex.: Other nations justify giving aid in order to protect "strong trade ties."

- IX. Congressional Role--A comment on the part Congress or a segment of Congress should or does play in foreign policy-making, including aid policy formation.

A statement dealing with the role of Congress as a whole.

A statement dealing with the role of a congressional committee.

A statement dealing with the prerogatives of the executive branch or the relationship of Congress with the executive branch, such as the flow of information between the two.

If the emphasis of the statement was on the role Congress has played in affecting the program or policy,

the statement was coded under "Congressional Role."

If the emphasis was on the substantive aspect of the program with reference made to whether the committee or its members favored or did not favor this aspect, then the statement was coded under the substantive aspect in the relevant category.

Ex. (of Congressional Role statement): "I say that because if Congress is to have a role to play other than killing the program, it might be in reducing it somewhat."

"Let the committee on Foreign Affairs have another try at it, this time hopefully using its own imagination instead of waving through, like a traffic policeman, whatever the Agency for International Development rolls up to Capitol Hill."

CONTENT ANALYSIS--SAMPLE STATEMENTS

1. "Because of our assistance to those Asian countries within the past ten years, haven't they made tremendous progress militarily, economically, and politically?"
2. "Usually it hasn't been earmarked in coming up. We initiate it in this committee. . . . We are not blaming the military or the State Department or anybody else. This is not what they have asked for. It has generally come up as an issue in the committee itself."
3. "What training is given our personnel so they have a good understanding of the political dynamics of these nations, as well as a deep understanding of American foreign policy objectives?"
4. "Has the current political situation within India affected the program plans you have for development loans there?"
5. "There was much discussion last year of supersonic planes for a certain country of Latin America and this caused much difficulty on the floor for the military sales program."
6. "I think the use of the military [as financed through military aid] is really to augment the Alliance for Progress program as far as seeking to strengthen the economies of these countries and at the same time teaching them to defend themselves is concerned."
7. "What do they use the \$350,000 for?"
8. "I go with you so far. I know what we are trying to do on a long-term goal. I have been sitting on this committee for ten years now. To say, in effect, as you have just said, that either short-term or long-term political goals are not significant, I can't go with; I think they are."

Witness: "Long-term definitely."
9. "I think the short-term political goals are."

10. "Would you place in the record at this point the estimated percentage of AID funds that will be spent in the United States in fiscal year 1969 as compared to estimated 1968 and actual 1967?"
11. "Secretary Rogers, in a war of words, while each side is rearming, can you tell us what is the present situation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and what our policies are with regard to the buildup of military forces?"
12. "Promoting economic stability does not necessarily guarantee support of free world principles which is the only reason I support and have supported foreign aid."
13. "We haven't achieved near the results with our forty billion dollars comparatively, that they [the Soviet Union] have with their seven billion dollars."
14. "In respect to the matter of the population problem, he calls my attention to the fact that it was this committee that forced AID five years ago to do something about population."
15. ". . . my own sense is that the problem that AID faces is a more fundamental one, and that has to do with the questions of why we are really in the aid business itself."
16. "We have an aid program that is characterized by very little else but a subsidy to United States business interests at the present time."
17. "The 1973 budget estimate for multinational loans through international lending banks is up one billion dollars over the present fiscal year. That is the multinational and I favor very strongly the multinational way and I think you and the administration do also.

Yet, we continue to increase our bilateral loans up \$215 million in worldwide loans and bilateral loans for the Alliance for Progress, which is up \$563 billion in the 1973 request.

I wonder if this is not an illustration that we are not shifting to multinational assistance but going to go full steam ahead in both channels.

Why are we not reducing our bilateral assistance at the same time we are increasing our multilateral?"

18. "It [the budget deficit] came into being at the same time the foreign aid program came into being."
19. "It is always extremely difficult to get to see first-hand any tangible results of AID programs."
20. "I feel that little has been accomplished; notwithstanding my efforts, the AID program is steadily increasing."
21. "There has been some question about who really directs these programs within a country like Vietnam--whether it is the Department of State in the person of the Ambassador or the Administrator for AID or the head of the MAAG's [Military Assistance Advisory Group]. Could you clarify the situation?"
22. "Let's take Brazil. What proportion of the land is owned by people with small incomes? Can you give me any assurance that it is more than 5 or 10 percent?"
23. "That is what I have said so many times until I even remember saying it in my prayers.

"Under the proposed legislation--if it passes--supporting assistance will be removed from under AID--that is further fragmentation which also reduces the amount that you have direct supervision over."
24. "If a country has to abandon its efforts at creating a democracy--we hope temporarily--and, yet, is still independent of foreign domination, we still are justified in trying to assist that country to maintain its independence, are we not?"
25. "Once again I think we can make a fairly strong argument on the side of the committee taking a position that we should reduce these programs."

26. "Mr. Secretary, I want to congratulate you for the policy that you have established in cooling the trouble spots of the world. You have taken care of the Berlin crisis, and in the Middle East, the shooting has stopped. Vietnam seems to be the only hot spot now. There has been a lot of criticism about Vietnamization: "Vietnamization has not worked in the present onslaught by the North Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese, and some stories come up about the soldiers refusing to fight and they have been driven back, and from this critics draw the conclusion that Vietnamization has not worked. Now, could you speak to that?"
27. "I think it is a topic of great interest to the American people to find out if this type of program could indeed possibly lead us into fifty-eight Vietnam-type conflicts. If it could not, I think it is really your responsibility to tell us why this is not the case or why this could not develop."
28. "I don't want program emphasis to go too far on food, as I am from Pittsburgh and geranium pot farmers in Pittsburgh don't believe that Illinois should over-emphasize the U.S. corn exports too much in the U.S. foreign aid programs."
29. "The longer I serve in the Senate, the more I am convinced among our [the Senate's] chief purposes should be to bring matters such as this before the public."
30. "I have supported this program for twenty-three years with the exception of once, back in the Johnson administration, but I not only do not intend to support it, I intend to do everything in my power, . . . to defeat this bill if there is one nickel in it for Greece. . . ."
31. "Mr. Gaud, in the past members of this committee have found that there were cases where assistance was applied to agriculture under the foreign aid program, but the operation was frustrated because the farmers in that particular country were discouraged by price structure, or by a system of collecting the rents. These farmers really had no inducement to adopt

improved methods, because they derived very little from their increased production. Now we are financing this year the construction of fertilizer plants, and we plan to finance the shipment of millions of dollars worth of fertilizer. What measures do we take to determine in particular countries, including in some of the Latin American countries, whether these farmers will be ready to increase production?

"Can you cite any cases where reforms in price structure or tax structure have actually occurred in any particular country where we have financed major programs?"

32. "Just briefly along that line. Is the family planning program working out to your expectation?"
33. "Well, aren't we being perhaps too skimpy, either in the amount that those countries are given, or the number of countries to which we are giving aid?"
34. "Population control is another matter that is very much related to this question of getting these countries to be self-sustaining, which is the only goal that we have."
35. "It is quite true that the House may have adopted this without serious discussion, probably with the idea that any damage would be repaired over here [in the Senate]."
36. "Where do you keep them? Do you mean you approve a \$4.3 million loan or gift, or whatever you want to call it, and you do not know where the contract is?"

Witness: "It is one of several contracts financed by this development credit, sir."

37. "You do not have a copy of it?"
38. "Is there any inconsistency in continuing a high-level of military assistance to a country that will not undertake sufficient self-help efforts to qualify for development aid under our economic aid program?"

39. ". . . that we want to create social institutions that will strengthen the social fabric of these areas."
40. "We think that this [credit sales of arms] is a healthy trend and should be encouraged."
41. ". . . do you support the policy of congressional committees that are handling foreign aid going out and checking aid projects in these countries where American money is involved?"
42. ". . . in this day of widespread strife, subversion, and violence, do you think that \$420 million is enough for the military assistance program?"
43. "Out of this figure we have in front of us, \$469 unexpended, how long do you anticipate it will take to spend that amount of money?"
44. "You have been on the Alliance for Progress not quite a year now, and there is very little evidence that it is getting off the ground."
45. "Mr. Secretary, if the Vietnamization program has worked--and I hope and pray you are right, and I certainly agree with you the most recent information we have is encouraging and heartening--but if it has worked, why is it necessary for the President to take this extraordinary action which would--we hope it won't, and maybe it won't--result in a confrontation with the Soviet Union, and action which could result in the destruction of ships and citizens of other countries, an action which was recognized by the previous administration and which has been categorized as being quite extreme--mining a harbor--and which has been supplemented, of course, with the most vigorous bombing attacks in a long, long time, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of people.
- "If the Vietnamization is working and the South Vietnamese are able to take over more of this, why is this extraordinary kind of lethal and dangerous confrontation necessary?"

46. "I have been of the opinion that one of the best stimulants to American enterprise that we have had, outside of the defense industries, has been the foreign aid program."
47. "Dividing an organization up, and then naming various czars to coordinate the divisions is not necessarily improving what is already a complicated situation."
48. "Would you furnish for the record information showing the use of fiscal 1968 funds for this purpose, showing the name of the institution, the purpose of the grant, the amount of the grant, and a brief statement as to what benefits AID will realize, if any, from these grants."
49. ". . . this committee at least would be keeping a reasonable hand in the responsibility of oversight of these programs, . . ."
50. "You and I know this is not a military program. This is a bureaucratic, civilian State Department program. . . . If you would make it a military program, I would salute you and keep my mouth shut. But this is a civilian, State Department Ambassador program. A military man may work out something and they can say, 'Well, we have to discuss that with the Secretary of State.' The political advisers actually may not want us to do that."
51. "If you could help them understand or promote that kind of activity [democratic processes], it seems to me that could possibly be the most important thing you could do."
52. "We are wasting our funds if we are thinking of defending our own vital interest against the Soviet Union in the Mideast by pouring funds into Turkey."
53. "Is this acquisition of arms contrary to the conditions that were imposed on the extension of economic assistance to India?"
54. "We do use aid in concert with our security interests."

55. ". . . the committee has been very concerned with limiting the number of countries receiving aid under our bilateral aid program."
56. "We are going to help this country because this government has voted with us in the United Nations. . . . Kind of payment which I think is least justified."
57. [Through the U.S. aid program] "My impression is that the United States has subordinated the interest of the Greek people to what we consider our strategic interest, our interest in the NATO alliance, and our general good relationship with the military in Greece."
58. "And do England and France have the investment guaranty programs with their private sector?"
59. "But now, with the extension of this 10-20 year period for repayment [for arms sales], does that not sort of obliterate the differences and distinctions between sales and loans?"
60. "The chairman is always pressing us very heavily, and we are always saying we don't get into enough depth, so there are several battles going on all the time."

APPENDIX B

RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Economic Assistance

	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>
Objectives	5%(23)	3.5%(14)	3%(9)	5%(6)
Means	19%(83)	31%(132)	15%(43)	29%(37)
Administration	12%(51)	6%(26)	32%(95)	42%(53)
Administration of program	9%(40)	10%(42)	11%(43)	less 1%(2)
Scope	4%(17)	11%(49)	3%(9)	8%(10)
U.S. Economy	2%(10)	4%(18)	3%(12)	0%(0)
Effect of Aid	3%(11)	3.5%(15)	2%(6)	3%(4)
Foreign Policy	0%(0)	5%(21)	5.5%(16)	0%(0)
International Policy	15%(64)	12%(50)	8%(18)	0%(0)
Technical	22%(96)	7.5%(32)	10%(31)	less 1%(1)
Congressional Role	8%(36)	5%(20)	9%(28)	8%(10)
Total	99% (431)	98.5% (426)	101.5% (296)	97% (126)

Military Assistance

Objectives	10%(14)	5%(8)	2%(2)	4%(4)
Means	12%(16)	6%(10)	0%(0)	14%(15)
Administration	11%(14)	19%(33)	2%(2)	11%(11)
Administration of program	17%(22)	9%(16)	9%(8)	0%(0)
Scope	7%(9)	5%(8)	14%(12)	11%(12)
U.S. Economy	1%(1)	0%(0)	0%(0)	1%(0)
Effect of Aid	5%(7)	2%(4)	4.5%(4)	1%(1)
Foreign Policy	11%(15)	29%(49)	45%(40)	29%(30)
International Policy	9%(12)	6%(11)	4%(3)	0%(0)
Technical	10%(13)	3.5%(6)	15%(13)	0%(0)
Congressional Roles	6%(8)	15%(25)	5%(4)	30%(31)
Total	99% (131)	99.5% (170)	100.5% (88)	101% (105)

Senate Appropriations Committee
Economic Assistance

	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>
Objectives	2%(8)	4%(7)	2%(5)	6%(45)
Means	33%(125)	8%(17)	9%(19)	31%(233)
Administration	10%(39)	3%(5)	2%(5)	8%(58)
Administration of program	5%(20)	6%(11)	5%(11)	1%(8)
Scope	5%(20)	4%(8)	3%(6)	10%(78)
U.S. Economy	less than 1%(3)	4%(8)	less than 1%(1)	7%(56)
Effect of Aid	4%(14)	3%(5)	2%(4)	5%(41)
Foreign Policy	.5%(2)	25%(44)	2%(5)	5%(35)
International Policy	15%(57)	4%(7)	4%(8)	5%(38)
Technical	20%(78)	37%(72)	54%(111)	14%(109)
Congressional Role	4%(17)	5%(9)	15%(31)	7%(53)
Total	99% (383)	103% (193)	99% (206)	99% (755)

Military Assistance

Objectives	2.5%(5)	7%(4)	3%(1)	7%(41)
Means	9%(16)	0%(0)	48%(14)	18%(104)
Administration	1%(2)	2%(1)	0%(0)	5%(27)
Administration of program	0%(0)	20%(12)	0%(0)	11%(64)
Scope	5%(10)	16%(10)	3%(1)	13%(76)
U.S. Economy	4%(8)	0%(0)	0%(0)	2%(12)
Effect of Aid	5%(10)	2%(1)	3%(1)	2%(14)
Foreign Policy	14.5%(29)	2%(1)	0%(0)	14%(83)
International Policy	3.5%(7)	2%(1)	0%(0)	1%(8)
Technical	51%(101)	38%(22)	10%(3)	10%(56)
Congressional Role	5.5%(11)	10%(6)	31%(9)	16%(95)
Total	101% (199)	99% (58)	98% (29)	99% (577)

House International Relations Committee

Economic Assistance

	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>
Objectives	5%(15)	3%(30)	12%(57)	7%(18)
Means	4%(12)	14%(126)	9%(42)	14%(39)
Administration	36%(119)	18%(169)	9%(44)	30%(82)
Administration of program	13%(42)	4%(40)	18%(83)	7%(19)
Scope	3%(10)	5%(42)	4%(19)	5%(14)
U.S. Economy	1%(1)	5%(40)	4%(17)	3%(9)
Effect of Aid	2%(7)	1.5%(14)	3%(12)	2.5%(7)
Foreign Policy	13%(44)	5.5%(46)	4%(19)	2.5%(7)
International Policy	7%(24)	5.5%(47)	3%(16)	13%(36)
Technical	10%(33)	35%(328)	24%(112)	7%(19)
Congressional Role	5.5%(18)	5%(47)	10%(49)	8%(23)
Total	99.5%	101.5%	100%	98%
	(327)	(929)	(470)	(273)

Military Assistance

Objectives	8%(9)	5%(18)	13%(43)	3%(10)
Means	3.5%(8)	4%(15)	6%(20)	8%(29)
Administration	7%(16)	2%(7)	2%(7)	20%(76)
Administration of program	10%(22)	7%(25)	11%(36)	9%(33)
Scope	4%(10)	4%(16)	10%(32)	7%(26)
U.S. Economy	1%(3)	1%(3)	1%(1)	1%(1)
Effect of Aid	3%(6)	1%(5)	7%(23)	3%(10)
Foreign Policy	29%(65)	0%(0)	8%(26)	2%(7)
International Policy	12%(28)	33%(125)	18%(60)	16%(62)
Technical	21%(48)	39%(146)	21%(68)	29%(110)
Congressional Role	less 1%(2)	3%(11)	2%(6)	5%(19)
Total	99.5%	99%	99%	103%
	(227)	(377)	(322)	(383)

House Appropriations Committee

Economic Assistance

	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>
Objectives	2%(17)	1%(7)	2%(24)	1.5%(9)
Means	17%(173)	8%(52)	16%(150)	15%(95)
Administration	5%(54)	10%(59)	7%(66)	7%(45)
Administration of program	5%(49)	14%(85)	8%(79)	11%(66)
Scope	4%(38)	9%(57)	6%(58)	12%(76)
U.S. Economy	12%(126)	13%(80)	14%(134)	6%(37)
Effect of Aid	1%(8)	2%(13)	2%(17)	2%(14)
Foreign Policy	3%(31)	less than 1%(1)	4%(5)	13%(82)
International Policy	4%(39)	8%(50)	5%(46)	9%(53)
Technical	35%(531)	29%(180)	30%(292)	18%(115)
Congressional Role	12%(117)	5%(33)	5%(49)	5%(30)
Total	100% (1013)	100% (617)	99% (966)	99.5% (622)

Military Assistance

Objectives	2%(5)	2%(21)	2%(3)	2%(11)
Means	.67%(2)	4%(38)	5%(8)	4%(33)
Administration	2%(5)	6%(67)	1%(2)	3%(19)
Administration of program	1%(3)	4%(37)	2%(3)	9%(53)
Scope	7%(20)	5%(48)	10%(18)	8%(45)
U.S. Economy	5%(16)	2%(16)	2%(3)	1%(4)
Effect of Aid	0%(0)	2%(23)	2%(3)	2.5%(15)
Foreign Policy	0%(0)	4%(38)	9%(16)	15.5%(93)
International Policy	15%(44)	9%(91)	0%(0)	12.5%(75)
Technical	65%(192)	58%(595)	55%(96)	38%(227)
Congressional Role	2%(7)	6%(60)	12%(21)	3%(18)
Total	100% (295)	102% (1034)	100% (173)	98.5% (597)

APPENDIX C

COMPARISON OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE PERCEPTIONS
OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES
1962, 1965, 1968 AND 1971*

Comparison of Committee Perceptions of Military
Assistance Objectives
1962

<u>Objective</u>	<u>Committee</u>			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
U.S. Interest/Security	8% (1)	21% (4)		
Fight Communism	43% (6)	53% (10)	100% (5)	
Political Development	21% (3)			
Foreign Policy Political	15% (2)	21% (4)		80% (4)
U.S. Economic Benefit				
Strengthen Recipient's Economy	8% (1)			
Internal Security	8% (1)			20% (1)
Economic Development		5% (1)		
Total	103% (14)	100% (19)	100% (5)	100% (5)

* Source: Results of content analysis.

Comparisons of Committee Perceptions of
Military Assistance Objectives
1965

<u>Objective</u>	<u>Committee</u>			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
U.S. Interest/Security		22% (4)	25% (5)	25% (1)
Fight Communism	12.5% (1)	17% (3)	25% (5)	25% (1)
Political Development				25% (1)
Foreign Policy Political	12.5% (1)	22% (4)	10% (2)	
U.S. Economic Benefit	12.5% (1)		5% (1)	
Recipient's Military Security	12.5% (1)		10% (2)	
Strengthen Recipient's Economy				
Internal Security		28% (5)	5% (1)	25% (1)
Stability	50% (4)	11% (2)	5% (1)	
Peace			10% (2)	
Economic Development			5% (1)	
Total	100% (8)	100% (18)	100% (20)	100% (4)

Comparison of Committee Perceptions of
Military Assistance Objectives

1968

Objective	Committee			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
U.S. Interest/Security		21% (9)	33% (1)	
Fight Communism	50% (1)	51% (22)		
Political Development	50% (1)	21% (9)		
Foreign Policy Political		2% (1)	67% (2)	100% (1)
U.S. Economic Benefit				
Recipient's Military Security				
Strengthen Recipient's Economy				
Internal Security				
Stability		2% (1)		
Peace		2% (1)		
Total	100% (2)	99% (43)	100% (3)	100% (1)

Comparison of Committee Perceptions of
Military Assistance Objectives

1971

Objective	Committee			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
U.S. Interest/Security	50% (2)	40% (4)	45% (5)	41% (17)
Fight Communism	25% (1)		18% (2)	19% (8)
Political Development		10% (1)		9% (4)
Foreign Policy Political		10% (1)	27% (3)	12% (5)
U.S. Economic Benefit	25% (1)		9% (1)	2% (1)
Recipient's Military Security		40% (4)		
Strengthen Recipient's Economy				
Internal Security				4% (2)
Stability				
Peace				7% (3)
Total	100% (4)	100% (10)	99% (11)	(94% (40))

APPENDIX D

THE MEANS OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Appendix D-1

Economic/Military Assistance

COMPARISON OF FUNDING LEVELS FOR VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN AID
(In billions)
FY 1963

Aid Category	Request	Authorization			Appropriation			Percent Cut
		House	Senate	Final	House	Senate	Final	
Development Loans ^a	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	.78	1.25	.98	22%
Supporting Assistance	.48	.44	.40	.42	.35	.40	.40	14%
International Organization ^b	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	0%
Economic Assistance	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.1	2.3	3.0	2.6	26%
Military Assistance	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.3	13%
Title I	4.9	4.6	4.7	4.6	3.6	4.4	3.9	20%
Other					2.3	2.4	2.4	

^aIncludes Alliance for Progress loans. Technical Assistance category includes grants for Alliance for Progress.

^bThis does not include all funding through multilateral channels, some of which is funded through the "Other" category.

COMPARISON OF FUNDING LEVELS FOR VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN AID
(In billions)
FY 1966

Aid Category	Request	Authorization			Appropriation			Percent Cut
		House	Senate	Final	House	Senate	Final	
Development								
Loans		1.13	1.03	1.28	1.12	1.03	1.06	
Supporting								
Assistance		.37	.35	.37	.37	.35	.37	
Technical								
Assistance		.28	.16	.29	.28	.26	.28	
International								
Organizations		.14	.13		.14	.13		
Economic								
Assistance	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	9%
Military								
Assistance	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	0%
Title I	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.2	7%
Other		.72	.71		.72	.71	.71	

COMPARISON OF FUNDING LEVELS FOR VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN AID
(In billions)
FY 1969

Aid Category	Request	<u>Authorization</u>			<u>Appropriation</u>			Percent Cut
		House	Senate	Final	House	Senate	Final	
Development								
Loans	1.29	.68	.68	.68	.47	.68	.56	57%
Supporting								
Assistance	.60	.42	.40	.41	.37	.37	.37	39%
Technical								
Assistance	.35	.29	.29	.29	.22	.29	.17	29%
International								
Organization	.14	.13	.135	.135	.12	.15	.14	0%
Economic								
Assistance	2.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.2	1.6	1.4	44%
Military								
Assistance	.42	.39	.36	.38	.38	.38	.38	10%
Title I	2.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.9	1.8	40%
Other	.7				.7	.7	.7	0%

COMPARISON OF FUNDING LEVELS FOR VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN AID
(In billions)
FY 1972

Aid Category	Request	Authorization			Appropriation			Percent Cut
		House	Senate	Final	House	Senate ^a	Final	
Development								
Loans	.71	.69			.4		.76	
Technical								
Assistance	.25	.27	.20 ^b		.23		.25	0%
International								
Organizations	.10	.14	.14		.04			
Economic								
Assistance	1.3	1.4	1.4		1.0		1.3	2%
Supporting								
Assistance	.57	.80	.70		.58		.65	
Foreign Military								
Credit Sales	.20 ^c	.51	.46		.51		.40 ^d	
Military								
Assistance	2.0	2.0	1.5		1.6		1.6	20%
Other	.77				.36		.39	

^aSince Congress approved only a continuing resolution, the Senate stated that appropriations be set at the lowest of congressionally approved figures in various aid categories.

^bDoes not include grants for Alliance for Progress.

^cDoes not include credits for Israel.

^d.30 earmarked for Israel

COMPARISON OF FUNDING LEVELS FOR VARIOUS
CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN AID
(In billions)
FY 1976

Aid Category	Request	House	Authori- zation	Senate
Food and Nutrition	.6		.6	
Population Planning and Health	.22		.24	
Education	.09		.09	
Technical Assistance	.09		.10	
International Organi- zations	.19		.194	
International Fund for Agricultural Develop- ment	.2		.2	
Disaster Assistance	.45		.6	
Economic Assistance	1.5		1.6	
Military Credit Sales		1.0		1.0
Economic Supporting Assistance		1.8		1.8
Military Assistance	3.4	3.2		3.2

COMPARISON OF FUNDING LEVELS FOR VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN AID
(In billions)
FY 1976

Aid Category	Request	House	Senate	Final	Percent Cut
Title I:					
Economic and Military Assistance	3.7	3.1	3.5	3.2	14%
Title II:					
Foreign Military Credit Sales	1.1			1.1	0%
Title III:					
Related Foreign Assistance	1.0			.9	10%
Total	5.8	5.0	5.5	5.2	10%

SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly, Vols. 20, 23, 26, 29, 33, and 34 (1962, 1965, 1968, 1971, 1975, and 1976), passim.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOREIGN AID
(In billions)

Fiscal Year	Foreign Aid ^a	Total Economic Aid	%	Total Military Aid	%
1947-53	34.7	31.2	90%	3.5	10%
1954-62	47.4	24.1	51%	23.4	49%
1963	7.2	4.4	61%	2.9	40%
1966	7.1	4.8	68%	2.3	32%
1969	6.8	3.5	51%	3.2	47%
1972	8.5	3.9	46%	4.6	54%
1973	8.4	4.1	49%	4.2	50%
1947-74	163.7	101.5	62%	62	38%

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, and Assistance from International Organizations, annual; Operations Report, and unpublished data, in Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1974, p. 787.

^aIncludes aid provided through all channels.

**ARMS SALES STATEMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF STATEMENTS CONCERNING
 THE MEANS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY COMMITTEE
 1962-71**

Year	Committee			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
1962	69%(11)	--	--	--
1965	--	13%(2)	32%(2)	-- ^a
1968	-- ^a	5%(1)	25%(2)	93%(13)
1971	87%(13)	79%(23)	92%(24)	47%(49)

SOURCE: Content Analysis.

^aIndicates there was no discussion of the means of military assistance that year.

Appendix D-2

Loans

During the early 1960's one important debate concerning the means through which economic aid would be extended to other nations revolved around the loans versus grants question. At this time the United States was attempting to shift the aid program from a give-away grant approach to a loan and repayment approach where possible. While there was virtually no congressional criticism of the idea of a loan program, the terms of loans were controversial. The table below presents content analysis findings concerning the salience of the loans/grants controversy during congressional debate throughout the Development Decade.

Loans/Grants Statements as a Percentage of Means of Economic Assistance Statements by Committee, 1962-71

Year	Committee			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
1962	10.5%(9)	33%(4)	25%(44)	34%(38)
1965	14%(18)	11%(13)	--	65%(11)
1968	--	14%(6)	6%(9)	21%(4)
1971	14%(5)	12.5%(4)	22%(21)	4%(12)

The House Appropriations Committee's Otto Passman led the attack claiming that American loans were not business-like, especially in comparison with the loans of other countries such as West Germany. He found little to distinguish U.S. loans from U.S. grants except rhetoric, and the committee's opposition to development loans continued unabated throughout the period under study. For example, in 1970 the committee cut worldwide development loans by over 50% while leaving other types of assistance such as military aid intact. This committee's attempts to ensure that the U.S. benefit financially, or at least break even on the program, has led it to be antagonistic to the soft-term loan approach which requires very little interest over a long period of time and usually provides for a lengthy grace period.

The Senate Appropriations Committee exhibited the same kind of concern in the early 1960's. However, a committee recommendation urged speeding the transition to the development loan approach, and a clear preference was noted for loans over grants, where the recipient country was financially capable of repaying loans. The committee continued its interest and encouragement for loans in later years, in keeping with the generally favorable attitude of the Senate toward economic loans for developmental purposes.

While not exhibiting the same verbal concern with this category of the means of foreign assistance, Senate Foreign Relations Committee members have also attempted to have an impact on the terms of development loans. In 1962 the committee strongly approved the concept of long-term dollar repayable development loans (requiring little or no interest over a fifty year repayment period). The shift from grants to loans is well underway. While over the period FY1946-1968, 69% of U.S. assistance took the form of grants,¹ by FY1967, 69% of AID's expenditures were in the form of loans.²

¹Congressional Quarterly, 27 (October 24, 1969): 2077.

²Agency for International Development, Loan Terms, Debt Burden, and Development, Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, April, 1965), in David Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy, p. 32.

Appendix D-3

Private Investment

One approach to aiding underdeveloped nations which has found a great deal of congressional support is the use of private investment. While not directly concerned with the transfer of public funds, it does deal with the transfer of resources to aid recipients and is undergirded by government action in the form of investment guarantees for American businessmen and legal provisions which attempt to protect such investments in nations which receive U.S. aid. All of the congressional groups studied have encouraged the private investment approach. For example, in 1962 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sponsored the Hickenlooper amendment allowing a cut-off of aid to governments which expropriated American-owned property without reasonable compensation. In 1962, the greatest part of the Senate Appropriations Committee's concern with the means of economic aid centered on the issue of the private investment guarantee. Senator Saltonstall, for example, felt that the Alliance for Progress would fail without a private investment guarantee program, and both he and Senator Ellender, two influential

members of the committee during this time, indicated a preference of private investment over either grants or loans.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee has consistently lent its unqualified support to encouragement of private investment. For example, in 1968, two-thirds of such statements showed support for this approach, and Chairman Morgan stressed the role of the committee in supporting an investment guarantee program. Furthermore, Representative Leonard Farbstein called for a "quasi-governmental corporation" to aid private investment in developing areas.

The most critical remarks have emanated from the House Appropriations Committee. While Passman has maintained that he is favorable to the concept of private investment as a method of assisting, he has not been favorable to AID's method of carrying it out. Passman has said that he does not see any need for the government to educate businessmen on the possibilities for foreign investment; there is simply no need for governmental intervention here.

In 1969 aid legislation contained provision for an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which had long been favored by the Senate and promoted by members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The corporation met

most resistance within the House Appropriations Committee which refused to appropriate any more for what it called "another lending action." Once again this committee felt that aid funds were misused and wasted through such endeavors, and aid legislation nearly met defeat in the House over this issue.

Thus the concept of private investment has been unanimously supported by the Congress. But while the Senate and the House Foreign Affairs Committee have encouraged increased aid spending to further this approach, the House Appropriations Committee has shown more opposition to the method through which such investment has been encouraged.

In 1973 authorization for the corporation was extended, but a request that the scope of its authority be broadened was denied until the matter could be thoroughly studied by subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as by the General Accounting Office, an investigative arm of the Congress. Skepticism over administration had rubbed off on the authorization committees.

Appendix D-4

Multilateralism versus Bilateralism

Another controversial issue within Congress throughout the past fifteen years has been the priority to be placed on a multilateral approach to helping other nations. Since the early 1960's The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has consistently urged increased reliance on international institutions for dispensing aid and has led the congressional fight to reduce bilateral assistance. The Senate Appropriations Committee has become more vocal in its support of a multilateral approach in the 1970's, although its actions have generally promoted a movement in this direction throughout the 1960's.

On the other hand, support for a shift to multilateral aid-giving has not been forthcoming from the House side of the Capitol, and there was no indication in 1971 that views were changing significantly. While the House Foreign Affairs Committee paid more attention to the concept in 1971, one-third of the comments were unfavorable to this method, and the one statement concerning bilateral aid was favorable. The major disadvantage of the multilateral approach, according to the committee, was that United States foreign

policy interests could not be the controlling factor in aid-giving. This injection of United States foreign policy control was exactly what the Senate Foreign Relations Committee deplored.

The House Appropriations Committee also took a firm stand against the multilateral approach, partially due to fear of a loss of committee control over the program and partially due to its view that the aid program should be used to gain and maintain political leverage with other countries. Their stands on this issue indicate that the House groups have been more favorable to the use of aid as a distinctly political mechanism, as well as more concerned than their Senate counterparts with their own institutional position. The following table shows the salience of this issue during congressional debate, 1962-1971.

Multilateralism/Bilateralism Statements as a Percentage of Means of Economic Assistance Statements by Committee, 1962-71

Year	Committee			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
1962	43%(36)	17%(2)	8%(13)	10%(11)
1965	60%(79)	13%(17)	25%(13)	29%(5)
1968	42%(18)	--	13%(20)	42%(8)
1971	38%(14)	31%(10)	46%(44)	16%(38)

SOURCE: Content Analysis.

Appendix D-5

Technical Assistance

One approach which has found favor throughout Congress is the use of technical assistance, which has the philosophical appeal of helping people help themselves. It is assistance which by its nature can be easily and quickly terminated if political conditions dictate and thus is popular with those who view aid as a short-run political weapon. It can be used in the areas of agriculture, health, and education, areas which appeal to those who view aid as useful for long-term economic, social, and political development.

Thus the two authorization committees have been in agreement on the merits of this approach, and their actions have illustrated this. For example, in 1968 while development loans took quite a cut in final authorization, technical assistance received a fairly small funding cut in the conference bill.

Technical assistance has even found favor within the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. By 1968 discussion of technical assistance consumed fifty percent of discussion of the means of economic aid within House Appropriations Committee hearings. More significantly,

only one out of seventy-two statements was critical. In 1970 the full House rejected a suggested reduction in technical aid at a time when all aid funding was in serious trouble.

During the late 1960's and early 1970's the Senate Appropriations Committee also placed increasing emphasis on technical aid. By 1971 the large type of economic development projects such as steel mills and power plants, which had represented the bulk of foreign aid expenditures in the early 1960's, were receiving more and more negative reaction within this committee, while technical assistance continued to find a very favorable audience. On this issue Congress has formed a rare consensus. The following table shows the percentage of economic aid means discussion devoted to this approach.

Technical Assistance Statements as a Percentage of Means of Economic Assistance Statements by Committee, 1962-71

Year	Committee			
	SFRC	HFAC	HAC	SAC
1962	5%(4)	--	2%(3)	--
1965	7%(9)	17%(21)	--	--
1968	--	43%(18)	48%(72)	16%(3)
1971	22%(8)	3%(1)	17%(16)	14%(32)

SOURCE: Content Analysis.

APPENDIX E

RESULTS OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE MAILED TO
AID AND STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL

FOREIGN AND PROGRAM-SUBSTANTIVE
(TOTAL)

Objectives

1. What should be the major purpose of the economic assistance program?
What should be the second most important purpose for which economic assistance is given?
What is the goal actually being served by economic assistance as it is presently administered?

	CHECK ONE		
	1st Most Important <u>Purpose</u>	2nd Most Important <u>Purpose</u>	Goal Actually <u>Served</u>
a. Humanitarian	2	3	3
b. Economic develop- ment of the recipient country	11	5	9
c. Political develop- ment of the recipi- ent country	0	2	1
d. National security of the U.S.	2	1	0
1. contain Commu- nist aggression			2
2. security of U.S. in terms other than threat of Communism	1	2	5
e. Domestic economic well-being of U.S.	0	4	4

- f. Peaceful world 2 2 2
- g. Independent & self-supporting world of nations 3 5 3
- h. Other--please specify!

2. What should be the major purpose of the military assistance program? What should be the 2nd major purpose of the military assistance program? What goal do you see as actually being served by the military assistance program as it is presently administered?

CHECK ONE

	<u>1st Major Purpose</u>	<u>2nd Major Purpose</u>	<u>Goal Actually Served</u>
a. Military security of U.S.	11	4	5
b. Political development of the recipient country	1	1	7
c. Peaceful world	3	3	3
d. Independent and self-supporting world of nations	3	10	5
e. Domestic economic well-being of U.S.	0	1	1
f. Encourage economic development (civic action, eg.)	2	1	1
g. Other--please specify!	1	1	2

3. What should be the major emphasis of the American economic assistance program? What is actually the major emphasis of the American economic assistance program?

CHECK ONE

	<u>Should be</u>	<u>Actually is</u>
a. Short-term political goals (such as winning		

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|
| allies in a UN vote
or averting a political
crisis in the recipient
country) | | 4 |
| b. Long-term political develop-
ment (such as building viable,
independent self-governing
nations) | 8 | 5 |
| c. Long-term economic ends
(building the ability to
produce economically) | 15 | 12 |
4. By which means primarily should the U.S. pursue its
foreign aid program?

CHECK ONE

- | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|----|
| I. a. Through multilateral aid
programs (such as the Inter-
national Development Association | | 14 |
| b. Through bilateral programs directly
with the recipient nation | | 10 |
| Economic Assistance | | |
| II. a. Primarily through loans | | 15 |
| b. Primarily through grants | | 8 |
| Military Assistance | | |
| a. Primarily through loans | | 8 |
| b. Primarily through grants | | 2 |
| c. Primarily through sales | | 9 |
| III. What should be the primary emphasis of the American
foreign assistance program? | | |
| a. economic assistance | | 19 |
| b. military assistance | | 1 |
| c. supporting assistance | | 2 |
| d. technical assistance | | 8 |
| e. emergency relief assistance
(humanitarian) | | 1 |
| f. encouraging private investments | | 1 |
| g. other--please specify! | | 1 |

ADMINISTRATION

5. I. Should there be a separation of the economic and
military assistance programs?

- | | |
|--------|----|
| a. Yes | 21 |
| b. No | 2 |

II. What is your reaction to the administration of the U.S. foreign aid program?

	CHECK ONE	
	<u>Economic Aid</u>	<u>Military Aid</u>
a. Very wasteful and inefficient		2
b. Some waste and inefficiency but not enough to condemn program	10	6
c. Adequate administration	10	7
d. Very little waste or inefficiency	3	3
e. Excellent administration	1	0

Please specify if one part of the program has been handled especially well or particularly poorly.

	CHECK ONE	
III. a. Administration of <u>economic</u> aid should be handled independently of the State Department		4
b. Administration of economic aid should be overseen by the State Department and subordinated to the foreign policy goals of the U.S.		16
IV. a. Administration of <u>military</u> aid should be handled primarily by the Pentagon		1
b. Administration of military aid should be overseen by the State Department and subordinated to the foreign policy goals of the U.S.		21

ROLE OF CONGRESS IN POLICY FORMATION

1. What should the basic (overall) role of Congress be in the formation of the foreign aid program?
What do you perceive as actually being the basic role

of Congress in the formation of this program?

	CHECK ONE	
	<u>Should Be</u>	<u>Actually Is</u>
a. Initiation of policy stands and alternatives	7	3
b. Modification of policy initiated by the executive branch	9	16
c. Legitimation of policy initiated by executive branch	4	8
d. Catalyst to spur the Executive branch to take action whose initiative could have come from a variety of sources--administrative agencies, interest groups, for example	8	3

The following code will be used to identify these committees:

House Foreign Affairs Committee - HFAC
 Senate Foreign Relations Committee - SFRC
 House Appropriations Committee - HAC
 Senate Appropriations Committee - SAC

2. What should be the basic role of each of the four major committees concerned with the foreign aid program?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Detailed oversight of administration action--e.g. funding for specific projects	0	11	0	6
b. Oversight of administrative action in terms of broad guidelines--e.g. cuts in funding for major parts of the program, like technical assistance	13	12	10	13
c. Initiation of policy change --e.g. move to handling aid through multilateral agencies rather than through bilateral programs	13	1	10	1
d. Modification of policy--e.g. encourage private investment				

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
guarantees even through major policy initiated by administration	10	3	12	3

3. What do you perceive as being the actual role of each of these committees in the formation of the foreign aid program?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Detailed oversight of administration action	2	15	2	7
b. Oversight of administrative action in terms of broad guidelines	12	10	11	17
c. Initiation of policy change	7	3	8	3
d. Modification of policy	13	7	17	6
e. Other--please specify	2	1	2	0

4. Is there a certain method of operation or standard within each of the four committees which might affect its concept of the foreign aid program and its administration?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Concern with economy of the taxpayer's money	5	19	2	18
b. Concern with impact on overall American foreign policy	12	2	16	3
c. Concern with keeping control over power of executive branch	5	8	16	7
d. Other standard (please specify)	3	2	2	2
e. No particular "norm"	2	0	0	0

5. What is the influence of the Chairman of the Committee on the tone of the Committee's attitudes toward foreign aid?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Very influential--controlling	7	13	2	3
b. Very influential but not controlling	8	3	10	11
c. Influential	7	4	10	7
d. Not very influential	1	0	0	1
e. No real influence	0	0	0	0

IMPACT OF CONGRESS

1. What has been, in your view, the impact Congress has made on the final outcome of the foreign aid bill during the decade 1961-1971?

a. Negligible	0
b. Impact made, but only on less important matters, not in terms of basic issues	11
c. Significant impact on important policy issues	11

2. What has been, in your view, the impact each of the four committees has made on the final outcome of the foreign aid bill during the decade 1961-1971?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Negligible	1	1	3	3
b. Impact made, but only on less important matters, not on basic issues	12	10	6	13
c. Significant impact on important policy issues	8	9	12	4
d. Other	0	1	0	0

3. Which committee, in your view, has had most significant impact on the final bill? Least impact?

	Most Impact	Least Impact
a. HFAC	4	5
b. HAC	16	0
c. SFRC	7	2
d. SAC	1	11

4. Do you think that Congress has had an impact on changing the goals or objectives of the foreign aid program?

	Economic Aid	Military Aid
a. Yes (If so, how?)	14	12
b. No	7	8

5. Do you think that each of the four committees or any of them has had an impact on changing the goals of the foreign aid program?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
I. Economic aid:				
a. Yes (Please specify)	11	9	9	6
b. No	8	9	9	12
II. Military aid:				
a. Yes (If so, please specify)	4	5	8	6
b. No	10	9	7	8

6. I. Do you think that Congress has had an impact on changing the "means" through which foreign aid is operated? In other words, has it had an impact on shifting the priorities given to certain types of programs, for example, technical assistance, multilateral assistance?

	Economic Aid	Military Aid
a. Yes (If so, please specify)	14	9
b. No	6	9

- II. Do you think each of the four committees has had an impact?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Yes (If so, please specify)	10	11	11	9
b. No	8	6	7	8

7. I. Do you think that Congress has had an impact on improving the actual administration of foreign aid? For example, improving the personnel procedures or coordination of functions?

a. Yes (If so, please specify)	10
b. No	8

- II. Do you think that each or any of the four committees has had an impact on improving administration?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Yes (If so, please specify. For example, which committee has had the most significant impact and which the least? Has this applied more to economic aid or to military aid?)	2	8	3	3
b. No	10	10	11	12

CHANGE

If you believe that your views in answering any of these questions have changed significantly during your work in the administration (or since 1961), please specify such changes.

FOREIGN AID PROGRAM-SUBSTANTIVE
(AID)

Objectives

1. What should be the major purpose of the economic assistance program?
 What should be the second most important purpose for which economic assistance is given?
 What is the goal actually being served by economic assistance as it is presently administered?

	CHECK ONE		
	1st Most Important <u>purpose</u>	2nd Most Important <u>purpose</u>	Goal Actually <u>Served</u>
a. Humanitarian	1 (0,1)	3 (2,1)	3 (0,3)
b. Economic development of the recipient country	9*(5,4)	2 (0,2)	6 (3,3)
c. Political develop- ment of the recipi- ent country		1 (1,0)	1 (0,1)
d. National security of the U.S.	1 (1,0)	1*(1,0)	
1. contain Commu- nist aggression			2 (0,2)
2. security of U.S. in terms other than threat of Communism		2 (0,2)	3 (0,3)
e. Domestic economic well-being of U.S.		3*(3,0)	3 (0,3)
f. Peaceful world	1 (0,1)	2 (0,2)	2*(1,1)
g. Independent & self- supporting world of nations	3 (1,2)	4 (1,3)	2*(1,1)
h. Other--please specify!			

2. What should be the major purpose of the military assistance program? What should be the 2nd major

purpose of the military assistance program? What goal do you see as actually being served by the military assistance program as it is presently administered?

	CHECK ONE		
	1st Major Purpose	2nd Major Purpose	Goal Actually Served
a. Military security of U.S.	6* (3,3)	3 (1,2)	3 (1,2)
b. Political development of the recipient country	1 (1,0)		5 (4,1)
c. Peaceful world	3 (0,3)	2 (2,0)	2*(1,1)
d. Independent and self-supporting world of nations	2 (2,0)	7*(3,4)	2 (0,2)
e. Domestic economic well-being of U.S.		1 (1,0)	1 (0,1)
f. Encourage economic development (civic action, eg.)	2 (1,1)	1 (0,1)	1 (0,1)

* indicates inclusion of official AID response in total.
(-, -) - (1972 officials, former officials)

3. What should be the major emphasis of the American economic assistance program?
What is actually the major emphasis of the American economic assistance program?

	CHECK ONE	
	<u>Should be</u>	<u>Actually is</u>
a. Short-term political goals (such as winning allies in a UN vote or averting a political crisis in the recipient country)		2 (1,1)
b. Long-term political development (such as building viable, independent self-governing nations)	4*(3,1)	2 (1,1)
c. Long-term economic ends (building the ability to produce economically.	12 (5,7)	9*(3,6)

4. By which means primarily should the U.S. pursue its foreign aid program?

CHECK ONE

- I. a. Through multilateral aid programs
(such as the International
Development Association 10*(5,5)
- b. Through bilateral programs
directly with the recipient
nation 7*(4,3)

Economic Assistance

- II. a. Primarily through loans 10*(5,5)
- b. Primarily through grants 6*(4,2)

Military Assistance

- a. Primarily through loans 3*(2,1)
- b. Primarily through grants 0
- c. Primarily through sales 8 (4,4)

- III. What should be the primary emphasis of the American foreign assistance program?

- a. economic assistance 15*(7,8)
- b. military assistance 1 (0,1)
- c. supporting assistance 2*(1,1)
- d. technical assistance 6*(2,4)
- e. emergency relief assistance 1*(1,0)
- (humanitarian) 1*(1,0)
- f. encouraging private investments 1*(1,0)
- g. other--please specify! 1*(1,0)

ADMINISTRATION

5. I. Should there be a separation of the economic and military assistance programs?

- a. Yes 14*(6,8)
- b. No 2 (2,0)

- II. What is your reaction to the administration of the U.S. foreign aid program?

CHECK ONE
Economic Aid Military Aid

- | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|
| a. Very wasteful and inefficient | | 2 (0,2) |
| b. Some waste and inefficiency but not enough to condemn program | 6 (1,5) | |
| c. Adequate administration | 7 (5,2) | 6 (5,1) |
| d. Very little waste or inefficiency | 3*(1,2) | 3*(1,2) |
| e. Excellent administration | 1 (1,0) | |

Please specify if one part of the program has been handled especially well or particularly poorly.

CHECK ONE

- | | | | |
|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|----------|
| III. | a. Administration of <u>economic</u> aid should be handled independently of the State Department | | 4 (1,3) |
| | b. Administration of economic aid should be overseen by the State Department and subordinated to the foreign policy goals of the U.S. | | 9*(6,3) |
| IV. | a. Administration of <u>military</u> aid should be handled primarily by the Pentagon | | 1 (0,1) |
| | b. Administration of military aid should be overseen by the State Department and subordinated to the foreign policy goals of the U.S. | | 14*(7,7) |

ROLE OF CONGRESS IN POLICY FORMATION

1. What should the basic (overall) role of Congress be in the formation of the foreign aid program?
 What do you perceive as actually being the basic role of Congress in the formation of this program?

	CHECK ONE	
	<u>Should Be</u>	<u>Actually Is</u>
a. Initiation of policy stands and alternatives	7 (2,5)	3 (1,2)
b. Modification of policy initiated by the executive branch	8 (3,5)	12 (6,6)
c. Legitimation of policy initiated by executive branch	3 (2,1)	6 (2,4)
d. Catalyst to spur the Executive branch to take action whose initiative could have come from a variety of sources--administrative agencies, interest groups, for example	4 (3,1)	2 (1,1)

The following code will be used to identify these committees:

House Foreign Affairs Committee - HFAC
 Senate Foreign Relations Committee - SFRC
 House Appropriations Committee - HAC
 Senate Appropriations Committee - SAC

2. What should be the basic role of each of the four major committees concerned with the foreign aid program?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Detailed oversight of administrative action--e.g. funding for specific projects		8 (6,2)		5 (4,1)
b. Oversight of administrative action in terms of broad guidelines--e.g. cuts in funding for major parts of the program, like technical assistance	8 (4,4)	10 (4,6)	6 (3,3)	10 (5,5)
c. Initiation of policy change --e.g. move to handling aid through multilateral agencies rather than through bilateral programs	12 (6,6)	1 (0,1)	9 (5,4)	1 (0,1)

- d. Modification of policy--
e.g. encourage private
investment guarantees even
through major policy 9 3 10 2
initiated by administration (2,7) (2,1) (5,5) (1,1)

3. What do you perceive as being the actual role of each of these committees in the formation of the foreign aid program?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Detailed oversight of administrative action	2 (0,2)	12 (6,6)	2 (0,2)	6 (4,2)
b. Oversight of administration action in terms of broad guidelines	9 (6,3)	9 (6,3)	9 (5,4)	14 (7,7)
c. Initiation of policy change	7 (3,4)	3 (0,3)	8 (3,5)	3 (0,3)
d. Modification of policy	11 (4,7)	5 (2,3)	13 (7,6)	4 (1,3)
e. Other--please specify	1 (0,1)	1 (0,1)	2 (0,2)	0

4. Is there a certain method of operation or standard within each of the four committees which might affect its concept of the foreign aid program and its administration?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Concern with economy of the taxpayer's money	3(2,1)	13(8,5)	2(1,1)	12(8,4)
b. Concern with impact on overall American foreign policy	9(5,4)	2(1,1)	10(7,3)	3(1,2)
c. Concern with keeping control over power of executive branch	5(3,2)	6(3,3)	12(7,5)	6(3,3)
d. Other standard (please specify)	3(1,2)	2(0,2)	2(0,2)	2(0,2)
e. No particular "norm"	1(0,1)	0	0	0

5. What is the influence of the Chairman of the Committee on the tone of the Committee's attitudes toward foreign aid?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Very influential-- controlling	4(1,3)	9(5,4)	2(02)	3(1,2)
b. Very influential but not controlling	7(3,4)	3(0,3)	8(4,4)	8(4,4)
c. Influential	5(4,1)	2(2,0)	5(4,1)	5(3,2)
d. Not very influential	0	0	0	0
e. No real influence	0	0	0	0

IMPACT OF CONGRESS

1. What has been, in your view, the impact Congress has made on the final outcome of the foreign aid bill during the decade 1961-1971?

a. Negligible	0
b. Impact made, but only on less important matters, not in terms of basic issues	8(5,3)
c. Significant impact on important policy issues	7(3,4)

2. What has been, in your view, the impact each of the four committees has made on the final outcome of the foreign aid bill during the decade 1961-1971?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Negligible	1(0,1)	1(1,0)	2(0,2)	3(1,2)
b. Impact made, but only on less important matters, not on basic issues	6(3,3)	6(3,3)	5(4,1)	10(4,6)
c. Significant impact on important policy issues	7(4,3)	7(3,4)	7(3,4)	4(2,2)
d. Other		1(1,0)		

3. Which committee, in your view, has had most significant impact on the final bill? Least impact?

	Most Impact	Least Impact
a. HFAC	4(2,2)	4(3,1)
b. HAC	12(7,5)	0
c. SFRC	4(2,2)	1(0,1)
d. SAC	1(0,1)	7(4,3)

4. Do you think that Congress has had an impact on changing the goals or objectives of the foreign aid program?

	Economic Aid	Military Aid
a. Yes (If so, how?)	11(5,6)	7(2,5)
b. No	5(3,2)	7(5,2)

5. Do you think that each of the four committees or any of them has had an impact on changing the goals of the foreign aid program?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
I. Economic aid				
a. Yes (please specify)	11(4,7)	7(3,4)	9(4,5)	6(3,3)
b. No	5(4,1)	8(5,3)	6(4,2)	9(5,4)
II. Military aid:				
a. Yes (If so, please specify)	3(1,2)	3(1,2)	5(2,3)	4(1,3)
b. No	7(5,2)	7(5,2)	6(5,1)	6(5,1)

6. I. Do you think that Congress has had an impact on changing the "means" through which foreign aid is operated? In other words, has it had an impact on shifting the priorities given to certain types of programs, for example, technical assistance, multilateral assistance?

	Economic Aid	Military Aid
a. Yes (If so, please specify)	10(5,5)	7(4,3)
b. No	5(3,2)	7(4,3)

- II. Do you think each of the four committees has had an impact?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Yes (If so, please specify)	7(3,4)	7(4,3)	7(3,4)	6(4,2)
b. No	6(4,2)	5(3,2)	6(4,2)	6(3,3)

7. I. Do you think that Congress has had an impact on improving the actual administration of foreign aid? For example, improving the personnel procedures or coordination of functions?
- a. Yes (If so, please specify) 6(4,2)
- b. No 5(2,3)
- II. Do you think that each or any of the four committees has had an impact on improving administration?
- | | HFAC | HAC | SFRC | SAC |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| a. Yes (If so, please specify. For example, which committee has had the most significant impact and which the least? Has this applied more to economic aid or to military aid?) | 2(1,1) | 6(3,3) | 2(2,0) | 3(2,1) |
| b. No | 7(4,3) | 7(4,3) | 8(4,4) | 8(4,4) |

CHANGE

If you believe that your views in answering any of these questions have changed significantly during your work in the administration (or since 1961), please specify such changes.

FOREIGN AID PROGRAM-SUBSTANTIVE
(STATE)

Objectives

1. What should be the major purpose of the economic assistance program?
 What should be the second most important purpose for which economic assistance is given?
 What is the goal actually being served by economic assistance as it is presently administered?

CHECK ONE

	<u>1st Most Important purpose</u>	<u>2nd Most Important purpose</u>	<u>Goal Actually Served</u>
a. Humanitarian	1		
b. Economic develop- ment of the recipient country	2	3	3
c. Political develop- ment of the recipient country		1	
d. National security of the U.S.	1		
1. contain Communist aggression			
2. security of U.S. terms other than threat of Communism	1		2
e. Domestic economic well- being of U.S.		1	1
f. Peaceful world	1		
g. Independent & self- supporting world of nations		1	1
h. Other--please specify!			

2. What should be the major purpose of the military assistance program?
 What should be the 2nd major purpose of the military assistance program as it is presently administered?

CHECK ONE

	<u>1st Major Purpose</u>	<u>2nd Major Purpose</u>	<u>Goal Actually Served</u>
a. Military security of U.S.	5	1	2

- | | | | | |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| b. | Political develop-
ment of the
recipient country | | 1 | 2 |
| c. | Peaceful world | | 1 | 1 |
| d. | Independent and self-
supporting world of
nations | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| e. | Domestic economic
well-being of U.S. | | | |
| f. | Encourage economic
development (civic
action, eg.) | | | |
| g. | Other--please specify! | 1 | | 1 |
3. What should be the major emphasis of the American economic program?
What is actually the major emphasis of the American economic assistance program?

CHECK ONE
Should Be Actually Is

- | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|---|---|
| a. | Short-term political
goals (such as winning
allies in a UN vote or
averting a political
crisis in the recipient
country) | | | 2 |
| b. | Long-term political develop-
ment (such as building
viable, independent self-
governing nations) | | 4 | 3 |
| c. | Long-term economic ends
(building the ability to
produce economically) | | 3 | 3 |
4. By which means primarily should the U.S. pursue its foreign aid program?

CHECK ONE

- | | | | | |
|---------------------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|---|
| I. | a. | Through multilateral aid
programs (such as the
International Development
Association) | | 4 |
| | b. | Through bilateral programs
directly with the recipient
nation | | 3 |
| Economic Assistance | | | | |
| II. | a. | Primarily through loans | | 5 |
| | b. | Primarily through grants | | 2 |
| Military Assistance | | | | |
| | a. | Primarily through loans | | 5 |
| | b. | Primarily through grants | | 2 |
| | c. | Primarily through sales | | 1 |

III. What should be the primary emphasis of the American foreign assistance program?

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------|---|
| a. economic assistance | 4 |
| b. military assistance | |
| c. supporting assistance | |
| d. technical assistance | 2 |
| e. emergency relief assistance
(humanitarian) | |
| f. encouraging private investments | |
| g. other--please specify! | |

ADMINISTRATION

5. I. Should there be a separation of the economic and military assistance programs?

- | | |
|--------|---|
| a. Yes | |
| b. No | 7 |
| | 0 |

XI. What is your reaction to the administration of the U.S. foreign aid program?

CHECK ONE
Economic Aid Military Aid

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|
| a. Very wasteful and inefficient but not enough to condemn program | 4 | 6 |
| b. Some waste and inefficiency but not enough to condemn program | 3 | 1 |
| c. Adequate administration | | |
| d. Very little waste or inefficiency | | |
| e. Excellent administration | | |

Please specify if one part of the program has been handled especially well or particularly poorly?

CHECK ONE

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| III. a. Administration of <u>economic aid</u> should be handled independently of the State Department | 0 |
| b. Administration of economic aid should be overseen by the State Department and subordinated to the foreign policy goals of the U.S. | 7 |
| IV. a. Administration of <u>military aid</u> should be handled primarily by the Pentagon | 0 |

- b. Administration of military aid should be overseen by the State Department and subordinated to the foreign policy goals of the U.S.

7

ROLE OF CONGRESS IN POLICY FORMATION

1. What should the basic (overall) role of Congress be in the formation of the foreign aid program?

What do you perceive as actually being the basic role of Congress in the formation of this program?

CHECK ONE
Should Be Actually Is

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| a. Initiation of policy stands and alternatives | | | |
| b. Modification of policy initiated by the executive branch | 1 | | 4 |
| c. Legitimation of policy initiated by executive branch | 1 | | 2 |
| d. Catalyst to spur the Executive to take action whose initiative could have come from a variety of sources--administrative agencies, interest groups, for example | | 4 | 1 |

The following code will be used to identify these committees:

House Foreign Affairs Committee - HFAC
Senate Foreign Relations Committee - SFRC
House Appropriations Committee - HAC
Senate Appropriations Committee - SAC

2. What should be the basic role of each of the four major committees concerned with the foreign aid program?

- | | HFAC | HAC | SFRC | SAC |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|------|-----|
| a. Detailed oversight of administration action--e.g. funding for specific projects | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| b. Oversight of administration action in terms of broad guidelines--e.g. cuts in funding for major parts of the program, like technical assistance | 5 | 2 | 4 | 3 |

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
c. Initiation of policy change-- e.g. move to handling aid through multilateral agencies rather than through bilateral programs	1	0	1	0
d. Modification of policy--e.g. encourage private investment guarantees even through major policy initiated by adminis- tration	1	0	2	1

3. What do you perceive as being the actual role of each of these committees in the formation of the foreign aid program?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Detailed oversight of administration action	0	3	0	1
b. Oversight of administrative action in terms of broad guidelines	3	1	2	3
c. Initiation of policy change	0	0	0	0
d. Modification of policy	2	2	4	2
e. Other--please specify	1	0	0	0

4. Is there a certain method of operation or standard within each of the four committees which might affect its concept of the foreign aid program and its administration?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Concern with economy of the taxpayer's money	2	6	0	6
b. Concern with impact on overall American foreign policy	3	0	6	0
c. Concern with keeping control over power of executive branch	0	2	4	1
d. Other standard (please specify)	0	0	0	0
e. No particular "norm"	1	0	0	0

5. What is the influence of the Chairman of the Committee on the tone of the Committee's attitudes toward foreign aid?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Very influential--con- trolling	3	4	0	0
b. Very influential but not controlling	1	0	2	3
c. Influential	2	2	5	2
d. Not very influential	1	0	0	1
e. No real influence				

IMPACT OF CONGRESS

1. What has been, in your view, the impact Congress has made on the final outcome of the foreign aid bill during the decade 1961-1971?

a. Negligible	0
b. Impact made, but only on less important matters, not in terms of basic issues	3
c. Significant impact on important issues	4

2. What has been, in your view, the impact each of the four committees has made on the final outcome of the foreign aid bill during the decade 1961-1971?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a. Negligible	0	0	1	0
b. Impact made, but only on less important matters, not on basic issues	6	4	1	3
c. Significant impact on important policy issues	1	2	5	0

3. Which committee, in your view, has had most significant impact on the final bill? Least impact?

	Most Impact	Least Impact
a. HFAC	0	1
b. HAC	4	0
c. SFRC	3	1
d. SAC	0	4

4. Do you think that Congress has had an impact on changing the goals or objectives of the foreign aid program?

	Economic Aid	Military Aid
a. Yes (If so, how?)	3	5
b. No	2	1

5. Do you think that each of the four committees or any of them has had an impact on changing the goals of the foreign aid program?

	HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
I. Economic aid:				
a. Yes (Please specify)	0	2	0	0
b. No	3	1	3	3

		HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
II. Military aid:					
a.	Yes (If so, please specify)	1	2	3	2
b.	No	3	2	1	2
6. I. Do you think that <u>Congress</u> has had an impact on changing the "means" through which foreign aid is operated? In other words, has it had an impact on shifting the priorities given to certain types of programs, for example, technical assistance, multilateral assistance?					
		Economic Aid		Military Aid	
a.	Yes (If so, please specify)	4			2
b.	No	1			2
II. Do you think each of the four committees has had an impact?					
		HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a.	Yes (If so, please specify)	3	4	4	3
b.	No	2	1	1	2
7. I. Do you think that <u>Congress</u> has had an impact on improving the actual administration of foreign aid? For example, improving the personnel procedures or coordination of functions?					
a.	Yes (If so, please specify)	4			
b.	No	3			
II. Do you think that each or any of the four <u>committees</u> has had an impact on improving administration?					
		HFAC	HAC	SFRC	SAC
a.	Yes (If so, please specify. For example, which committee has had the most significant impact and which the least? Has this applied more to economic aid or military aid?)	0	2	1	0
b.	No	3	3	3	4

CHANGE

If you believe that your views in answering any of these questions have changed significantly during your work in the administration (or since 1961), please specify such changes.

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